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ABSTRACT 
Managerial overconfidence, as a particular form of managerial irrationality, 
concerns that some managers are less than completely rational and tend to 
overestimate the outcome of the investment projects under their control. This 
study focuses on the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate policy 
decisions. There are two main objectives. First, it explores the consequences of 
managerial overconfidence for investment decisions and the cash holding policy 
by emphasizing the role of financial constraints. Second, it investigates the 
potential role of managerial overconfidence in determining debt maturity. Using 
an original and very detailed dataset for a large sample of UK listed firms, we 
show that investment by overconfident managers tend to be more sensitive to 
internal funds in financially constrained firms identified by leverage, dividend, 
age and cash. Meanwhile, a cash holding policy can be associated with 
investment decision by overconfident managers. We argue that, though 
investment can increase cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially constrained 
fines identified by leverage and dividend, managerial overconfidence can reduce 
this positive relationship. Moreover, managerial overconfidence can induce a 
biased debt maturity structure. It seems that overconfident managers can take 
advantage of short-term debt to signal their perceived firms' quality to the market. 
Hence, firms with managerial overconfidence tend to increase the negative 
relationship between long-term debt and firms' quality. Finally, we find that the 
impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate decision can also vary with 
different corporate governance mechanisms. We show that the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on corporate policies in firms with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms (i. e. lower ratio of non-executive directors in boards, 
lower blockholders' ownership) is pronounced, whereas, in firms with good 
corporate governance mechanisms, it turns to be insignificant. 
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1.1 Motivation 
Traditional research in corporate finance deals with issues of how the 
effectiveness of corporate financial and investment decisions suffers from 
asymmetric information and agency problems. The underlying assumption is that 
agents/managers in firms act entirely rationally (Barberis and Thaler, 2003; 
Baker et al., 2004). Agents/managers can update their expertise correctly and use 
it to make decisions to maximize their utility. It admits people are probably not 
rational actors, but in a competitive market they would be driven out of the 
market. However, the proponents of behavioural corporate finance provide 
evidence that people's deviations from predicted behaviour are present at the 
market level and argue that capital structure (Heaton, 2002; Helliar et al., 2005; 
Hackbarth, 2008) and capital budget decisions (Statman and Caldwell, 1987; 
Gervais et al., 2006) can be better understood by considering managerial 
irrationalityl' 2. 
In these studies, managerial overconfidence, as a particular form of managerial 
irrationality, has been increasingly emphasized. Overconfidence stems from 
phenomena such as the `better-than-average' effect 3 and `narrow confidence 
intervals'4, which have long been studied in psychology. Though managerial 
overconfidence is a widespread phenomenon, economists start implementing the 
presence of this cognitive bias into economic models since the 1990s. But most 
developed overconfidence research is from the perspectives of financial markets. 
Only recently, it starts to consider managerial overconfidence in the corporate 
context. As far as the empirical literature is concerned, there is even less analysis 
of the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate decisions. The less 
' Managerial irrationality includes, loss-aversion, such as making a heuristic evaluation of a risky 
situation (see K. ahneman and Tversky, 1979), aversion to regret and reluctance to acknowledge 
losses (see Thaler, 1980), procrastination (see Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) and overconfident biases. 2 Another implication of agents' irrationality is investor irrationality, which explains stock price 
bubbles, and market over/under lion (see Blanchard and Watson, 1982; Baiberis ei al., 1998; 
Daniel et al., 1998). 3 Svenson's (1981) study shows that 80% of drivers in Texas believe their driving ability is above 
average. 
4 Larwood and Whittaker (1977) found that people tend to be unrealistic in their predictions of 
. Cooper dal., (1988) found oftepeneurial ovaronfidence. Weinstein (1980) found that 
People are CRNMdIY overconfident about projects to which they are highly committed. 
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explored field is due to the limited scope of available data sets. It is much easier 
to access data sets about stock market forecast and turnover than to access data 
sets related to managerial psychological characteristics. 
Another reason for taking managerial overconfidence seriously is that it is not 
easily affected by standard incentive contracts such as stock-based or option 
based compensation designed to solve agency problems (Barberis and Thaler, 
2003; Stein, 2003). In fact, overconfident managers unintentionally make biased 
decisions while thinking that they are serving the best interests of shareholders, 
even if they are not actually doing so. 
Finally, a study of managerial overconfidence in the corporate context is not to 
isolate overconfidence effects from the conventional explanations. It is an 
integration of many respects which include agency problems, asymmetric 
information and managerial overconfidence. Traditional finance is still the 
centrepiece; however, managerial overconfidence is a catalyst within this field. 
Hence, in the presence of market frictions, managerial overconfidence will have 
unique effects on corporate decisions. To give more new insights on the interplay 
of managerial overconfidence and other corporate characteristics would be of 
considerable instructive. 
1.2 Research Design 
The premise behind managerial overconfidence in our analysis is that 
overconfident managers tend to overestimate the prospects of projects under their 
control. In terms of investment decisions, too, they tend to overestimate the 
outcomes of their investment projects. Recent literature has documented the 
consequences of this irrational behaviour as low-return takeovers (Roll, 1986; 
Doukas and Petmezas, 2007) and overinvestment (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). 
In the same vein, the managerial overestimation of firms' prospects can shed 
light on their financing preferences (Heaton, 2002; Stein, 2003). Overconfident 
managers are reluctant to use external funds unless they have exhausted internal 
finds, since they believe their firms' value in the market is unfairly low. This 
12 
induces an implication that the investment undertaken by overconfident 
managers increases with internal funds when firms are facing costly external 
financing and limited internal funds for investment. 
The foremost response to the investment decisions of overconfident managers is 
their management of cash holdings. The existing literature regards holding cash 
as a buffer against transaction costs (Keynes, 1936) and capital market 
imperfections, such as asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and 
agency costs of debt financing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). 
However, a key drawback of investing in liquid assets is its low rate of return 
(Kim et al., 1998). Thus, there may be another explanation for a cash holding 
structure, in that investment decisions may influence firms' cash holding policies. 
For instance, if firms expect to experience high costs of external financing, 
hoarding cash today means passing up current investment projects. Thus, an 
increase in internal funds can generate an increase in investment and an increase 
in cash holding. Moreover, an increase in internal funds can provide more 
opportunities for overconfident managers to achieve their desired investment 
level. Also, their desired investment level is usually higher than the level desired 
by non-overconfident managers. Therefore, overconfident managers think the 
benefits of their desired investment should be greater than the benefits of 
accumulating cash. And they would rather increase their investment with internal 
funds than increase their cash holdings. 
Another manifestation of the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate 
financial policies concerns debt maturity. The majority of empirical studies on 
debt maturity focus on the influences of asymmetric information and agency 
costs of debt and equity (see Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; 
Datta et al., 2005). However, these studies do not tackle the potential role played 
by managerial overconfidence. To deeply understand this issue, we argue that 
overconfident managers may have biased preference of debt maturity. It builds 
on our initial premise that overconfident managers tend to overestimate the 
prospects of their firms. In their perspective, the debt market undervalues their 
firms. Therefore, firms with overconfident managers tend to issue more short- 
term debt than firms with non-overconfident managers. In other words, 
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overconfident managers can take advantage of short-term debt as a signalling 
role of their firms' quality (Flannery, 1986). 
These arguments lay further grounds for the research that we conduct in our 
thesis. We follow an investigation into whether overconfident managers can 
affect their internal financing policy, which is a choice between cash holding and 
other investment projects. In addition, we test whether managerial 
overconfidence can affect managers' external financing policy such as debt 
maturity, which is a choice between short-term debt and long-term debt. 
1.3 Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which managerial 
overconfidence can affect firms' investment decisions and financial policies. 
Three important aspects of our study, which differentiate it from previous 
research, are as follows: 
First, we attempt to establish a link between managerial overconfidence and the 
internal financing policy. It is presented in two stages. First, we analyze the 
impact of managerial overconfidence on investment decisions. When firms 
expect to face limited internal funds for their investment, an increase in internal 
funds can induce overconfident managers to increase their investment more than 
non-overconfident managers. Second, we examine whether the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on investment can further affect firms' cash holding 
policy. In particular, we focus on the fact that the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on internal financing decisions is not homogeneous but varies 
with financial constraints. To do so, we identify firms as financially constrained 
and unconstrained by using firm-specific characteristics, e. g. size, leverage, 
dividend, age. In order to measure managerial overconfidence, we consider the 
aggregate stock dealings by all executives in the open market during the sample 
year. When the amount of shares purchased by a firm's executive directors 
during one calendar year is greater than the amount of shares sold, this firm is 
classified as a net buyer. Since overconfidence is a persistently psychological 
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factor, we identify those firms which have been habitual net buyers for certain 
durations during our sample period as firms with managerial overconfidence. To 
test the robustness of our results, we also measure managerial confidence using 
outsiders' perception of the executive directors captured by press. During our 
sample period, when the total number of articles describing executive directors as 
the optimistic or confident is higher than the total number of articles describing 
executive directors as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, 
not optimistic, or not confident, this firm will be classified as a firm with 
managerial overconfidence. 
Second, we discuss the linkage between managerial overconfidence and firms' 
external financing policy investigating the empirical deternninants of firms' debt 
maturity. We take into consideration the complicated ways in which managerial 
overconfidence interacts with firm-specific characteristics, e. g. firms' quality. 
The underlying notion is the signalling role of short-term debt on firms' quality 
available to the market. We argue that overconfident managers believe their 
firms are undervalued by the debt market, which then leads their firms to pay a 
higher premium on long-term debt than they expected. In order to avoid this, 
overconfident managers have an incentive to issue short-term debt rather than 
long-term debt. Therefore, firms with overconfident managers are more disposed 
to choose short-term debt to signal their perceived quality than firms with non- 
overconfident managers. 
Third, we attempt to investigate whether the effects of managerial 
overconfidence on corporate decisions vary in different corporate governance 
environments. It has been suggested that the potential prescription for managerial 
overconfidence could be outsider monitoring (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). By that they mean that outsiders are 
capable of drawing managerial attention to information that may indicate that 
their perceptions are wrong. If this is the case, when firms have weak governance 
mechanisms, monitoring by outsiders will not be an effective constraint on 
biased decisions. Hence, we can argue that the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on corporate policies will be consistently significant in those 
firms. When firms have good governance mechanisms, however, monitoring by 
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outsiders will be more effective and can constrain overconfident managers from 
undertaking biased decisions. In such firms, therefore, the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on corporate policies becomes insignificant. To investigate this, 
we divide firms by using a set of corporate governance attributes respectively 
such as board structure and ownership concentration6. 
Our thesis uses a unique dataset that includes detailed information on accounting 
data, ownership structure, board structure, managerial share dealings and outside 
perception of managers of a large sample of UK listed companies. Several 
factors combine to make the UK a particularly interesting environment to study. 
First, the debate about how to interpret the overconfidence hypothesis is much 
less developed in Europe than in the US. Second, in the wake of several 
corporate scandals in the early 1990s, especially in the UK, corporate governance 
issues have become increasingly important (see in Cadbury, 1992; Hampel 
Committee, 1998, Dahya and McConnell, 2005) and the effectiveness of the 
boards of UK firms has been highly recommended. Consequently, an intensive 
investigation of managerial overconfidence issues and the effectiveness of 
various alternative governance mechanisms in the UK maybe important. 
1.4 Main Findings 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a detailed analysis of the 
impact of managerial overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity by 
using a sample of UK listed firms over the period 2002-2006. We take the 
graphical analysis approach used in Hubbard (1998) and apply it to the presence 
of managerial overconfidence. This centres on the view that the slope of demand 
curve for capital is determined by growth opportunity, and the optimal level of 
investment is the interaction point of demand and supply curves. Since 
'We assume that the biased decision is a recurrent problem as in Kahneman and Lovallo (1993). 
In their study, the 'outside' view is the one can assess the present position by comparing to other 
similar cases. However, if it is not, they effective monitoring can not constrain manager's' biased 
decisions. 
We consider the lack of consensus regarding the governance role of these attributes, i. e. board 
size, non-executive ratio, blockholders' ownership and divide firma into subgroups using each of 
them. 
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overconfident managers tend to overestimate their future returns from investment, 
the growth opportunities perceived by firms with overconfident managers are 
greater than those firms without overconfident managers. Hence the slope of 
demand curve for investment in firms with managerial overconfidence is much 
flatter than for firms without managerial overconfidence. With financially 
constrained firms, when internal funds increase, we find that those with 
overconfident managers may increase investment more than firms without 
overconfident managers. This implies that managerial overconfidence can 
significantly increase investment-cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially 
constrained firms. With financially unconstrained firms, the fluctuation of 
internal funds is independent of the level of investment. Finally, we aim to 
provide a detailed investigation of the roles of corporate governance mechanisms 
in influencing corporate investment decisions by overconfident managers. We 
argue that the impact of managerial overconfidence on cash flow sensitivity of 
investment will be significant in financially constrained firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms. To do so, we divide constrained firms into 
two subgroups according to their board size, ratio of non-executive directors and 
blockholders' ownership respectively. Median values of the three attributes are 
the benchmarks in this classification. 
The results presented in Chapter 2 support our view that managerial 
overconfidence can be an important factor in determining firms' investment 
decisions. Our findings indicate that managerial overconfidence can significantly 
increase investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially constrained firms in 
leverage, dividend, cash and age groups. However, the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially 
unconstrained firms is uncertain. Moreover, we observe that the positive 
relationship between managerial confidence and cash flow sensitivity of 
investment remains significantly positive in financially constrained firms with 
weak corporate governance mechanisms (e. g. low ratio of non-executive 
directors or low blockholders' ownership). By contrast, the positive relationship 
between managerial overconfidence and cash flow sensitivity of investment 
becomes insignificant in financially constrained firms with good corporate 
governance mechanisms (e. g. high ratio of non-executive directors or high 
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blockholders' ownership). Our results provide no consistent evidence that the 
positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and cash flow 
sensitivity of investment varies with board size. 
Building on the analysis of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 seeks to establish a relationship 
between investment decisions and cash holding policy using a panel data of UK 
listed firms over the period 1996-2006. While the previous literature has 
discussed the relationship between cash policy and investment choices, most of 
them are concerned with the determinants of cash holding or the impact of cash 
holding on investment, rather than the impact of investment decisions on cash 
holding. We conduct our analysis in two stages. We first evaluate the extent to 
which investment influences cash flow sensitivity of cash by emphasizing the 
importance of financial constraints. For example, financially constrained firms 
choose to increase investment and cash with cash flow in the first stage. Higher 
investment expenditure may limit the available sources for saving cash and 
increase cash flow fluctuations in the future. Consequently, an increase in 
investment expenditure may finally induce financially constrained firms to save 
more cash out of their cash flow. In other words, we can predict that investment 
can increase cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially constrained firms. 
Next, we discuss whether investment decisions by overconfident managers can 
also affect cash flow sensitivity of cash, especially in financially constrained 
firms. This is because overconfident managers believe that the benefits of their 
desired investment should be greater than the benefits of accumulating cash. In 
other words, we may not be able to find a positive relationship between 
investment and cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially constrained firms with 
overconfident managers. 
Finally, via GMM estimation of a dynamic model, we can study firms' cash 
holdings in terms of their cash holdings in the previous period and their target 
levels. This dynamic analysis is conducted in financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms respectively. Accordingly, we predict that there will be 
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differences between the adjustment speeds of financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Financially unconstrained firms can much more easily 
change their cash holding level by choosing among several alternative sources of 
financing. By contrast, financially constrained firms are more likely to face 
future cash shortfalls and their target cash levels are relatively higher. In order to 
adjust to the target levels, they have to pass up some positive NPV (net present 
value) projects and accumulate cash out of cash flow. Hence, financially 
constrained firms are expected to have lower adjustment speeds to their target 
cash level - either because of the low return of cash holding, or else because 
they have higher levels to adjust. 
The results presented in Chapter 3 indicate that firms with less dividend payouts 
and lower investment expenditure tend to hold more cash. In addition, our results 
reveal a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and cash holding. 
When managerial ownership is at a low level, an increase in ownership can align 
the conflict between managers and shareholders and less cash will be required. 
However, when managerial ownership exceeds a certain level, the alignment 
effects of managerial ownership are replaced by the entrenchment effects of it 
and the relationship between managerial ownership and cash holding becomes 
positive. Finally, when managerial ownership is substantially high, the intents 
of managers converge to the interests of shareholders and the relationship 
between ownership and cash holding is back to be negative. More importantly, 
we find a significant and positive relationship between investment and cash flow 
sensitivity of cash holding in financially constrained firms with lower dividend 
payouts or lower leverage. However, this significant relationship can not be 
found in financially constrained firms with managerial overconfidence. Finally, 
our dynamic panel data regressions show that UK firms adjust partially toward 
target cash holding and that the adjustment speed is much slower in younger 
firms with smaller size and lower leverage. 
Chapter 4 aims to establish a linkage between managerial overconfidence and 
debt maturity policy by using a sample of UK listed firms over the period 2002- 
2006. First, based on the traditional theories of asymmetric information and 
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agency costs, we investigate the direct effects of firm-specific characteristics on 
debt maturity (long-term debt ratio). Specifically, we investigate the non-linear 
impact of managerial ownership on debt maturity. Below a low level, managerial 
ownership is good because it can incentivise the managers to act in the interest of 
shareholders. So we can predict a negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and debt maturity. However, when managerial ownership is above a 
certain level, managers can not act in the interest of other minority shareholders. 
And the alignment benefits are replaced by private benefits from long-term debt. 
In this case, therefore, we can predict a positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and debt maturity. Second, we test the role of managerial 
overconfidence in dealing with firms' debt maturity. In the presence of 
asymmetric information, we hypothesize that managerial overconfidence can 
increase the negative relationship between firms' quality and long-term debt. 
That is, overconfident managers believe their firms have been undervalued by the 
market, which leads their firms to pay a higher premium on long-term debt 
contracts than they expected. To avoid this, overconfident managers have an 
incentive to issue more short-term debts to signal their perceived quality than 
non-overconfident managers. Meanwhile, in the presence of agency cost, we 
hypothesize that managerial overconfidence can increase the negative 
relationship between growth opportunity and long-term debt. That is, 
overconfident managers realize short-term debt can alleviate the underinvestment 
problems and give them opportunities to invest their desired project. Third, we 
further consider whether the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt 
maturity varies with corporate governance mechanisms. We use a more cautious 
way (than Chapter 2) to divide sample into three subgroups according to the 
board size, the ratio of non-executive directors and the blockholders' ownership 
respectively: smaller-size board, medium-size board and larger-size board; lower, 
medium and higher ratio of non-executive directors; lower, medium and higher 
level of blockholders' ownership. 
The results presented in Chapter 4 indicate that firms with larger size, higher 
leverage ratio, worse quality and lower liquidity tend to issue more long-term 
debt. In addition, the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
debt maturity is supported by our evidence. More importantly, managerial 
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overconfidence can increase the negative relationship between firms' quality and 
long-term debt. It is in line with our hypothesis that firms with overconfident 
managers are more disposed to issue short-term debt to signal their firms' quality 
to the market than those without overconfident managers. However, we find 
limited evidence that managerial overconfidence can increase the negative 
relationship between firms' growth opportunity and long-term debt. 
Finally, our findings strongly support our empirical hypothesis that the 
significantly negative impact of managerial overconfidence on the relationship 
between debt maturity and firms' quality persists in firms with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms (e. g. lower ratio of non-executive directors, lower 
blockholders' ownership). Meanwhile, managerial ownership can act as an 
important incentive mechanism when the monitoring mechanism is less effective. 
And we find that the effect of managerial ownership is still significant in weakly 
governed firms. In contrast, the impacts of managerial overconfidence and 
managerial ownership on debt maturity both turn to be insignificant in firms with 
good corporate governance mechanisms (medium ratio of non-executive 
directors, medium level of blockholders' ownership). 
Chapter 5 presents the main conclusions of this thesis. In particular, we 
emphasize how managerial overconfidence can lead to biased investment and 
sub-optimal corporate policy decisions. We also demonstrate that this effect can 
vary with different corporate governance mechanisms. Finally, we discuss 
several promising avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate 
Investment: Empirical Evidence from the UK 
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2.1 Introduction 
The existing literature attributes the wedge between internal and external funds 
to asymmetric information and agency problems among different stakeholders. 
Since the pioneering work of Fazzari et al. (1988), there has been a profusion of 
empirical articles providing evidence that investment is more sensitive to cash 
flow in financially constrained firms than in financially unconstrained firms (see 
e. g. Hoshi et al. 1991; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Himmelberg and Petersen, 
1994). The underlying notion of these studies is that because of costly external 
funds, the fluctuations of limited internal funds can change the level of 
investment, leading to a positive cash flow sensitivity of investment. However, 
studies from Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) present opposite 
results. They use qualitative and quantitative information contained in firms' 
annual reports and creditworthiness respectively, to distinguish between 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms and find that firms with less 
financial constraints have greater sensitivity of investment to cash flow. 
Despite these controversial findings, they all ignore the potential roles that 
personal characteristics, especially managerial overconfidence, may play in 
determining corporate decisions. Cooper et al. (1988) argue that entrepreneurs 
tend to overestimate the possibility of success. For example, 81% of 
entrepreneurs believe their chance of success in new projects is at least 70%, and 
33% of entrepreneurs believe theirs are to be 100'/o certain. In fact, only about 
25% of these new projects exist after five years. Similar behaviour can also be 
found in trading markets (Barberis and Thaler, 2003), in which most people 
believe that they have sufficient information to justify a trade, while, in fact, the 
information they have is weak. 
As far as corporate investment is concerned, Roll (1986) was the first to 
introduce CEO's overconfidence as a way of explaining why many takeovers are 
ex post value destroying. Also, Heaton (2002) proposes that overconfident 
managers may invest in some projects with negative net present values (NPV 
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thereafter), which are positive in their perspectives. Both papers assume that 
overconfident managers tend to overestimate the future return of investment 
under their control. However, these authors did not directly tackle the 
measurement issue of managerial overconfidence in order to provide fiuther 
evidence. A notable exception is Malmendier and Tate (2005), who use the 
timing of option exercises and the habitual acquisition of company stock to 
identify managerial overconfidence. They argue that when overconfident 
managers have sufficient internal funds for investment and are not disciplined by 
the capital market or corporate governance mechanisms, they overinvest relative 
to the optimal investment level. By contrast, when they do not have sufficient 
internal funds, they are reluctant to use costly external funds (debt or equity) and, 
curb their investment as a consequence. Additional cash flow then provides an 
opportunity to invest more to their desired level. They report a positive 
relationship between investment and CEOs' overconfidence in the US. 
Investments by these CEOs are significantly more responsive to cash flow, 
especially in those equity-dependent firms identified by the KZ index. 
Although Malmendier and Tate (2005) have been successful in providing 
supporting evidence for the significant role of CEOs' overconfidence in 
determining investment across firms in the US, there has been surprisingly little 
attempt in the current literature, especially in the UK, to keep up with this pace. 
Moreover, it has also left an unanswered empirical question: can the impact of 
overconfident behaviour on investment vary with corporate governance 
mechanisms? It has been suggested that a strong outsider monitoring by 
governance mechanism can potentially constrain irrational managerial behaviour 
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). In their view, when biased decisions are 
recurrent problems, outsiders can yield a more realistic estimate via comparison 
with other similar cases, rather than restrict to the details of the case at hand. The 
objective of this chapter is to extend the investigation of these studies by 
analysing empirically whether the impact of managerial overconfidence on 
investment is homogeneous across all firms in the UK. To do so, we focus on all 
executive directors' behaviour rather than just that of CEOs. In particular, we 
aim to provide a detailed examination of the roles of financial constraints and 
ý ýYn .ýý 
.ý 
,:. t,; 
24 
monitoring governance mechanisms in influencing the corporate investment 
decisions by overconfident managers. 
Our analysis is conducted in two stages, which we believe significantly 
distinguishes our work from the existing research. 
First, apart from Malmendier and Tate's (2005) two-period model, we add the 
impact of managerial overconfidence into the graph originating from Hubbard 
(1998) and emphasize the importance of the financial constraints. This is based 
on the view that the slope of demand curve for capital is determined by the 
growth opportunity or the future profitability of capital. Since overconfident 
managers tend to overestimate the future return of investment, then the growth 
opportunity perceived by overconfident managers is greater than the one 
perceived by non-overconfident managers. Our graph implies that firms with 
managerial overconfidence can increase investment. More importantly, an 
increase in internal fiords in financially constrained firms with managerial 
overconfidence can generate higher investment than financially constrained firms 
without managerial overconfidence, while financially unconstrained firms cannot 
display such a positive relationship. We, therefore, hypothesize that in financially 
constrained firms, managerial overconfidence can increase investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, whereas in financially unconstrained firms, managerial 
overconfidence is independent of investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Second, we consider whether the impact of managerial overconfidence on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity varies according to different corporate 
governance mechanisms. For example, in the presence of a weak corporate 
governance mechanism, biased investment decisions by overconfident managers 
cannot be constrained by firms' monitoring mechanisms and their positive 
impacts on investment-cash flow sensitivity should still be held. Accordingly, 
for financially constrained firms, we hypothesize that managerial overconfidence 
can consistently increase the investment-cash flow sensitivity in firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms. In contrast, if investment biases are reculTent 
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problems, then a governance mechanism with strong monitoring from outsiders 
may restrain them. And managerial overconfidence cannot consistently increase 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially constrained firms with good 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
To investigate these empirical hypotheses, we use a sample of the UK listed 
firms over the period 2002-2006. To assist our estimation, we set up a unique 
data set, which includes firms' accounting data, share dealing information for 
each executive director, ownership concentration and board structure. To 
measure managerial overconfidence we consider executive directors' stock 
dealing activities in the open market. This proxy, first used by Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) in the context of CEOs' overconfidence, is a dummy variable. It 
equals 1 when the net amount of stock purchasing by all executive directors is 
positive for one year, which indicates the firm is a net buyer this year. In 
particular, since overconfidence is a persistently psychological factor, we 
identify those firms which have been habitual net buyers for all years during 
2003-2006 as firms possessing managerial overconfidence (OVER 1). 
Meanwhile, we consider those firms which have been habitual net buyer for at 
least three years during 2003-2006 as an alternative measurement of managerial 
overconfidence (OVER 2). Apart from that, we also verify the robustness of the 
results to another alternative overconfidence measurement (OVER 3), which is 
based on outside perception by using the business press which characterizes 
executive directors as "confident" or "optimistic" (Malmendier et al., 2007). 
When the number of articles describing a firm's executive directors as 
"confident" or "optimistic" is larger than the number of articles describing a 
firm's executive directors as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, fiugal, 
cautious, not optimistic, or not confident over 2003-2006, this firm is identified 
as the one with managerial overconfidence. Furthermore, we identify firms as 
financially constrained firms and unconstrained firms according to top (bottom) 
three deciles of their size, leverage, dividend payouts, age and cash holding 
distributions. Finally, to identify the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
mechanisms, we employ a set of three governance attributes such as proxies for 
board structure and ownership concentration. We use these attributes respectively 
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to divide firms. They are firms with large or small board, firms with high or low 
ratio of nonexecutive directors in board room or firms with high or low 
blockholders' ownership. We aim to find whether the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity varies with different 
conditions. And median values of these three attributes are the benchmarks in 
this classification. 
The analysis in this chapter provides several interesting findings. 
First, we use a cross-sectional average (CSA) method to estimate our hypothesis. 
In particular, we use two different periods to give more evidence: one is the 
dependent variable is measured in year 2006 and the other is the dependent 
variables is measured in year 2005. Accordingly, all the independent variables 
are measured by average-past values over 2002-2005 and 2002-2004 
respectively. We find that financially constrained firms generally exhibit a 
positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and cash flow 
sensitivity of investment. It is statistically significant in leverage, dividend, age 
and cash groups. In contrast, this positive relationship cannot be consistently 
found in financially unconstrained firms. This is in line with our first argument 
that investment decisions by overconfident managers in financially constrained 
firms should be more sensitive to cash flow than investment decisions by non- 
overconfident managers. An increase in cash flow can induce them to increase 
their investment to their desired level. 
Second, we observe that the positive relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and cash flow sensitivity of investment is remained in financially 
constrained firms with small-size boards, low ratio of nonexecutive directors in 
board room or low blockholders' ownership. It is statistically significant in 
dividend, age and leverage groups. This is in line with our second argument that 
weak monitoring by corporate governance mechanisms, such as firms with low 
ratio of non-executive directors or low blockholders' ownership, cannot 
influence the positive impact of managerial overconfidence on investment. 
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Third, all these findings have been supported by our robustness checks using two 
alternative measures of managerial overconfidence (OVER2 and OVER3). We 
generally find that in financially constrained firms in leverage, dividend, age and 
cash groups, managerial overconfidence can positively affect the investment- 
cash flow sensitivity. And this relationship is kept to be significant when 
constrained firms with low ratio of non-executive directors or low blockholders' 
ownership. However, we do not find any further supportive evidence that the 
impact of managerial overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity varies 
with the board size. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss 
the theoretical background and present our empirical hypotheses. In Section 2.3 
we introduce the data, classification scheme and empirical specifications used in 
our analysis. Section 2.4 contains our empirical tests. Our univariate analysis is 
to provide preliminary evidence on the relationship between overconfidence and 
investment and multivariate results provide empirical evidence for our 
hypothesis. Robustness checks have also been included in this section. Section 
2.5 presents our conclusion. 
2.2 Theoretical Background and Our Hypotheses 
In this section, we first provide a literature review of the relationship between 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and investment decisions emphasizing the 
importance of financial constraints. We then discuss whether investment 
decisions by overconfident managers can be effected by the financial constraints. 
We finally discuss whether investment decisions by overconfident managers vary 
in the corporate governance regime. 
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2.2.1 Financial Constraints and Investment Decisions 
In the first instance, it is convenient to recall that in a perfect capital market, 
capital is well allocated such that the marginal product of capital is equal in each 
investment project (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, in an imperfect 
capital market, various frictions result in costly external financing and influence 
the effectiveness of the capital allocation in investment. Two main issues of these 
frictions have been discussed by traditional research: one is the asymmetric 
information and the other is agency problems from debt financing. Both 
incorporate the role of financial constraints in determining investment that 
limited internal funds and costly external financing prevent firms from raising 
external funds to undertake all profitable investment projects. 
2.2.1.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial Constraint 
The asymmetric information in the context of capital market refers to the 
situation where some information about firms is known to managers but not to 
outside investors. For example, in debt market, since lenders cannot differentiate 
between high-risk (or quality) and low-risk applicants, they cannot attain price 
discrimination (e. g. increase interest rates) to set up a loan contract. The reason 
for this is that when interest rates increase, adverse selection (Akerlof 1970) can 
lead to equilibrium such that all low-risk applicants will withdraw from the 
capital market. On the other hand, if applicants do get a loan, moral hazard 
(Blanchard and Fisher, 1989; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) can induce them to 
invest in riskier projects. These two sorts of consideration result in credit 
rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) that the interest rate of the supply for 
loanable fiords exceeds the interest rate of the demand. Consequently, applicants 
(or firms) are simply unable to access all debt financing they want at the 
prevailing market interest rate. Furthermore, costly debt financing and limited 
liability will induce firms to pass up some positive NPV projects. This is because 
firms do not take into account the gain to debt holders in all states of nature in 
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which the project maybe profitable but not profitable enough to ensure that the 
firm will remain solvent (Myers, 1977). 
It is also argued that in equity market, managers can take advantage of the 
private information they possess and issue new shares when this information 
suggests that their shares are overvalued by the market (e. g. Greenwald, Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1984; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Then, new equity 
issuance can be rationally interpreted by the market as bad news (see 
announcement effects in Asquith and Mulline, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). As a result, firms with good quality are reluctant to 
issue new shares, whereas firms with poor quality are not. Also, the former may 
pass up some valuable investment projects. 
Finally, fines' response to costly debt and equity financing is to follow a 
`pecking order', formalized by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). That 
is, firms prefer internal financing to external financing for their investment 
projects. When internal financing is not sufficient for investment, they turn to 
external financing and prefer to issue debts rather than new equity. The reason 
for this is that firms choose to issue equity and invest if and only if the NPV of 
the investment project is at least equal to the amount (AN 7) by which the shares 
are overvalued (AN <0) or undervalued (AN >0), otherwise firms have to pass up 
some valuable investment projects. In order to avoid passing up valuable 
projects, firms can reduce AN by issuing safest securities such as debts in which 
the absolute value of AN is always less for debt than for equity. 
In summary, asymmetric information problems can create a wedge between the 
cost of external financing and internal financing. Empirically, larger firms are 
believed to be more diversified, have higher reputation in capital markets and are 
at lower risk of default, thus they face less informational asymmetry. However, 
smaller firms are more likely to face higher asymmetric information costs (see 
Collins et al., 1981; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) and tend to be financially 
' AN is the amoant of mis-vahation. 
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constrained firms. Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZE 1) in 2002 prices. To test the robustness of the results, we also define firm 
size as the natural logarithm of total sales (SIZE 2) in 2002 prices. 
The age of a firm can also be used as a financial constraint criterion. The 
underlying argument is that younger firms are more likely to face asymmetric 
information problems since it is not possible for them to have long-term 
relationships with outsider investors as do older firms (Oliver and Rudebush, 
1992; Schaller, 1993; Berger and Udell, 1995). We calculate a firm' age as the 
number of years that the firm has been incorporated in 2006 and use the natural 
logarithm of one plus of this number(AGE). 
2.2.1.2 Agency Costs of Debt Financing and Financial Constraint 
Agency costs of debt can also increase the cost of external fiords. Two types of 
conflicts can describe the origin of agency costs. The conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders has been identified as a principal-agent problem, 
in which managers are assumed to act on behalf of the shareholders as the agents 
and bondholders act as the principals. In order to maximize firms' value for 
shareholders, managers may be motivated to choose riskier projects than those 
agreed with bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This asset substitution 
problem would result in shareholders expropriating wealth from bondholders, 
since shareholders do not have to pay any extra gains from riskier projects to 
bondholders, yet bondholders would bear the risk of failure. In the attempt to 
align the different interests between agents and principals, monitoring, 
mandatory audit and bonding costs for overseeing the agent's behaviour are 
incurred. Although such costs are initially borne by the principal, they will be 
transferred to the agent through contracting. 
Another conflict is between shareholders and bondholders, which induces the 
underinvestment problem associating with debt overhang. A large amount of 
debt can discourage implementation of new investment, because any profits 
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generated from the new investment will accrue to bondholders (Myers, 1977) 
rather than to shareholders. This potential transfer of wealth from shareholders to 
bondholders may induce the former to reject some projects, even those projects 
with positive NPV. Bondholders may anticipate this incentive problem and will 
discount it accordingly in the current price at which they purchase debt (Barnea 
et al., 1980). 
As far as the ability to issue debt is concerned, leverage ratio can be considered. 
The larger the cost of external debt financing is, the lower the leverage ratio is 
expected to be. Accordingly, we predict that firms with higher leverage are more 
likely to be financially unconstrained firms, and vice versa (Castanias, 1983; 
Bradley et al., 1984; John, 1993). However, one may argue that higher leverage, 
to some extent, can increase the likelihood of business failure (Ferri and Jones, 
1979; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Whited, 1992). If this is the case, we might 
predict that higher leveraged firms are more likely to be financially constrained 
firms. We use the ratio of total debt to total assets to calculate firms' leverage 
(LEV). 
In addition, the larger the cost of external debt financing is, the larger the 
retention of earnings is expected to be. This is because retained earnings are the 
main source of internal financing such as dividend payouts, regardless of firm 
size. Lintner (1956) suggests dividend policy cannot be changed until new 
earning levels are sustainable. La Porta et al. (2000) advance two alternative 
agency models of dividend: `outcome model' and `substitute model'. In the 
outcome model, dividend is the legal protection of shareholders which hinders 
managers benefitting themselves. In the substitute model, dividend is used to 
establish reputation rather than for a legal protection. They find empirical support 
for the outcome model in those countries with better legal protection. In 
summary, firms with higher dividend payouts should face lower agency costs of 
external financing. Dividend payout is a popular strategy to identify financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms as well (e. g. Fazzari et al., 1989; Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997 etc. ). We compute dividend payout (DIV 1) as the ratio of 
dividend payments to total assets, in line with Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Arslan et 
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al. (2006) and Florackis and Ozkan (2007). We also use the ratio of dividend 
payments to net income to calculate dividend payouts (DIV 2), in line with 
Antoniou et al. (2008). 
2.2.1.3 Investment-Cash Flow sensitivity and Financial Constraint 
As described above, on one hand, firms with unlimited access to capital or 
sufficient internal funds for their investment can be regarded as financially 
unconstrained firms. On the other hand, firms with limited access to capital and 
insufficient internal funds for their investment can be regarded as financially 
constrained firms. Financial constraints can be used to interpret the relationship 
between corporate investment and cash flow, and become central issues with 
regard to the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. 
In his comprehensive survey, Hubbard (1998) illustrates the linkage between 
internal funds and investment decisions. Figure 2.1 shows the linkage between 
net worth, the cost of external finance and investment. It includes a demand 
curve (D) for capital and a supply curve (S) for capital. The horizontal axis is the 
quantity of capital and the vertical axis is the cost of capital. The slope of the D 
curve is determined by the firm's investment opportunities and the location of the 
S curve is determined by the cost of capital (r). Then, in a perfect capital market, 
the first-best investment level (K*) is at the intersection of the D and S curves. 
In an imperfect capital market, the supply curve S(Wo) splits into two segments. 
The horizontal segment is at the interest rate r up to a level of internal funds Wo, 
in which there is no information costs. The upward-sloping segment is 
determined by information cost. The higher the information cost a firm faces, the 
steeper the upward-sloping supply curve will be. Given information costs and 
internal funds Wo, then the investment level in equilibrium is Ko. When internal 
funds increase from Wo to W, and information costs remain the same, the supply 
curve shifts from S(Wo) to S(W1) and investment level in equilibrium increases 
from Ko to K1. However, the investment level in equilibrium K1 is still lower 
than the flat-best investment level K* in a perfect capital market. 
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Figure 2.1 implies that given the level of investment opportunities, information 
costs and market interest rates, firms with a reduction in net worth (or internal 
funds) should reduce their investment, and vice versa. If a firm has good 
investment opportunities but is short of internal funds for their investment, it may 
have to pass up some investment projects. 
Most empirical studies use cash flow as a proxy for internal funds (net worth) in 
an investment model. We use the sum of pre-tax profits and depreciation over total 
assets to calculate cash flow (CFLOW) and the ratio of capital expenditure in fixed 
assets to total assets to calculate investment (I), which are in line with Arslan et al. 
(2006). We expect a positive relationship between cash flow and investment, and 
this relationship is expected to be significant in financially constrained firms. 
2.2.1.4 Empirical Evidence 
Since investment-cash flow sensitivity increases with the degree of financial 
constraints, we can expect that investment-cash flow sensitivity should be greater 
in financially constrained firms. The majority of empirical studies in this area 
have attempted to use different criteria to split firms into financially constrained 
and financially unconstrained firms. These can be size, bond rating, commercial 
paper rating, bank relation, KZ index or dividend payout, etc. 
sporting Evidence 
Using dividend payouts as their splitting criterion, Fazzari et al. (1988) examine 
the influence of financial constraints on investment by looking at the sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow. They use different investment models, among them 
the neoclassical model, accelerator investment model and Q model, and different 
estimation methods to take account of the measurement error, such as using fixed 
firm and year effects, instrumental variables, first and second differences of all 
variables in their tests. Their results tend to reach a consistent conclusion that 
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financially constrained firms incline to have higher investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. 
Their result provokes a number of subsequent studies to confirm this linkage. 
These studies mainly depend on Tobin' q model and use different splitting 
approaches such as size, age, business group affiliation, dividend payout ratios, 
and non-oil or oil subsidiaries of oil companies. 
For instance, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) attribute agency costs rather 
than asymmetric information costs to firm size because they believe managerial 
ownership is more concentrated in smaller firms. They find that larger firms in 
the UK rely more heavily on cash flow financing than smaller firms. They adopt 
firms' age as another classification scheme and find that younger firms are more 
exposed to asymmetric information and have higher cash flow sensitivity of 
investment. Similar results for younger firms were also found in the US (Oliner 
and Rudebush, 1992) and Canada (Schaller, 1993). 
In Hoshi et al. (1991), business group affiliation is another classification 
approach. Owing to the monitoring role of financial intermediation, the authors 
argue that firms with closer relations with banks have lower debt agency costs 
and fewer asymmetric information problems. They classify firms into affiliated 
and independent firms and find that there is greater cash flow sensitivity of 
investment for firms that are associated with banks. Similar results were found 
in different countries based on this classification (see e. g. Italy (Schiantarelli and 
Sembenelli, 1995), Korea (Cho, 1995), Germany (Elston and Albach, 1995) and 
Canada (Chirinko and Schaller, 1995)). 
Lamont (1997) tries to test the cash flow sensitivity of investment by using a 
group of firms that have businesses both in oil and non-oil industries. He argues 
that a decrease in cash flow in companies' oil segment can reduce investment in 
their non-oil subsidiaries. In fact, he finds a correlation between cash flow from 
oil subsidiaries and investment from non-oil subsidiaries of 26 large diversified 
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companies. That is, when oil revenues fell following the collapse of oil prices in 
1986, investment by firms' subsidiaries unrelated to the oil business also 
declined. Although the sample size is small, it is still robust evidence that cash 
flow is important in investment. 
Another strand in this area is to use the Euler equation describing firms' 
investment decisions without using Tobin's q, but controlling future profitability. 
For example, Whited (1992) particularly considers the role of debt financing 
constraints on investment. This classification criterion is firms' leverage level 
including debt ratio, interest coverage ratio and rated debt level. The Euler 
estimation provides evidence of a significant relationship between cash flow and 
investment spending for financially unhealthy firms with a high debt ratio or a 
high interest coverage ratio, or without rated debt. 
Moreover, using the first-order conditions of the optimization process of a 
standard neoclassical model of investment with quadratic costs of adjustment, 
Bond and Meghir (1994) derive an Euler equation. According to their Euler 
equation, the investment is a function of discounted expected future investment, 
adjusted for the impact of the expected changes in the input prices and net 
marginal output8. They use a dummy variable to identify liquidity-constrained 
firms, which equals zero when dividend payout is positive and new share 
issuance is zero for two periods, otherwise one. They show that for liquidity- 
constrained firms, the standard Euler equation is not a valid model to describe 
investment behaviour. By contrast, for liquidity-unconstrained firms, investment 
behaviour can be described by the standard Euler equation. 
The effect of financial constraints on investment has also been examined for a 
wide range of investment. Besides expenditure on plant and equipment, working 
capital, R&D expenditure and inventory investment have been analysed in the 
literature above. For example, Faaari and Petersen (1993) examine the effects of 
financial constraints on working capital. They use dividend payout ratio as a 
s Although it is bmd on the amcs which is some distance from our main idm it can 
Still give us an original clue for the Euler equation, 
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criterion to distinguish financially constrained and unconstrained firms and find 
that low-payout firms have higher sensitivities of working capital investment to 
cash flow. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) find that smaller manufacturing 
firms' R&D spending is highly dependent upon operating cash flow. Carpenter et 
al. (1994) suggest that smaller firms and firms without bond rating tend to have a 
higher sensitivity of inventory investment to cash flow. 
b. Criticisms 
One important criticism of the above strand of literature is the use of Tobin's q in 
the Q model to control for investment opportunity. It is argued that the 
relationship between cash flow and investment could stem from the correlation 
between cash flow and omitted or mismeasured investment opportunities 
(Tobin's q). Therefore, alternative measures of investment opportunities need to 
be constructed to test whether when these opportunities are more adequately 
measured, cash flow still plays a significant role in firms' investment. 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) estimate a set of vector autoregressive 
forecasting equations to build a `fundamental q' as a proxy for the expected 
value of marginal q conditional on observed fundamentals. This allows the role 
of cash flow as a forecasting variable to be distinguished from its role as an 
explanatory variable of investment. When they use the dividend-payout ratio to 
identify financially constrained firms, they find contradictory results as did 
Fazarri et al. (1988). However, when considering firm size, commercial paper 
ratings and bond ratings, it reveals a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
in financially constrained firms. 
Erickson and Whited (2000) analyse the measurement error problem by creating 
measurement-error consistent generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimators. With this method, they find that Tobin's q suffers from substantial 
measurement error. Instead, the consistent estimators imply that Tobin's q has 
good explanatory power. Furthermore, they argue that many stylized facts in the 
empirical investment literature potentially result from measurement error in 
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Tobin's q. In particular, they find that cash flow becomes insignificant; while 
the point estimates of the q-coefficient roughly triple in magnitude relative to the 
OLS baseline estimation (e. g. the estimated coefficient increases from 0.014 to 
0.044). Similarly, in the work of Gomes (2001), optimal investment is sensitive 
to both Tobin's q and cash flow irrespective of whether firms are financially 
constrained or not. He finds that in the absence of financial constraints, the 
standard investment regression predicting cash flow is an important determinant 
of investment only if one ignores Tobin's q. Thus the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is probably due to the measurement error in Tobin's q and an 
identification problem. 
More recently, Alti (2003) proposes that cross-sectional variations in the 
informational content of cash flows regarding investment opportunities could 
generate the patterns reported by Fa=ari et al. (1988), even without financial 
constraints. Tobin's q is shown to be a more noisy measure of the investment 
opportunities in young firms, since the long-term growth options add noise to the 
part of q that measures near-term investment. When Tobin's q is replaced by the 
`noise-free' q, the investment sensitivity to expected cash flow is eliminated. 
Finally, Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) introduce `alongside q' as a new proxy 
for investment opportunities measuring the firm's contractual obligations for 
future investment. When they include q in their investment regression, they find 
that the explanatory power of cash flow falls for large firms but remains 
unchanged in small firms. 
Another important criticism of hypothesis of the positive relationship between 
investment and cash flow originates from the validity of the financial constraints' 
criterion. Kaplan and Zingales (1997,2000) re-examine some of the firms 
studied by Fazzari et al. (1988) by using their own identification of financial 
constraints. This identification is based on the availability and demand for funds 
from qualitative and quantitative information contained in the firms' various 
reports. Conversely, they find that financially unconstrained firms appear to have 
greater sensitivities of investment to cash flow than financially constrained firms. 
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Kadapakkam et al. (1998) examine the different impacts of cash flow on firm 
investment in six OECD countries by using firm size as their classification. They 
adopt three measures of firm size: total sale, market value and total assets. They 
find that investment-cash flow sensitivity is generally highest in the largest firms 
and lowest in the smallest firm. They interpret this as meaning that larger firms 
are more flexible in timing investment and more susceptible to managerial 
agency problems. 
Cleary (1999) classifies firms according to his financial constraint index (ZFC ). 
He computes 
Z, C a score based on six variables such as firm liquidity, leverage, 
profitability and growth. Two steps are included in this process: first is to classify 
firms into constrained or unconstrained firms according to some characteristics. 
Second, a statistical analysis is performed to delivers a coefficient for each of the 
six control variables. This analysis is similar to a probit or a logit estimation. His 
results show that the investment decisions with high creditworthiness (Z) are 
significantly more sensitive to cash flow. 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) examine whether the puzzling results by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) are driven by the fact of firms 
being in bad shape. When cash shortfall is severe, the firm can only make 
essential investment such that any decrease in investment is impossible. Thus, 
investment cannot respond to cash flow. They use negative cash flow as a proxy 
to identify firms that are in bad shape and confirm the validity of this proxy 
according to firms' growth rates, debt ratings, debt ratios and dividend changes. 
They provide evidence that these puzzling results are largely due to firms' 
negative cash flow. And Kaplan and Zingales' (1997) results are also affected by 
an influential observation in a small sample. 
Finally, Moyen (2004) reconciles the conflicting empirical results by using an 
unconstrained model and a constrained model. With the constrained model, firms 
cannot access external debt or equity, while with the unconstrained model, firms 
can issue debt and access external equity at zero cost. They find that, in the 
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constrained model, unconstrained firms use debt and cash flow to increase their 
investment and dividend payouts, while constrained firms can only use cash flow 
to increase their investment or dividend payouts. Consistent with Kaplan and 
Zingales' results (1997), they find cash flow sensitivity of investment is lower in 
constrained firms. Meanwhile, in unconstrained firms, firms can adjust their debt 
level over time and invest more than firms in the constrained model. Low- 
dividend firms, regarded as financially unconstrained firms in this model, exhibit 
higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. That is because paying off debts 
accounts for a larger proportion of cash flow in unconstrained fines than 
unconstrained firms. Unconstrained firms have lower dividends than constrained 
firms and exhibit higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. This is in line with 
results from Fazzari et al. (1988). 
I Z. Z Financial Constraint, Investment and Managerial Overconfidence 
The above traditional models of investment behaviour implicitly assume that 
managers are rational, while behavioural finance assumes that managers can be 
irrational. Recently, researchers in behavioural finance became interested in the 
analysis of causes and consequences of overconfidence. In this section, we 
present the related background to this issue followed by our hypothesis. 
2.2.2.1 Background 
Since the 1990s, overconfidence has also become a field of interest for 
economists, mainly in the context of behaviour on financial markets. 
Overconfidence is defined as an overestimation of one's knowledge or precision 
of private information. Some puzzles found on the financial markets were 
successfully accounted for once overconfidence of investors was assumed, which 
include excessive trading volumes (Barber and Odean, 2001), security 
misevaluation (Chuang and Lee, 2006) and so on. However, the existence of 
managerial overconfidence in the corporate finance context is less explored. Two 
main directions of overconfidence research in the context of corporate finance 
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are included: one is the study of merger and acquisition and the other is the study 
of internal corporate financing structures. 
Roll (1986) publishes one of the first studies introducing individual-level 
overconfidence into the context of merger and acquisition. This study uses CEO 
overconfidence to explain why many takeovers are ex post value destroying. 
According to his `hubris' theory, the takeover could be interpreted such that the 
decision-makers convince themselves that the valuation of their target firms is 
correct and that the market does not reflect this correct value, which leads to too 
high bids and ex post loss. Following Roll's argument, Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) analyse corporate merger and acquisition using a sample of US firms. 
They empirically find that overconfident CEOs in the sample are not only more 
likely to conduct mergers than their rational counterparts, but also their mergers 
are proven to be much less profitable. Moreover, acquiring firms with 
overconfident CEOs suffer from higher negative price effects on stock prices 
following announcements. 
On the other hand, there are some studies of the overconfidence issues in the 
corporate context. For example, in a questionnaire study by March and Shapira 
(1987), they find that managerial decisions are removed from the standard 
decision making theory. Managers believe they are able to control the risks rather 
than a gambler and are more risk seeking than their peers, which is in line with 
the view of the better-than-average effect. Also, in Camerer and Lovallo (1999), 
most business failures can be explained by the fact that entrepreneurs strongly 
believe in their relative skill and forecast negative returns for an average market 
entry, with themselves being an exception to the rule. 
Moreover, Heaton (2002) argues that optimistic managers are those who 
overestimate the probability of good project performance but underestimate bad 
performance. Optimistic managers sometimes advance a biased cash flow 
forecast and believe their firms to be undervalued by the market. Hence, they 
prefer to use internal finds to invest. And some profitable investment projects 
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will be passed up (underinvestment) because of the costly external financing in 
their perspective. Meanwhile, they also tend to overvalue the investment 
opportunities and thus tend to undertake investment with negative present value 
(overinvestment). 
Despite these valuable insights, very few studies directly use a measurement to 
identify overconfidence with the notable exception of Malmendier and Tate 
(2005). They use a sample of Forbes 500 CEOs and construct three managerial 
overconfidence measurements: Holder 67, Longholder and Net Buyer. The first 
two use the timing of option exercises to identify overconfidence and the third 
concerns the habitual acquisition of company stock. In particular, Holder 67 
considers the statues of each individual option package in the sample at the end 
of the vesting period. If an option is more than 67 % in-the-money at some point 
in the fifth year, the CEO should have exercised at least some portion of the 
package during or before the fifth year. If the CEO failed to exercise such an 
option during or before the fifth year, he/she will be classified as overconfident. 
Longholder classifies a CEO as overconfident if he/she ever holds an option until 
the last year of its duration. Net buyer examines the tendency of CEOs' stock 
purchasing behaviour despite their high exposure to company-specific risk and 
classifies a CEO as overconfident if he/she buys more stocks on net than their 
selling on net during their first five sample years. 
In addition, Malmendier and Tate (2005) set up a theoretical model to 
demonstrate the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate investment in 
an efficient capital market. They assume that managers are not self-interested and 
their aim is to maximize current shareholders' value and that CEOs' 
overconfidence is perceived by his/her overestimation of investment return. The 
authors propose two predictions: first, that the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
of overconfident CEOs is higher than those who are not overconfident; and 
second, that the investment-cash flow sensitivity of overconfident CFAs is more 
pronounced in equity-dependent firms without sufficient cash and riskless debt 
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for investment than in firms with sufficient cash and riskless debt for investment. 
The first prediction is supported by using their three managerial overconfidence 
measurements noted above and the second is confirmed by using "Longholder" 
to measure managerial overconfidence. 
More recently, Ben-David et al. (2007) collect a survey data set of CFOs' 
quarterly stock market forecasts in the US. They find that CFOs are significantly 
miscalibrated in the predictions of short-term and long-term stock market returns. 
That is `only 40% of stock market realizations fall within the 80% confidence 
intervals that executives provide'. They also find supportive evidence that 
overconfident CFOs rely more on cash flow, have higher investment and prefer 
longer maturities of debt. 
In summary, the review presented above show that managerial overconfidence 
can affect corporate financing structure and overconfidence in the corporate 
context needs fur her research. Hence, in this chapter, we focus on the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on investment decision. 
2.2.2.2 Our hypothesis 
In the spirit of Malmendier and Tate (2005), we focus on the role of financial 
constraints in determining the relationship between investment-cash flow 
sensitivity and managerial overconfidence. In particular, we extend the graphical 
analysis as in Hubbard (1998) to demonstrate our initial hypothesis. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 describe the links among net worth, the cost of external 
finance and investment in financially constrained and unconstrained firms, 
respectively. Both figures include demand curve for capital (D) and supply curve 
for capital (S). The horizontal axis is the quantity of capital and the vertical axis 
the cost of capital. In line with Hubbard, the slope of demand curve (D) is 
determined by the growth opportunity and the slope of supply curve (S) is 
determined by the information costs. 
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The main difference between ours and Hubbard's analysis is that we include two 
types of demand curves: a demand curve (Dm) with managerial overconfidence 
and a demand curve (D) without managerial overconfidence. Since the slope of a 
demand curve is determined by investment opportunity, we argue that the slope 
of D. is flatter than the slope of D in both Figures 2.2 and 2.3. We reason that 
overconfident managers are assumed to overestimate their abilities to generate 
higher and positive returns. Thus, they overinvest when they have sufficient 
internal funds but curtail investment when they need external funds. This is in 
line with the description of overconfident managers' investment behaviour 
reported in the work of Malmendier and Tate (2005). This tendency could be 
represented by higher perceived investment opportunities. Another difference is 
that the starting points for demand curves D and Dm in our figures are at different 
levels. We reason that, given certain costs of capital, overconfident managers can 
invest more than non-overconfident managers. In other words, overconfident 
managers decide not to invest at a higher cost of capital than do non- 
overconfident managers. 
Figure 2.2 describes investment decisions in financially unconstrained firms. 
When a firm has sufficient internal funds for investment, both non-overconfident 
and overconfident managers will invest to their desired optimal investment (K* 
and K: ). Their investment levels are independent of changes in internal 
funds(S). 
Figure 2.3 describes investment decisions in financially constrained firms. When 
a firm does not have sufficient internal funds for investment, then the S(Wo) 
curve splits into two segments. One is a horizontal segment up to the initial 
internal funds Wo, and the other is an upward segment, in which the slope is 
determined by the information cost. Given the initial internal funds Wo, we can 
find the desired capital stock Ko and Kom for investment in firms with non- 
overconfident managers and overconfident managers, respectively. Shortages of 
internal finds in financially constrained firms are denoted by the gap between 
Wo and Ko (Korn). Given an investment opportunity, when internal funds increase 
from Wo to W,, we will find that desired capital stock increases from Ko to Kl 
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(Kim) in firms without overconfident managers and with overconfident 
managers, respectively. Using geometrical theory, we can find that the change 
between Ko and Kim is higher than the change between KO and KI, which means 
that an increase in internal funds can induce overconfident managers to increase 
investment more than do non-overconfident managers. Finally, this positive 
relationship between investment cash-flow sensitivity and managerial 
overconfidence is robust even if we consider not only information cost but also 
cost of private information for project risks and quality, which can be realized by 
changing the cost of funds. 
In summary, overconfident managers increase their investment in response to an 
increase in cash flow when they face financial constraints. In contrast, firms with 
overconfident managers cannot display such determinate behaviour in investment 
when they do not face financial constraints. Empirically, we expect that cash 
flow sensitivity of investment can be increased by managerial overconfidence in 
financially constrained firms. However, managerial overconfidence does not 
necessarily increase cash flow sensitivity of investment in financially 
unconstrained firms. 
113 The Rok of Corporate Governance Mechanism 
In the following text, we discuss whether the biased impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment cash-flow sensitivity varies with the corporate 
governance mechanism. We want to test whether a corporate governance 
mechanism can serve as an outside monitoring role in overconfident behaviour? 
In other words, we attempt to analyze whether the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment decisions is kept to be pronounced in a weak 
governance mechanism (or a weak monitoring mechanism). 
This analysis is in the spirit of Kahneman and Lovallo (1993). They argue that 
organizational optimism can be best alleviated by introducing an `outside' view 
when the cognitive biases can be treated as recurrent problems. By that they 
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mean that outsiders are capable of drawing managerial attention to information 
that may indicate that their perceptions are wrong. The information is obtained 
from a comparison with other similar cases rather than focus on the decision 
itself. Also, Malmendier and Tate (2005) emphasize that overconfident managers 
can still invest sub-optimally even if managerial private incentives are perfectly 
aligned and/or they are not facing any informational asymmetries. Moreover, 
overconfident managers even believe that they are acting in the best interests of 
shareholders, although they are not actually, from the perspective of shareholders. 
Thus, a standard incentive contract such as a stock-based compensation is unable 
to mitigate the biased impact of overconfidence. Instead, the governance 
mechanism of an active or independent board of directors would be able to 
control the biased behaviour. In summary, managerial overconfidence as 
cognitive biases can not be easily avoided. However, if this bias is a recurrent 
problem, then the most effective prescription for managerial overconfidence can 
be the strong outsider monitoring by corporate governance mechanisms. 
As far as the investment by overconfident managers is concerned, we 
hypothesize that managerial overconfidence can consistently increase the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity in constrained firms with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms. However, the relationship between overconfident 
managers' investment decision and the effective governance mechanism will be 
more complicated. The biased investment could be restrained when it is a 
recurrent problem and noticed by an effective governance mechanism. It also 
depends on the condition that the effective governance mechanism is capable of 
influencing managers' decision making. Under these conditions, we can argue 
managerial overconfidence cannot consistently increase the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity in firms with good corporate governance mechanism. 
In order to identify fines as those with effective monitoring mechanisms or those 
with weak monitoring mechanisms, we focus on a number of related issues such 
as ownership concentration and board stnudure. A monitoring function can be 
explained by a classic principal-agent fiameworlc, in which the board or outside 
shareholders is regarded as the "principal" and management as the "agent". And 
the effectiveness of the monitoring role is related to their structure. 
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First, ownership concentration can exert a monitoring role in firms' management 
to align shareholder-manager conflicts. Grossman and Hart (1988) argue that the 
monitoring benefits are related to their shareholdings. In particular, non- 
management investors with substantial stakes should have more incentives to 
maximize their firms' value and are able to collect information and oversee 
management, while those with few stakes should have fewer incentives (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and 1997; Friend and Lang, 
1988). However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large investors may 
represent their own interest, which need not coincide with the interests of other 
investors in the firms, or with the interests of employees and managers. Woidtke 
(2002) also argues that non-management shareholders may focus on political or 
social issues other than firm performance. Thus, not all shareholders benefit from 
the monitoring by institutional investors. We include blockholders' ownership 
(BLOCK) as a measure of ownership concentration, which refers to the sum of 
shares of all shareholders (rather than manager) with a stake greater that 3 %. To 
estimate our hypothesis, we split firms into firms with high (low) blockholders' 
ownership when the value of BLOCK is higher (lower) than the median value. 
And we predict that the impact of managerial overconfidence on investment-cash 
flow sensitivity is kept significantly in financially constrained firms with low 
blockholders' ownership. 
Second, boards can exert a monitoring role or an advisory role in influencing 
management as well (Mace, 1986; Adams and Ferreira, 2008). For example, 
board members can use their expertise to counsel management on their strategic 
directions. The effectiveness of the monitoring role of the board room is related 
to the board's degree of independence. And the degree of board independence is 
related to observable board characteristics such as size or composition (the 
proportion of outside directors on the board). 
It is believed that larger boards are better for corporate performance because they 
have a range of expertise to help make better decisions, and are harder for a 
powerful CEO to dominate. As Peace and Zahra (1991) point out, large and 
powerful boards help to strengthen the linkage between corporate performance 
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and their external environments. A positive relationship could be expected 
between board size and the board's capacity for monitoring. 
However, other papers have leaned towards smaller board. For instance, Jensen 
(1993) point out the `great emphasis on politeness and courtesy at the expense of 
truth and frankness in boardrooms'. He states that boards having more than seven 
or eight people are unlikely to function effectively. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
argue that larger boards are more cumbersome than smaller boards. When boards 
become too big, agency problems (e. g. free-rider problem) increase within the 
board and the board becomes more symbolic and less a part of the management 
process. Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Mak and Yuanto (2005) 
support this view empirically. Yermack (1996) finds a significant negative 
relationship between Tobin's q and board size in a sample of large U. S. firms. 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) finds that board size and profitability are negatively 
correlated in a sample of small and mid-size Finnish firms. Using a sample of 
firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia, Mak and Yuanto (2003) find that a firm 
valuation is highest when the board has five directors, a number considered 
relatively small in those countries. Finally, Wu (2000) addresses a marketplace 
view of the importance of board size. She finds that average board size decreased 
over the period of 1991-1995. This might due to the pressure from CaIPERS that 
market investors seems to think that small boards do better job of monitoring 
management than do large boards. 
Therefore, the relationship between the effectiveness of boards' monitoring roles 
and board size would be an empirical issue. In this respect, we use the sum of the 
number of executives and non-executives to measure board size (BOARD). In 
particular, we split firms into two subgroups: firms with large-size boards and 
small-size boards. We assign firms to those with large-size (small-size) boards 
when those firms' board sizes are larger (smaller) than the median value. Given 
that large-size boards can not play an effectively monitoring role, we predict that 
the impact of managerial overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
should remain significantly positive in financially constrained firms with large- 
size boards. 
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In addition to board size, the issue of controlling boards by independent directors 
has received considerable attention, especially after the corporate scandals 
afflicting the likes of Enron, Tyco, Adelphi and others (examples in Burns (2004), 
Luchetti and Lublin (2004), and Solomon (2004)). Independent directors are 
believed to curtail the agency problems. Especially in the UK, the importance of 
non-executive directors has been increasingly recommended (see Cadbury, 1992; 
Hampel Committee, 1998; Dahya and McConnell, 2005). It is widely 
acknowledged that non-executive directors are appointed to act in the 
shareholders' interests and have an incentive to build reputation as expert 
monitors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hart, 1995). The beneficial monitoring and 
advisory functions of outsider directors have been extensively supported by 
empirical studies (see e. g. Brickley and James, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; Byrd and 
Hickman 1992; Brickley et al., 1994). However, non-executives are usually 
characterized by a lack of information about the firm. Agrawal and Knoeker 
(1996) suggest that boards expanded for political reasons often result in too many 
outsiders on the board, which does not help performance. They reason that non- 
executive directors tend to regard their roles as advisory rather than disciplinary. 
Moreover, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) suggest that a board's independence 
depends on a bargaining game between the board and the management. That is 
the executive directors prefer a less independent board, while the boards prefer to 
keep their independence. When executive directors have demonstrated their good 
performance, the board's independence declines. Franks et al. (2003) find no 
evidence that non-executive directors do not perform a disciplinary function on 
firms' management in the UK. And there is no evidence that the faction of 
outside directors on board is correlated with firm performance and that firms 
with more independent directors achieve improved firm profitability (see Morck 
et al., 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Mehran, 1995; Klein, 1998 and 
Bhagat and Black, 2000). 
In our analysis, we use the ratio of total number of non-executives to total 
number of directors (RATIO) for this issue. We split firms into firms with high 
(low) ratio of nonexecutive directors in board when the value of RATIO is higher 
(lower) than the median value. If outside directors play the positive role in 
board's monitoring and control function, we predict that the impact of 
49 
managerial overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity is consistently 
significant in financially constrained firms with low ratio of non-executive 
directors. 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
We use a large sample of non-financial listed UK firms over the period 2002- 
2006. The initial data are available from the DataStream and Hemscott Guru 
Academic Database (Hemscott hereafter). The whole data set is constructed as 
follows. 
First, the data for companies' accounting information were mainly collected from 
DataStream between 2002 and 2006. We use Datastream to collect information 
for the following variables: MTB, firm size, investment, leverage, dividend 
payouts, cash holding and cash flow. For firms' age, we mainly download from 
the Datastream. As a further check, we used the companies' website and London 
Stock Exchange Yearbook. We only chose those firms that had no missing data 
over the period 2002-2006. 
Second, information on share dealings by all executive directors (2003-2006), 
ownership concentration (2004-2005) and board structure (2004-2005) are from 
Hemscott. This database provides detailed information about the share dealings 
of each director in the open market for each year, the level of each director, 
ownership concentration, and the number of executive directors and non- 
executive directors. The biggest problem we found is that all this information 
could only be downloaded from separate files. For example, in order to get 
information about the amount of share dealings by executive directors, two 
different files must be combined: (a) the file that contains the share dealings of 
each director, (b) the file that contains the names of each executive director in 
each company. In addition, we note that those firms without any share dealings 
50 
in one of the sample years will be missed from the downloaded files. We then 
have to add this missing information into the file and set the amount of share 
dealings by executive directors as zero in these firms. There will be similar 
compilations for us in collecting other information about ownership 
concentration and board structure. 
Finally, to ensure that these outliers do not contaminate our results, we trim data 
within the range of 199%. After matching Datastream and Hemscott, we end up 
with a data set of 578 listed firms. In addition, we divide firms into 15 sectors 
with 15 dummy variables to control for sector effects (see Appendix A). Table 
2.1 provides the definitions of the variables used in this chapter. 
Table 2.2 provides the summary statistics of all our variables. We observe that 
the average investment (I) is 0.045. The average cash flow (CFLOW) is 0.052, 
which is lower than some studies. The reason for this is because the average 
levels of cash flow from 2002 to 2003 are much lower (about 0.026-0.041) than 
the other two years from 2004 to 2005 (about 0.074-0.076). Cash holding level 
(CASH) is 0.129, which is rather higher than that reported by Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004), and may be due to the different sample period. Average leverage (LEV) 
is about 0.169, firm's size (SIZE 1) is around 11.352, dividend payout (DIV 1) is 
approximately 0.02 and average market-to-book value (MTB) is 1.864 which are 
all line with work on the UK by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Florackis (2005) and 
Florackis and Ozkan (2007). As a further check, we also include SIZE 2 and DIV 
2 to provide more results, which are 10.98 and 0.582 respectively. These two 
values are higher than the ones (9.16 and 0.43) reported by Antoniou et al. 
(2008). This might be due to their different time period, which they collect the 
data over the period 1987-2000. 
As far as the board structure and ownership concentration are concerned, average 
board size (BOARD) in the UK is 7.179, and about 51.3% are non-executive 
directors (RATIO). All major shareholders (BLOCK) with at least 3% shares 
hold more than 37% of the remaining shares. This is in line with other UK works 
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by Florackis and Ozkan (2007) and Florackis (2005). Finally, we find in our 
sample, about 43.1% of firms are net buyers in the stock market in each year. 
Accordingly, our overconfidence variables (OVER 1 and OVER 2), which are 
based on the information of net buyer, are about 10.6% and 27.5%. Moreover, 
the alternative overconfident variable (OVER 3), which is based on the 
information of outside perception, is about 38.1%. 
Table 2.3 presents the Pearson's correlation for the variables used in our 
regression. The results are generally in line with our expectations. Cash flow 
(CFLOW) and market-to-book ratio (MTB) as main determinants are both 
positively correlated with investment (I). Firms with larger size (SIZE 1 and 
SIZE 2) and higher leverage (LEV) and dividend payouts (DIV 1) tend to invest 
more. And it shows investment (I) is positively related to age (AGE) but not at a 
statistically significant level. However, it shows that age (AGE) is positively 
correlated with firm size, dividend and leverage, which implies that firm age 
could be used to identify financially constrained firms and unconstrained firms. It 
also shows that the relationship between cash holdings (CASH) and investment 
(I) is an negative one, which reveals that firms are more likely to retain cash and 
curtail investment. 
Moreover, our three alternative managerial overconfidence measures (OVER 1, 
OVER 2 and OVER 3) are significantly and positively correlated with each other. 
It also indicates that firms with managerial overconfidence tend to invest more. 
However, such findings do not lead to concrete inferences for the potential 
interaction effect of managerial overconfidence and investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. 
212 Methodology 
2.3.2.1 Class cation Scheme 
As discussed in Section 2.2, size, leverage, dividend payouts, and age can be 
used to identify financially constrained and unconstrained firms. In addition, we 
also use cash holding as another alternative classification method. Cash holding 
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is believed to increase the capacity of firms' investment. Consistent with this 
argument, Almeida et al. (2004) contend that financially constrained firms are 
more probably exposed to costly external financing and have greater propensity 
to save cash out of cash flow. They find that firms with smaller size, lower 
dividend payouts and lower credit and bond rating tend to accumulate cash. 
Moreover, Arslan et al. (2006) argue that firms with cash holding lower than 
their optimal levels are those financially constrained firms that exhibit greater 
cash flow sensitivity of investment. Therefore, we argue that firms retaining 
lower cash tend to be financially constrained firms, while those with much higher 
cash holding tend to be financially unconstrained firms. 
Apart from the above five criteria, KZ index has also been used to measure 
financial constraints. KZ index stems from a paper of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
use a mix of quantitative and qualitative information from disclosure filings to 
classify a firm's level of financial constraints. They found that investment-cash 
flow sensitivity does not monotonically increase with financial constraints level. 
Therefore investment-cash flow sensitivity is not a useful measure of financial 
constraints in their conclusion. In their KZ index, five explanatory variables are 
included, in which they believe that financial constraints is positively related to 
leverage and Q and negatively related to cash flow, cash levels and dividends. 
And the coefficients of these variables are used to construct the KZ index of 
financial constraints. 
However, recent papers have questioned whether the KZ index is an appropriate 
measure of financial constraints. For example, Almeida et al. (2004) use four 
different firm specific characteristics (e. g. size, dividend payout, common paper 
ratings and bond ratings) to identify financially constrained firms and find they 
are not closely related to the KZ index. Whited and Wu (2006) use an Euler 
equation approach to identify the relative importance of several firm and industry 
characteristics in determining a firm's level of financial constraints. They found 
their index of constraints has no correlation with the KZ index. 
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Moreover, Hadlock and Pierce (2008) recently revaluate the validity of the KZ 
index. They question the generality and the mechanism link of the KZ index. The 
generality means the generality of inferences derived from it. They argue that the 
coefficients of the five components of the KZ index are calculated based on a 
sample of 49 manufacturing firms from 1970s and early 1980s. These firms are 
large, grow rapidly, pay low dividends, and satisfy a survival requirement, which 
limit the generality. They also argue that there is a mechanical link between the 
five components of the index and constraints categories. For example, in the KZ 
index, it will not be surprise to find more-cash holding firms have been regarded 
as less constrained firms. Instead, they consider a more representative sample of 
356 firms over 1995-2004 and entirely based on qualitative statement rather than 
a mix of qualitative and quantitative information in the KZ index. When they 
estimate ordered logit model of constraint status as a function of the five 
components of the KZ index, they find only leverage and cash flow are 
consistently significantly related to financial constraints. Thus, they conclude 
that the KZ index is not an appropriate measure of financial constraints. 
Hence, we consider the five conventional firm-specific characteristics to be the 
criteria of identifying financially constrained and unconstrained firms: 
SIZE: our sample is divided based on their average value of total assets over the 
period 2002-2005 and assigned to the financially constrained firms when those 
firms are in the bottom three deciles (smaller) of the size distribution. Meanwhile, 
we assign those firms which are in the top three deciles (larger) of the size 
distribution to the financially unconstrained firms. 
LEVERAGE: our sample is divided based on their average value of leverage 
over the period 2002-2005 and assigned to the financially constrained firms 
when those firms are in the bottom three deciles (lower) of the leverage 
distribution, and vice versa. 
DIVIDEND: our sample is divided based on their average value of dividend over 
the period 2002-2005 and assigned to the financially constrained firms when 
those firms are in the bottom three deciles (lower) of the whole dividend 
distribution, and vice versa. 
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AGE: our sample is divided based on their age and assigned to the financially 
constrained firms when those firms are in the bottom three deciles (younger) of 
the age distribution, and vice versa. 
CASH: our sample is divided based on their average value of cash holding over 
the period 2002-2005 and assigned to the financially constrained firms when 
those firms are in the bottom three deciles (lower) of the cash holding 
distribution, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, in order to classify firms into weak-governed firms and good- 
governed firms, we adopt a set of the above variables, such as board size 
(BOARD), non-executive ratio (RATIO) and blockholders' ownership (BLOCK), 
to identify them. In particular, we use the median values of them to split firms 
into two subgroups respectively. Median values of them are the benchmark in 
our classifications. We aim to find whether the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on financially constrained firms varies with board size, non- 
executive ratio or blockholders' ownership. 
2.3.2.2 Overconfidence Measurement 
We use the stock purchase decision to define our main overconfidence 
measurement (OVER 1). First, this is a net buyer approach, which is different 
from the managerial ownership approach. Although the level of managerial 
ownership has been suggested as a proxy for managerial confidence in some 
studies, we still question the validity of this measurement. The reason is that the 
level of ownership cannot fully reflect the active purchase decisions by directors. 
For example, new stock grants as a sort of compensation can also change the 
level of managerial ownership. And directors can offset any changes in the level 
of managerial ownership by new stock grants whenever they sell firms' shares. 
However, executive directors' stock purchase is in addition to the stock grants 
and options exercised during the year9. Such purchases cannot be motivated by 
tax consideration or by the concerns about underdiversification (Jin and Kotharti, 
9 The share dealing information in Hanscott has already clarified whether the dealing is purely 
done in the open market or because of exercise optiodatoch gram . 
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2005). Also, stock purchase in an open market is costly for managers. This is 
because when directors purchase shares of their firms, they send positive signals 
about the future value of the firm to the market and the signals are costly for 
directors since it puts at risk their own wealth. 
Second, in the UK, regulation of insider transactions is much stricter than in the 
US. Insiders are much more unlikely to take advantage of the undisclosed 
information (Fidrmuc et al., 2005). For example, in the UK, stock holdings of 
5% or more (3% or more from 1990) and increases in holdings of 1% or more 
above 5% in a listed company must be disclosed within five days (two days from 
1990) of the holding being purchased (Short and Keasey, 1999). Therefore, 
inside managers can hardly benefit from stock purchasing. However, even with 
such kinds of consideration, overconfident managers may still think a firm's 
value perceived by the market is much lower than the value perceived by 
themselves. So, they have greater propensity to purchase stock as a net buyer. 
Additionally, Odean (1998a, 1998b, 1999) suggests that behavioural bias such as 
investors' overconfidence can generate higher trading volume in the financial 
market. He notes that overconfident investors, at the individual level, trade more 
aggressively, which results in a lower profit. Accordingly, he finds that 
overconfident traders exhibit lower expected utility than rational traders and hold 
underdiversified portfolios. 
Moreover, Longholder and Holder 67, which are based on CEOs' persistent 
holding of options after vesting, have been mainly used by Malmendier and Tate 
(2005). This approach may be reasonable if the cost of diversification is smaller 
than the cost of early exercise of options, but otherwise the practice cannot not be 
used to measure overconfidence (Jin and Kothari, 2005). Hence a net buyer 
approach can be a more reasonable proxy for overconfidence. 
Finally, we consider whether there exist other alternative explanations of our net 
buyer approach. For example, the directors' share dealings may due to inside 
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information or signalling concern. When directors have positive inside 
information of their future stock prices, they are more likely to buy stocks. And, 
when the market has not such information and the firm's stock price is 
undervalued, investment may be sensitive to cash flow. In our analysis, we 
especially control this by emphasizing the persistence. As suggested in 
Malmendier and Tate (2005), positive information is viewed as a transitory rather 
than a fixed effect. It is unlikely that directors can repeatedly receive positive 
draw. Thus, our net buyer approach requires that the executive directors purchase 
additional shares for a specific length. Moreover, if directors would like to send 
a positive signal of their firms' prospect to the market, they would also be likely 
to purchase more shares. However, the signalling can decrease asymmetric 
information costs and eliminate the positive relationship between investment- 
cash flow sensitivity and the stock-based proxy for managerial overconfidence. 
And our hypothesis in turn dispels this alternative explanation. 
All in all, our main overconfidence variable (OVER 1) is set up according to 
stock purchasing in the open market and is similar to that in Malmendier and 
Tate (2005). When his/her amount of shares purchased during the sample period 
is larger than the amount of shares sold, the manager will be classified as a net 
buyer or overconfidence. In this chapter, we accumulate all executive directors' 
annual stock purchase amount (positive value) and selling amount (negative 
value) during 2003-2006. Accordingly, firms will be regarded as those with 
managerial overconfidence when the net amount of stock dealing is positive for 
all these four years. This not only allows us to distinguish managerial 
overconfidence from other explanations (such as inside information or signalling 
motives) that would cause simultaneous failure, but also accounts for their 
persistently overconfident behaviour. We also use OVER 2 to check the 
robustness, which regards firms as those with managerial overconfidence when 
the net amount of stock dealings is positive for at least three years over 2003- 
2006. 
To give more evidence, we also measure managerial confidence (OVER 3) using 
outsiders' perception of the executive directors captured by the press. A similar 
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approach can be found in Malmendier et al. (2007) and Hribar and Yang (2006). 
We collect data on the press coverage of our sample executive directors in all 
available business articles using Nexis UK. We count the total numbers of 
articles over 2003-2006 referring to the executive directors using the words 
"confident" or "confidence"; "optimistic" or "optimism"; and "reliable" , 
"cautious" , "practical" , "frugal" , "conservative" , or 
"steady. " We also hand- 
check each article to ensure that the articles are used to describe the executive 
directors and to identify articles that use the terms in negated form When the 
total number of articles describing executive directors as the optimistic or 
confident is higher than the total number of articles describing executive 
directors as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not 
optimistic, or not confident, this firm will be classified as a firm with managerial 
overconfidence and OVER 3 equals 1, otherwise 0. 
2.3.2.3 Empirical Spectfrcation 
In our primary analysis, the investment model only includes cash flow and 
investment opportunities which are concerned with the effects of internal funds 
on investment (Fazzari et al., 1988) where the market-to-book value ratio 
controls for the demand of the internal funds and cash flow controls for the 
supple side. The basic specification is as follow: 
(1)1, = a, +a2MTB, + a3CFLOW, + a4OYER, +asCFLOW, *0 YER, +. s, 
where I is the capital investment expenditure, CFLOW is cash flow, MTB is 
market-to-book value, OVER represents three kinds of managerial 
overconfidence variable and a, is the error term. 
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We also add more control variables (X, ) in our model to check the robustness of 
our estimation. X, includes a vector of control variables such as size (SIZE 1 and 
SIZE 2), leverage (LEV), dividend payouts (DIV 1 and DIV 2) and age (AGE), 
cash holding (CASH). The specification is as follow: 
(2) I, =a, + a2MTB, + a3CFLOW, + a, OVER, + a5CFLOW, * OVER, + A6X, + e, 
In both specifications, we especially concern about the coefficient (as) of the 
interaction of CFLOW and OVER. According to our hypotheses, we expect to 
find that as is positive in financially constrained firms, especially in firms with 
weak governance mechanisms. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
24.1 Univariate Analysis 
We report univariate mean comparison of main independent variables by 
different investment quartiles in Table 2.4. The investment quartiles are based on 
data from 2006. Then, we use t-test to test whether the firms' characteristics (e. g. 
investment, market-to-book value, cash flow, cash holding, size, leverage and 
dividend) and managerial overconfidence in the first-quartile are significantly 
different from those in the fourth quartile. 
In Table 2.4, the mean value of MTB is monotonically increasing with 
investment from the second to the fourth quartiles. This is consistent with the 
prediction that investment is positively related to growth opportunity. However, 
the MTB in first quartile is quite higher. We reason that it can be attributed to 
cash holding, in that firms with the lowest investment also hold the highest cash 
reserves, which mean that cash holding can facilitate more investment 
opportunities in the future, but curb the current invest. 
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Cash flow as a proxy for internal funds plays an important role in determining 
investment, which also increases with investment quartiles. As far as other fines' 
characteristics are concerned, dividend payouts and size consistently increase 
from the first to the fourth quartile, which means firms with lower dividend 
payouts and smaller size always have lower investment. Leverage and age 
increases with investment from the first to the third quartile, which also provides 
evidence that younger firms with lower leverage have lower investment. These 
variables in the first and fourth quartiles differ significantly at 1% level, except 
for DIV2 and MTB. 
Finally, managerial overconfidence (OVER 1 and OVER 2) has a positive 
relationship with corporate investment and displays a clear difference between 
the first and fourth investment quartiles and t-test is significant at 1% level. This 
is robust in our press portrayal measurement (OVER 3). The results are in line 
with our correlation matrix, that managerial overconfidence is positively related 
with firms' investment expenditure. 
2.4.2 Regression Reste 
2.4.2.1 The Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
We examine the impact of managerial overconfidence on investment decisions 
by employing the average cross-sectional regression (CSA) approach. As 
suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995), the dependent variable is based on time 
t, while other independent variables are based on averaged values from lagged 
time t-1 to time t-n. Averaged value can mitigate annual adjustment of each firm 
or extreme values and lagged value can deal with endogeneity. To provide robust 
results, we estimate our hypothesis by using two average cross-sectional 
regressions over two different periods. For example, our dependent variable I 
(investment) is measured in years 2006 and 2005 respectively, while other 
independent variables including financial constraint proxies are average-past 
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values over 2002-2005 and 2003-2005. Similar methods have also been used in 
Marchica and Mura (2007). 
We start with a baseline CSA regression (equation 1) on our whole sample to 
show the determinants of investment in Table 2.5. It includes investment 
opportunity (MTB), cash flow (CFLOW), and managerial overconfidence 
variable (OVER 1). We also include the interaction term of CFLOW and OVER 
1 to test whether managerial overconfidence itself can influence corporate 
investment levels. In Table 2.5, the dependent variable is measured in year 2006, 
while other variable are measured by the average values over 2002-2005. We 
find the positive impacts of cash flow and investment opportunity on investment 
for all firms. In particular, the impact of cash flow on investment is significant at 
the I% level, which suggests cash flow (CFLOW) as a proxy for internal funds is 
preferred by firms to invest and is an important determinant of investment. In 
addition, we find that managerial overconfidence (OVER 1) has positive impacts 
on investment. More importantly, the coefficient of OVER 1 *CFLOW is 
significantly positive. This implies that overconfident managers tend to increase 
their investment with internal fiords. 
We then compare the different impacts of managerial overconfidence on 
investment between financially constrained and unconstrained firms in Table 2.5. 
Using size, leverage, dividend, age and cash holding to identify financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms, we mainly concern whether managerial 
overconfidence can significantly increase the investment-cash flow sensitivity in 
financially constrained firms. 
The most important result in Table 2.5 refers to the coefficient of the interaction 
term (OVER I* CFLOW). For example, in leverage (LEV), age (AGE), cash 
(CASH) and dividend (DIV 2) groups, this coefficient consistently displays 
positive at 5-10'/o significance levels in financially constrained firms. In 
particular, the value of coefficient (OVER 1 *CFLOW) is in a range from 0.155 
to 0.230, which suggests that for each unit of additional cash flow, a constrained 
61 
firm with overconfident managers can increase around 0.185 units of investment. 
Whereas, in financially unconstrained firms, the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity is indeterminate. This 
implies that, in financially unconstrained fines, overconfident managers can 
invest at the first-best level in their perspective, which is independent of cash 
flow. The different impacts of managerial overconfidence on investment-cash 
flow sensitivity imply that overconfident managers tend to increase investment 
with cash flow when they are facing financial constraints. It also reveals the fact 
that overconfident managers prefer to use internal funds for investment in 
financially constrained firms. 
As far as the impact of investment opportunity (MTB) is concerned, we find a 
positive relationship between MTB and investment in financially constrained 
firms identified by size, leverage, dividend and age. However, the results are 
only statistically significant in the leverage and size groups. This cannot provide 
supportive evidence that a positive role of growth opportunities in determining 
investment decisions especially in financially constrained firms. Similar results 
could also be found in Aslan et al. (2006), in which they discuss the corporate 
investment in Turkey. 
Finally, Table 2.5 reveals that financially constrained firms, except in size 
groups, exhibit significantly a positive relationship between investment and cash 
flow, whereas the significant relationship cannot be found consistently in 
financially unconstrained firms. This is in line with previous studies (see e. g. 
Fazzari et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Himmelberg 
and Petersen, 1994) on investment that report that investment-cash flow 
sensitivity should be more pronounced in financially constrained firms. When 
fines are facing limited cash flow and costly external fiords for their investment, 
their investment should be more sensitive to cash flow. Moreover, the F-tests are 
rejected in the size groups (SIZE 1 and SIZE 2), which indicates that size cannot 
serve as a good identification in our test. 
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To provide more evidence, we estimate the regression with more control 
variables (equation 2). Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 present the results of the average 
cross-sectional regressions, in which the dependent variable is measured in years 
2006 and 2005 respectively. In these two tables, we find consistent results with 
our baseline regression. In financially constrained firms identified by leverage, 
dividend, age and cash holding, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is 
significantly positive. But the financially constrained firms in size groups 
identified by SIZE 1 and SIZE 2 do not display a positive relationship between 
cash flow and investment. And some F-tests are still rejected in size groups. 
Also, the adjusted R-squared value is very low in size groups, which implies that 
the data of financial constrained firms identified by size does not fit the model 
well in our sample. Moreover, we find that the coefficient of OVER 1 *CFLOW 
is significantly positive in financially constrained firms identified by leverage, 
dividend, age and cash holding. These are consistent with the results of our 
baseline regression and support our hypothesis that managerial overconfidence 
can increase investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially constrained firms. 
Moreover, as for other control variables, we find a positive relationship exists 
between cash holding and investment and it is statically significant in financially 
constrained firms identified by leverage, dividend and age in Table 2.6 and Table 
2.7. This indicates that in financially constrained firms, more cash holdings can 
facilitate more investment in the future. 
2.4.2.2 The Role of Corporate Governance Mechanism 
A following question that emerges from our empirical analysis could be: given a 
firm nm by managerial overconfidence and weak corporate governance 
mechanism, to what extent does managerial overconfidence affect their 
investment decisions? 
We then use board size (BOARD), non-executive directors ratio (RATIO) and 
blockholders' ownership (BLOCK) respectively to classify firms as mentioned in 
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Section 2.2.3. We mainly expect to find that managerial overconfidence, 
especially in financially constrained firms, could persistently increase firms' cash 
flow sensitivity of investment when firms' monitoring mechanisms are 
weak(firms with large board size, low non-executive directors or low 
blockholders' ownership). When the biased investment decision is a recurrent 
problem, then the potential prescription for managerial overconfidence can be 
strong outsider monitoring by corporate governance mechanism. If this is the 
case, we predict that the impact of managerial overconfidence on investment may 
turn to be insignificant in these firms. 
In Tables 2.8 and 2.9, we present the results of comparing firms with large-size 
boards with those with small-size boards over the different time periods. In 
particular, we only consider financially constrained firms in leverage, dividend, 
age and cash groups, in which the significant relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and investment-cash flow sensitivity has been found in our 
previous estimates. In these two tables, we find some evidence that the positive 
impact of managerial overconfidence in investment-cash flow sensitivity varies 
with the board size. That is in leverage, age and dividend groups, managerial 
overconfidence remains a positive and significant influence on investment-cash 
flow sensitivity for firms with large-size boards, while managerial 
overconfidence play an indeterminate role on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
for firms with small-size boards. This is consistent with some governance 
studies (see, Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) that firms with large-size 
boards are more cumbersome. When boards become too big, they become less 
effective because the coordination and process problems overwhelm the 
advantages from more expertise to draw on. 
We then follow another governance attribute: the ratio of non-executive directors 
in boards (RATIO). In Tables 2.10 and 2.11, we present the results of financially 
constrained firms with high or low ratio of non-executive directors according to 
the different time periods. We find that the positive impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity is significant for constrained 
firms with low RATIO in leverage, dividend and age groups. It indicates that, 
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when non-executive directors have fewer incentives to oversee managers' 
behaviour, managerial overconfidence can increase investment with cash flow to 
their desired level. By contrast, we find that the positive relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and investment-cash flow sensitivity turns to be 
statistically insignificant in constrained firms with high RATIO. This supports 
the view that more non-executive directors in boards can act as professional 
referees to ensure that managers stimulates action align with shareholders' 
interests. They are useful in disciplining management and overconfident 
investment can be restrained when the biased investment by overconfident 
managers is a recurrent problem. 
Finally, we use blockholders' ownership (BLOCK) to provide more evidence. In 
Tables 2.12 and 2.13, we present the results of financially constrained firms with 
high or low blockholders' ownership using different time periods. We find that 
the positive impact of managerial overconfidence is kept to be significant for 
constrained firms with low blockholders' ownership (BLOCK) in leverage, 
dividend, age and cash groups. It reveals that, when non-management 
shareholders' ownership is low, they cannot monitor management effectively and 
the impact of managerial overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
remains significant. By contrast, managerial overconfidence can no longer 
consistently affect investment-cash flow sensitivity in constrained firms with 
high blockholders' ownership. This provides supportive evidence that the impact 
of managerial overconfidence might be restrained when non-management 
shareholders with large ownership can monitor management successfully and 
exercise influence over managers of the firms they invest in. 
14 .3 Robustness Checks 
For the robustness purpose, we adopt two alternatives measures of managerial 
overconfidence (OVER 2) and (OVER 3) in our estimations. OVER 2 is based 
on managers' share dealing information and OVER 3 is based on press portrayal. 
When firms have been identified as net buyers for at least three years (2003- 
65 
2006) rather than all years in our previous analysis, OVER 2 in our regression 
will be assigned as a value of 1, otherwise a value of 0. OVER 3 is also a dummy 
variable. It equals 1 when the number of articles describing executive directors as 
optimistic or confident is larger than the number of articles describing executive 
directors as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not 
optimistic, or not confident over 2003-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
2.4.3.1 The Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 present the results for our estimation of the different roles 
of managerial overconfidence (OVER 2) in financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms using the different time periods. And Tables 2.16 and 2.17 
present the results for our estimation of the different roles of managerial 
overconfidence (OVER 3) in financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
according to the different time periods. Since, size group (SIZE 1 and SIZE 2) do 
not provide any supportive evidence in our main estimation, we only do the 
robustness checks for other five groups. Consistent with our previous results in 
Tables 2.5,2.6 and 2.7, we find that financially constrained firms display a 
positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. The coefficient of OVER 2*CFLOW or OVER 3* CFLOW is 
statistically significant at 5-10% level. Moreover, in all groups, financially 
constrained firms exhibit positive investment-cash flow sensitivity. The 
coefficient of CFLOW is statistically significant at the 1-5% level. In contrast, 
we cannot find any positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially unconstrained firms. In summary, 
these results are consistent with our prediction that investment by overconfident 
managers is more sensitive to cash flow in financially constrained firms. 
2.4.3.2 The Role of Corporate Governance Mechanism 
We then investigate the monitoring role of corporate governance mechanism in 
investment by overconfident managers. Accordingly, Tables 2.18-2.23 present 
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the results using OVER 2 as a proxy for managerial overconfidence. And Tables 
2.24-2.29 provide evidence using OVER 3 as a proxy for managerial 
overconfidence. 
As for board size (Tables 2.18,2.19,2.24 and 2.25), we do not find any 
supportive results that managerial overconfidence can persistently increase 
investment-cash flow sensitivity in firms with large-size boards. Instead, our 
results reveal that managerial overconfidence can persistently increase 
investment-cash flow sensitivity in firms with small-size boards, which is 
contrary to our previous results. Furthermore, due to our classification, the 
subsample size decreases a lot resulting in some poor F-tests in our estimation. 
As for the ratio of non-executive directors (Tables 2.20,2.21,2.26 and 2.27) we 
find consistent evidence that managerial overconfidence consistently increase 
investment with internal funds in constrained firms with low non-executive 
directors' ratio. And according to the valid F-test, we find the results are robust 
in leverage, cash and dividend (DN2) groups. 
Finally, as for the blockholders' ownership (Tables 2.22,2.23,2.28 and 2.29), we 
find a positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and cash flow 
sensitivity of investment is held in constrained firms with lower blockholders' 
ownership. And it is statistically significant in cash, dividend (DIV2) and age 
groups. 
in sum, the robustness results support our prediction that the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity should be greater 
in financially constrained firms. Meanwhile, the results reveal that for 
constrained firms with low ratio of non-executive directors or with low 
blockholders' ownership, the effect of managerial overconfidence on investment- 
cash flow sensitivity is held. While, the effect of managerial overconfidence on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity is not held in constrained firms with high ratio 
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of non-executive directors or with high blockholders' ownership. However, we 
do not find consistent results for firms with various board sizes. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the impact of managerial overconfidence on investment 
decisions in a sample of UK firms. There are two important features of our 
analysis. First, we focus on the importance of financial constraints in determining 
the linkage between managerial overconfidence and investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. In particular, we use size, leverage, dividend, age and cash holding to 
identify firms as financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Second, we 
have attempted to test whether corporate governance mechanisms working as the 
monitoring management can check overconfident managers' investment. To do 
so, we use a set of governance variables, such as board size, non-executive 
directors' ratio and blockholders' ownership, to split firms into two subgroups. 
Consistent with our predictions, our results indicate that managerial 
overconfidence can increase investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially 
constrained firms identified by leverage, dividend, age and cash. But we do not 
find any supportive results in size classification. Overconfident managers tend to 
overestimate the outcomes of their investment and tend to invest more. In 
financially constrained firms, overconfident managers are more sensitive to cash 
flow to pursue their desired investment level. By contrast, managerial 
overconfidence is independent of investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially 
unconstrained firms. That is because overconfident managers in financial 
unconstrained firms can much easier to access various sources of capital to 
pursue their desired investment. Both results are consistent in our robustness 
checks using two other alternative measures of managerial overconfidence. 
In addition, our results provide evidence that the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment varies in corporate governance regime. In 
particular, we argue that firms with large (small) board sire, low (high) ratio of 
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non-executive directors in boards or low (high) blockholders' ownership tend to 
have weak (good) corporate governance mechanism. And the weak corporate 
governance mechanism cannot affect the impact of managerial overconfidence 
on constrained firms in that the positive relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and investment-cash flow sensitivity is still held in those firms. 
Our results show that the positive relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and investment-cash flow sensitivity is kept to be significant in 
constrained firms with low ratio of non-executive directors in boards or with low 
blockholders' ownership. This implies that lower proportions of non-executive 
directors or investors with lower ownership cannot provide effective monitoring, 
nor influence the biased investment decisions by overconfident managers. In 
contrast, we find the positive relationship managerial overconfidence and 
investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially constrained firms changes to be 
insignificant in the presence of good corporate governance mechanism. However, 
we do not find any consistent results that the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity varies with the board size. 
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Figure 2.1: Investment Decisions with Capital Market Perfection or 
Imperfection. 
0 ý C) 
b 
... ý 
ý 
r 
wo W, Ko K, 
S 
KK Capital Stock 
Notes: This figure is reproduced from Hubbard's (1998) graph. The horizontal axis 
represents the capital stock, and the vertical axis represents the cost of capital. D is the 
demand for capital by firms and r represents the real interest rate in the market. The 
horizontal S is the supply curve in a perfect capital market. Given a growth opportunity, 
D and S intersect at the capital stock of W. K is the first-best capital stock in a perfect 
capital market. 
S(Wo) is the supply curve with two components in an imperfect capital market: the 
horizontal one which is at r up to the level of net worth (Wo) and the up-sloping line. 
The slope of it is determined by growth opportunity. Ko is the equilibrium capital stock 
in an imperfect capital market, which is lower than W. Given a constant growth 
opportunity, an increase in net worth from Wo to W,, can shift the supply curve from 
S(Wo) to S(W1). K, is the new equilibrium level of capital stock, which is higher than Ko 
but is lower than the first-best K. 
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Figure 2.2: Managerial Investment Decisions: Financially Unconstrained 
Firms. 
r S 
º 
K" Km 
Capital Stock 
Notes: This figure is based on Hubbard's (1998) graph. The horizontal axis represents 
the capital stock, and the vertical axis represents the cost of capital. D is the demand for 
capital by firms and r represents the real interest rate in the market. The horizontal S is 
the supply curve in a perfect capital market. Given a growth opportunity, D and S 
intersect at the capital stock of K*. K* is the first-best capital stock for financially 
unconstrained firms with non-overconfident managers. 
The key point here is that we consider investment decisions by overconfident managers. 
Given that overconfident managers tend to overestimate the future return of investment, 
they perceive the growth opportunity to be higher than that perceived by non- 
overconfident managers. Hence, the slope of their demand curve (Dm) is flatter than D. 
K`m is the equilibrium capital stock of financially unconstrained firms with 
overconfident managers. 
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Figure 2.3: Managerial Investment Decisions: Financially Constrained 
Firms. 
r 
WO Wi KoKomK1 Kim K" Km 
Notes: This figure is based on Hubbard's (1998) graph. The horizontal axis represents 
the capital stock, and the vertical axis represents the cost of capital. D is the demand for 
capital by firms and r represents the real interest rate in the market. The horizontal S is 
the supply curve in a perfect capital market. Given a growth opportunity, D and S 
intersect at the capital stock of K*. K* is the first-best capital stock for financially 
unconstrained firms with non-overconfident managers. 
S(Wo) is the supply curve with two components for financially constrained firms: the 
horizontal one which is at r up to the level of net worth (Wo) and the up-sloping line. 
The slope of it is determined by growth opportunity. Ko is the equilibrium capital stock, 
which is lower than K. Given a constant growth opportunity, an increase in net worth 
from Wo to W,, can shift the supply curve from S(Wo) to S(W1). K, is the new 
equilibrium level of capital stock for financially unconstrained firms with non- 
overconfident managers, which is higher than Ko but is lower than the first-best Ka. 
We consider investment decisions by overconfident managers. Given that overconfident 
managers tend to overestimate the future return of investment, they perceive the growth 
opportunity to be higher than that perceived by non-overconfident managers. Hence, the 
slope of their demand curve (Dm) is flatter than D. W. is the equilibrium capital stock of 
financially unconstrained firms with overconfident managers. Given a constant growth 
opportunity, an increase in net worth from Wo to W1, can shift the supply curve from 
S(Wom) to S(W, m). Kim is the new equilibrium level of capital stock for financially 
unconstrained firms with non-overconfident managers, which is higher than Kom but is 
lower than the first-best KCm. More importantly, the changing amount from Kom to Kim is 
greater than the distance Ko to K,. 
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Table 2.1: Variables, Definitions and Sources. 
Variable Definition Sources 
I Investment. The ratio of payments to fixed assets to Datastream total assets. 
MTB The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity to book Datastream 
value of total assets. 
CFLOW Cash flow. The ratio of pretax profits plus depreciation Datastream 
to total assets. 
LEV Leverage. The ratio of total debt to the total assets. Datastream 
SIZE 1 Total assets (in natural logarithm). Datastream 
SIZE 2 Total sales (in natural logarithm). Datastream 
DIV 1 Dividend. The ratio of ordinary dividends to total Datastream 
assets. 
DIV 2 Dividend. The ratio of ordinary dividends to earnings Datastream 
before dividend. 
CASH Cash holding. Total ratio of total cash and equivalents Datastream 
to total assets. 
AGE The number of years that a firm has been incorporated Datastream 
in 2006 plus one in natural logarithm. & Internet 
BOARD Board size. The total number of directors in the 
boardroom. 
RATIO The ratio of total number of non-executive directors to 
total number of all directors. 
BLOCK Blockholders' ownership. The total percentage of 
shareholding by shareholders (other than managers) 
with ownership greater than 3%. 
Hemscott 
Hemscott 
Hemscott 
NET Net buyer. A dummy variable, which takes the value of 
BUYER 1 if the net amount of share dealings by all executive Hemscott 
directors is positive and 0 otherwise. 
OVER 1A dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm 
has been identified as net buyer for all years over 2003- Hemscott 
2006 and 0 otherwise. 
OVER 2A dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm 
has been identified as net buyer for at least 3 years over Hemscott 
2003-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
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OVER 3A dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the 
number of articles describing a firm's executive 
directors as optimistic or confident is larger than the 
number of articles describing a firm's executive NexisUK 
directors as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, 
fiugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not confident over 
2003-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
Notes: Datastream database provides accounting and market data. Hemscott Guru 
Academic database provides financial data for the UK's top 300,000 companies and 
detailed data on all directors of UK listed companies. Nexis UK is a single most 
powerful global news and business information service. 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics. (N=578) 
Variables Mean S. D. 25% Median 75% 
I 
MTB 
CFLOW 
SIZE 1 
SIZE 2 
LEV 
DIV 1 
DIV 2 
AGE 
CASH 
BOARD 
BLOCK 
RATIO 
OVER 1 
OVER 2 
OVER 3 
0.045 0.051 0.013 0.030 0.060 
1.864 1.858 1.062 1.400 2.013 
0.052 0.185 0.019 0.087 0.150 
11.352 2.217 9.737 11.197 12.756 
10.980 3.040 9.459 11.227 12.970 
0.169 0.164 0.015 0.138 0.268 
0.020 0.026 0.000 0.015 0.029 
0.582 10.511 0.000 0.167 0.472 
3.199 0.912 2.398 3.091 3.989 
0.129 0.161 0.024 0.071 0.170 
7.179 2.551 579 
37.372 22.197 21.283 35.845 51.210 
0.513 0.158 0.4 0.5 0.615 
0.106 0.308 000 
0.275 0.447 001 
0.381 0.486 001 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our 
analysis. Investment is measured in 2003-2006, OVER 1 and OVER 2 and OVER 3 is 
measured over 2003-2006 and internal corporate governance variables are measured 
over 2004-2005. All other variables are measured over 2002-2005. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.4: Firm Characteristics by Investment Quartiles. 
Investment First Second Third Fourth 
quartiles quartile quartile quartile quartile 
t-test 
MTB 1.911 1.666 1.802 1.821 
(1.572) (1.077) (1.237) (1.072) 0.81 
CFLOW -0.025 0.033 0.078 0.116 
(0.195) (0.151) (0.125) (0.131) -10.18*** 
SIZE I 10.422 11.141 11.911 11.881 
(1.952) (2.259) (2.102) (2.141) -8.56*** 
SIZE2 9.373 10.978 11.949 11.621 
(3.498) (2.598) (2.346) (2.582) -8.79*** 
LEV 0.134 0.172 0.194 0.184 
(0.164) (0.152) (0.141) (0.153) -3.74*** 
DIVI. 0.014 0.018 0.023 0.024 (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) -5.34*** 
DIV2 
0.295 0.303 0.325 0.314 
(2.534) (1.151) (1.375) (1.805) -0.11 
AGE 2.937 3.191 3.475 3.216 (0.794) (0.902) (0.957) (0.905) -3.94*** 
CASH 0.164 0.149 0.096 0.107 
(0.177) (0.157) (0.121) (0.105) 4.70*** 
OVER 1 0.083 0.093 0.107 0.138 
(0.276) (0.292) (0.310) (0.346) -2.13** 
OVER 2 0.228 0.239 0.284 0.349 (0.421) (0.427) (0.452) (0.478) -2.94*** 
OVER 3 
0.339 0.339 0.422 0.422 
(0.474) (0.474) (0.495) (0.495) -2.06** 
Notes: This table provides univariate mean comparisons of firm-specific characteristics 
by investment quartiles. It also provides standard deviation comparison in parentheses. 
The t-statistics is for the difference of means between the first (lowest investment) and 
the fourth quartiles (highest investment). ***and ** indicate coefficient is significant at 
1% and 5%, respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Chapter 3 
How Does Investment Affect Cash Flow 
Sensitivity of Cash: An Empirical Study of 
UK Firms 
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3.1 Introduction 
There is an extensive literature that attempts to explain firms' motives for 
holding cash. One of the explanations is based on transaction costs (Meltzer, 
1963; Miller and Orr, 1966), that is, firms with lower transaction costs tend to 
accumulate less cash. Moreover, departing from capital market perfection, 
asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and agency problems (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) provide further grounds to explain another 
precautionary motivation for holding cash. That is, when the costs of external 
financing increase, firms needing external funds to invest will have to pass up 
some positive NPV projects. Therefore, investment expenditure is not only 
subject to their growth opportunity but also subject to the availability of internal 
funds. Under such conditions, holding cash can avoid the costs of cash shortfalls 
and facilitate future investment ability. Dittmar et at (2003), on the other hand, 
suggest that holding cash can be indicative of managerial discretion. For example, 
entrenched managers would rather hold more cash to pursue their private benefits 
than distribute it to shareholders. Previous empirical research also provides 
detailed evidence on the determinants of cash holding (e. g. Kim et al., 1998; 
Opler et al., 1999) incorporating firms' specific characteristics such as size, 
growth opportunity, cash flow, etc. 
Another strand of the cash holding literature links financial constraints with cash 
flow sensitivity of cash. A notable study is by Ahneida et al. (2004), who 
emphasize that financial constraints can create a demand for hoarding cash to 
facilitate future investment. Their results suggest that cash flow sensitivity of 
cash is positive in financially constrained firms, while there is no systematic 
relationship between cash holdings and cash flow in financially unconstrained 
firms. This is an alternative explanation for the effects of financial constraints 
emphasizing the linkage between financial constraints and liquidity demand 
rather than the linkage between financial constraints and corporate investment 
demand in other previous papers (e. g. Fazzari et al., 1998; Hoshi et al., 1991; 
Whited, 1992, etc). However, their argument still do not provide a clear account 
about how financial constraints can be related to both cash flow sensitivity of 
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cash and cash flow sensitivity of investment within one framework. One 
hypothesis, for example, is that financially constrained firms should increase 
their investment with cash flow, which may also lead firms to save more cash out 
of cash flow. The main objective of this chapter is, therefore, to provide more 
insights into this relationship by providing a detailed analysis of the impact of 
investment on cash flow sensitivity of cash in the presence of financial 
constraints. 
This chapter consists of three stages. 
In the first stage, we simply discuss the determinants of cash holding relating to 
several firm-specific characteristics such as size, leverage, dividend, cash flow, 
investment and managerial ownership. 
In the second stage, we emphasize the importance of financial constraints in 
determining cash holdings. In line with Ahneida et al. (2004), we acknowledge 
that there exists a positive relationship between cash flow sensitivity of cash and 
financial constraints. In particular, we evaluate the extent to which investment 
influences cash flow sensitivity of cash by emphasizing the importance of 
financial constraints. A possible scenario is that financially constrained fines are 
those firms that have limited internal funds and lower capacity to raise funds 
externally for investment. They, therefore, have higher preferences for saving 
cash out of cash flow than other unconstrained firms. Owing to insufficient 
internal cash flow in financially constrained firms, not all profitable investment 
projects can be achieved to a first-best level. When cash flow increases, firms 
distribute additional cash flow into dividend payouts, debt payoff; investment 
and cash holding. However, financially constrained firms are unlikely to choose 
dividend payouts (a zero NPV project) rather than pass up other positive NPV 
investment projects. Meanwhile, cash plays an important role in hedging future 
cash shortfalls in these constrained firms. As a result, an increase in cash flow 
would lead to an increase in investment and an increase in cash holding in the 
first stage. However, more investment expenditure may limit the source available 
for cash and increase cash flow fluctuations in the future. Then, an increase in 
investment expenditure can finally induce financially constrained firms to save 
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more cash out of cash flow. In contrast, financially unconstrained firms have 
higher capacity to raise either internal or external funds and are expected to 
undertake all profitable investment projects to the first-best level. Hence, cash 
holding policy is independent of cash flow and investment policy. Empirically, 
we hypothesize that investment can increase firms' propensity to save cash in 
financially constrained firms, with reference to cash flow sensitivity of cash. In 
contrast, we do not expect to find a determinant impact of investment policy on 
cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially unconstrained firms. 
In the third stage, we further test whether investment decisions by overconfident 
managers can affect cash flow sensitivity of cash, especially in financially 
constrained firms. The underlying notion is that that agents/managers may act in 
a manner deviating from the behaviour we would expect of fully rationality. In 
particular, behavioural researchers have argued that overconfident managers tend 
to make biased corporate decisions (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Roll, 1986; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Malmendier et al., 
2007). These studies attribute managerial overconfidence to a stylish fact that 
overconfident managers tend to overestimate the future returns of investment 
projects under their control. In Chapter 2, we have analyzed the issue of how 
managerial overconfidence affects investment decisions in financially 
constrained firms. A natural extension would be whether this impact can further 
affect firms' cash holding policy. In this chapter, we focus on this clue aiming to 
provide a more comprehensive analysis on the association between investment 
decisions and cash policy in the presence of managerial overconfidence. 
Our hypothesis is as follows: although cash is an important tool for hedging cash 
flow shortfalls in the future and avoiding transaction costs, financially 
constrained firms with overconfident managers might still persist in investing in 
their perceived profitable projects as many as possible rather than save more cash 
out of cash flow. This is because overconfident managers believe the benefits of 
their desired projects should be higher than the benefits of accumulating cash. In 
other words, the positive relationship between investment and cash flow 
sensitivity of cash may not be held in financially constrained firms with 
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overconfident managers. We, therefore, hypothesize that the positive association 
between cash flow sensitivity of cash and investment expenditure becomes 
weaker in financially constrained firms with managerial overconfidence than 
those firms without managerial overconfidence. 
To empirically investigate these hypotheses, we use a large sample of UK listed 
firms over the period 1996-2006 and collect various firm-specific characteristics 
(e. g. market to book value ratio, cash flow, size, leverage, etc. ) in order to 
analyse the determinants of cash holding. In line with the prediction of the non- 
linear relationship between managerial ownership and cash holding (Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004), we also include managerial ownership and its squared and cubic 
values in our estimation. We then interact investment expenditure with cash flow 
as an essential factor in our regression. Doing so enables us to test the existence 
of the impact of investment on cash flow sensitivity of cash. Moreover, we 
identify firms as the financially constrained and unconstrained firms according to 
their single indicators, such as dividend payouts, size, leverage and age. Finally, 
to test the role of managerial overconfidence on cash holding policy, we split 
firms into those with managerial overconfidence and those with managerial non- 
overconfidence by using our managerial measurement (OVER 1). This is a 
dummy variable, which equals 1 when firms have been identified as net buyers in 
the open stock market for at least three years between 2003 and 2006, otherwise 
it equals 0. To give more evidence, we also use press portrayal as an alternative 
measurement (OVER 2). 
With respect to estimation methods, we initially employ an average cross- 
sectional technique developed by Rajan and Zingales (1995), in which the 
averaged value of explanatory variables are used to allow for annual adjustment 
rather than fixed adjustment over the entire sample period in GMM and lagged 
explanatory variables (one year lag) are used to reduce endogeneity. We execute 
our CSA regressions over two time periods: one, the dependent variable is 
measured in year 2006; two, the dependent variable is measured in year 2005. 
And the independent variables are average-past values over 2002-2005 and 2001- 
2004 respectively. In addition, the first-difference GMM and the system GMM 
110 
estimations (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995) are used to 
present target adjustment models. This enables us to explain a firm's cash 
holding in terms of its cash holding in the previous period and its target level. 
Also, the dynamic models can control for unobservable fine-specific effects and 
firm-constant time-specific effects. And their instrument variables can be used to 
deal with endogeneity. Moreover, our dynamic analysis is conducted in 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms, respectively. We predict that 
there exist different adjustment speeds between financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms, that is financially constrained firms are expected to have 
lower adjustment speeds with regard to their target cash level. We argue that it is 
easier for financially unconstrained firms to change their cash holding level and 
investment level by choosing among several alternative sources of financing. In 
contrast, financially constrained firms are more likely to face future cash 
shortfalls and their target cash levels are relatively higher. In order to adjust to 
the target levels, they have to pass up some positive NPV projects and 
accumulate cash out of cash flow. Hence, it would take longer for financially 
constrained firms to adjust to their target cash levels. 
Our average cross-sectional estimation shows that firms with higher growth 
opportunity, lower investment, lower dividend payouts and lower leverage tend 
to hold more cash. Our results also find a non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and cash holding. When managerial ownership is at a low 
level, we find a negative and significant relationship between ownership and cash 
holding (alignment effect). This implies that an increase in managerial ownership 
can help to align the conflicts between managers and shareholders and thus 
managers tend to use less cash to pursue their private benefits. However, when 
managerial ownership exceeds a certain level, the benefits of alignment effect 
can be replaced by the private benefits of holding cash (entrenchment effect). 
Then, an increase in managerial ownership can result in higher cash holding. 
Finally, the negative coefficient of the cubic value of managerial ownership 
means that the positive relationship between cash holding and ownership will 
change back to a negative one. This indicates that the interests of managers can 
converge to the interests of shareholders when managerial ownership is 
substantially high. 
III 
More importantly, our average cross-sectional estimation implies a significant 
and positive relationship between the interaction term of investment and cash 
flow and cash holding in financially constrained firms with lower leverage ratio 
or lower dividend payouts. Contrarily, in financially unconstrained firms, we 
cannot find such a significant relationship. This supports our prediction that 
investment expenditure can increase cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially 
constrained firms, but cannot affect cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially 
unconstrained firms. In addition, we also find that cash flow has a significant and 
positive impact on cash in constrained firms, identified by leverage and dividend, 
which is in line with the arguments of Almeida et at. (2004). 
In terms of the role of managerial overconfidence, we especially analyse its 
impact on cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially constrained firms. The 
cross-sectional regression demonstrates that financially constrained firms with 
managerial overconfidence have an insignificant relationship between the 
interaction term of investment and cash flow and cash holding. However, in 
dividend, leverage and age groups, financially constrained firms without 
managerial overconfidence retain a significant positive relationship between the 
interaction term of cash flow and investment and cash holding. This implies that 
overconfident managers tend to believe the benefits of their projects should be 
larger than the benefits of accumulating cash. Hence they would rather invest 
than retain cash out of cash flow. Therefore, we can conclude that managerial 
overconfidence can weaken the positive relationship between investment and 
cash flow sensitivity of cash in younger firms with lower leverage and dividend 
payouts. 
Furthermore, our first-difference GMM and system GMM estimations provide 
consistent evidence that there exists a significant and positive relationship 
between investment and cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially constrained 
firms in leverage and dividend groups. In contrast, in financially unconstrained 
firms, investment cannot lead to any significant impact on the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash. 
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Finally, both dynamic GMM estimations show that financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms tend to adjust their cash holding to a target level. Our results 
reveal that this adjustment is slower in financially constrained firms, except for 
dividend group. This implies that financially unconstrained firms are able to 
quickly change their cash holding level and investment level by choosing among 
several alternative sources of financing. However, it would take longer for 
financially constrained firms to adjust to their target cash levels - either because 
of the higher target levels or the costs of adjustment they entail. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the 
determinants of cash holding. We argue the different roles of investment on cash 
flow sensitivity of cash in financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Then, 
we discuss the impact of investment by overconfident managers on cash flow 
sensitivity of cash, especially in financially constrained firms. Section 3.3 
presents data and our estimation techniques. Our empirical results are provided in 
Section 3.4. Finally, in Section 3.5 conclusions are drawn. 
3.2 Theoretical Background and Empirical 
Hypotheses 
In the presence of perfect capital markets, cash holdings are irrelevant. However, 
holding cash can be relevant when firms are facing capital market imperfection. 
In what follows, we present the main reasons why cash holdings can be relevant. 
3.2.1 Transaction Costs 
There are two major motives associated with this framework: (1) the transaction 
costs motive and (2) the precautionary motive. The transaction motive is based 
on the costs of transferring cash from other non-cash substitutes (Keynes, 1936). 
Referring to the transaction costs, a value-maximizing firm balances the marginal 
costs and benefits of cash holding to hold an optimal amount of cash. Thus, those 
firms who can more cheaply convert their non-liquid assets into cash will hold 
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less cash. The precautionary motive is that firms need to accumulate cash to 
hedge their future cash shortfalls and so those firms who are more likely to face 
financial constraints in the future tend to hold more cash. 
Nevertheless, holding cash also has costs. In fact, there are three feasible ways 
for firms to obtain cash promptly: cutting dividends, external funds from capital 
market or cutting off investment in production; however, each of them is costly. 
For example, assuming that managers aim to maximize their firms' value, then 
the costs of holding cash lie in their lower expected return relative to other 
investments with the same risk. Moreover, a large shortage of cash implies 
decreasing investment or raising more costly external funds. A study from Kim 
et al. (1998) emphasize that firms' optimal level of cash holding is the result of a 
trade-off between investment in production and investment in cash. Namely, 
there must be a critical level of external financing costs, above which firms 
would invest in cash. Meanwhile, due to potential financial constraints in the 
future, they may pass up some current positive growth opportunities to retain 
earnings on cash. Therefore, we can predict a positive relationship between cash 
holding and transaction costs. 
Firms with sufficient cash flow have lower transaction costs and fewer incentives 
to hold large amounts of cash (Kim et al., 1998, Opler et al., 1999). Therefore, a 
negative relationship between cash and cash flow can be predicted. We define 
cash holding (CH) as the ratio of total cash and equivalents to total assets, while 
cash flow (CFLOW) is pre-tax profits phis depreciation over total assets. To the 
extent that investment can limit the internal source of cash holding, we could 
expect a negative relationship between investment expenditure and cash holdings. 
However, investment expenditure could also be regarded as a proxy for 
investment opportunities or costs of financial distress, in which investment can 
be positively related to cash (Hartzell et al., 2006). Firms with better investment 
opportunities value cash more and accumulate more cash to satisfy higher future 
investment, the reason being that it is more costly for these firms to be 
financially constrained. We use the ratio of capital expenditure in fixed assets to 
total assets to measure investment expenditure (I). 
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Moreover, leverage ratio and dividend payouts can be related to the transaction 
costs. On one hand, firms having access to debt markets can use debt as a 
substitute for maintaining cash holdings. Larger amounts of debt imply firms' 
greater ability to raise funds from an external capital market (John, 1993). 
Moreover, Baskin (1987) argues that when the firms' debt ratio increases, the 
cost of funds used to invest in liquidity increases, and this can decrease the need 
for cash holding. Acharya et al. (2007) argue that debt can be regarded as 
negative cash only when financially constrained firms are facing lower hedging 
needs. As far as leverage can act as a proxy for firms' ability to issue debt, we 
predict that there would be a negative relationship between debt and cash holding 
and use LEVERAGE (LEV) to measure debt which is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. 
On the other hand, it is reasonable to predict that dividend paying firms are 
facing lower transaction costs than non-dividend paying firms, because they can 
gain cash relatively cheaper by cutting their payouts. This leads to a negative 
relationship between dividend and cash holdings. However, firms have 
incentives to stick to their dividend payout plan (Brav et al., 2005) and they may 
have to accumulate cash to avoid future cash shortfalls. If this is the case, then 
we could expect a positive relationship between cash and dividend payouts. 
Nonetheless, if we regard dividend payouts and leverage as alternative 
substitutes for cash, we can expect cash holding to be positively related to them 
(Opler et al., 1999; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). We define dividend as the ratio of 
total cash dividend payouts to total assets (DWI) and as the ratio of dividend 
payouts to earnings before dividend (DIV2). 
Finally, Mulligan (1997) argues that the transaction cost motive for cash holding 
can be associated with firms' activity, technological sophistication and 
opportunity costs. In other words, larger firms are believed to have with lower 
transaction costs. Hence, we can expect a negative relationship between firms' 
size and cash holding in that those larger firms tend to hold less cash. Here, we 
use the natural logarithm of total assets to measure firms' size (SIZE) in 1996 
prices. 
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3.2.2 Asymmetric Information 
As mentioned above, external funds from the capital market can be one of the 
feasible ways for firms to obtain cash. In other words, if external funds are 
costly, more cash will be needed to facilitate future investment opportunities. 
This precautionary motive is based on capital market frictions due to asymmetric 
information and agency costs. 
It has been acknowledged that asymmetric information between managers and 
investors can induce costly external financing. On the one hand, outside lenders 
realize it may be difficult to distinguish a risky debt from a safe one because of 
the asymmetric information between firms and themselves. They tend to limit 
their supply of loans by raising interest rates. As a result, firms are simply unable 
to access any loans they would like at a prevailing market interest rate (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). Moreover, this credit rationing induces adverse selection 
(Akerlof, 1970) in that all low-risk borrowers will be withdrawn from the market. 
Finally, only risky borrowers with higher returns will be ready to take up the 
higher interest rate debt contracts. On the other hand, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
propose the signalling role of equity issuance when asymmetric information 
exists between managers and the equity market. Assuming that managers know 
the future prospects of their firms while investors do not, managers in firms in 
good shape but with limited internal funds may be reluctant to issue stocks and 
pass up valuable investment projects, because they believe their stocks are 
undervalued. 
Therefore, we can primarily predict that firms facing higher asymmetric 
information costs tend to hold more cash to avoid costly external funds. 
Empirically, firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to incur 
higher bankruptcy costs or shortfalls of cash (Williamson, 1988; Harris and 
Raviv, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), and then tend to have larger cash 
reserves. We predict a positive relationship between growth opportunity and cash 
holding. To proxy for investment opportunity (MTB), we also use the ratio of 
book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity 
to book value of total assets. In addition, smaller firms exhibit less information 
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asymmetries (Collins et al., 1981; Brennan and Hughes, 1991) and lower costs of 
external financing (Whited, 1992; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993) than larger firms, 
who tend to hold lower cash. In this respect, we can expect a negative 
relationship between firms' size and cash holding. 
3. Z3 Agency Costs of Debt 
The standard agency model examines the relationship between the principal and 
the agent within a firm. The agency costs arise when the interest of shareholders 
differ from those of bondholders. Two main kinds of agency costs have been 
frequently debated: asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Barnea et al., 
1980) and underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977). In the first case, incentive 
effects associated with debts can induce managers to undertake risky but higher 
return projects and transfer wealth from bondholders to themselves. To avoid this 
asset substitution, bondholders may have to pay higher monitoring and audit 
costs to oversee agents' behaviour. In the second case, if debt matures after the 
expired date of investment, then issuing debt can induce an underinvestment 
problem. The reason for this is because shareholders may not receive all net 
benefits from future investment opportunities, and part of them could be 
transferred to bondholders such that shareholders prefer not to invest, even 
though the projects are valuable. Although such costs are initially borne by the 
principals (bondholders), they are finally transferred to managers (shareholders) 
through contracting. 
In both cases, firms may face costly external funds and have to pass up some 
current profitable investment opportunities. Firms with higher agency costs tend 
to hold more cash to hedge future cash shortfalls and avoid raising costly 
external finds. Firms with higher leverage level are expected to face higher 
agency costs and bankruptcy costs and hold more cash. Hence, we can predict 
that leverage is positively related to cash holding. However, firms can use 
leverage as a substitute for holding cash because leverage can act as a proxy for 
firms' ability to borrow debts (John, 1993). If this is the case, we predict a 
negative relationship between leverage and cash holding. 
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3.2.4 Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion 
Besides the low return of cash holding, another cost of holding cash is its agency 
costs of managerial discretion. Jensen (1986) proposes a free cash flow theory to 
identify another agency cost arising from conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, in which managers with more cash have greater flexibility to 
pursue their own private interests at shareholders' expense. Cash as free cash 
flow should be paid back to shareholders, but these payouts can reduce 
managers' control over firms' resources. Hence, the less cash managers pay back, 
the more self-interest can be retained. We expect that the agency cost of 
managerial discretion is positively related to cash holding. In other words, 
increasing cash may reduce firms' value but increase managers' private benefits. 
Agency costs arising from the conflicts between managers and shareholders 
could be eliminated by managerial ownership. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
formalized a relationship between firms' value and managerial ownership. They 
suggest that firms' value depends on the fraction of shares owned by managers. 
So, more managerial shareholdings can result in less agency costs and higher 
firm value. However, some empirical studies indicate that this relationship can 
be non-monotonic (e. g. Stutz, 1988; Morck et a!., 1988; McConnel and Serveas, 
1990,1995; Short and Keasey, 1999). For example, in a takeover market (Stutz, 
1988), when managerial ownership increases, the possibility of hostile takeover 
will be lower. But this possibility will be zero when managerial ownership rises 
to 50%. Morck et al. (1988) proposed a trade-off of two opposing forces arising 
from managerial shareholdings: managerial tendency to pursue their own 
interests (entrenchment effects) and greater coincidence between managers and 
outsiders (incentive alignment a ffiwts). McConnel and Serveas (1990,1995) 
document a significant curvilinear relation between Tobin's Q and managerial 
ownership: Q first increases according to the fraction of shares held by corporate 
insiders, and then declines as insider ownership increases beyond the 40-50% 
range. Using UK data, Short and Keasey (1999) show that the performance of 
firms as measured by RSE is positively related with managers' ownership in the 
0-15.58% range, negatively related in the 15.58-41.84% range and positively 
related when managers' ownership exceeds 41.84%. The turning points change 
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to 12.99 and 41.99%, respectively when VAL is used to measure the 
performance. 
In the context of cash holding decisions, the evidence of the relationship between 
cash holding and managerial ownership is mixed. Opler et al. (1999) report 
neither strong evidence of a linear association between insider shareholding and 
cash in the US nor any evidence of their non-linear relationship. However, Ozkan 
and Ozkan (2004) document a cubic relationship between managerial ownership 
and cash holding due to the opposing impacts of incentive alignment effects and 
entrenchment effects. That is, an increase in managerial ownership can help to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders and thus managers tend to use 
less cash to pursue their private benefits (alignment effects). Also, there exists a 
negative relationship between cash holding and managerial ownership. However, 
when managerial ownership exceeds a certain level, the benefits from alignment 
effects cannot be greater than the private benefits by holding more cash. In this 
case the conflicts will not be aligned and managers tend to hold more cash 
(entrenchment efiects). Thus, managerial ownership is predicted to be negatively 
related to the amount of cash reserves. 
Therefore, a preliminary investigation about the relationship between managerial 
ownership and cash holding is carried out. Figure 3.1 presents the way in which 
the two variables are associated. It seems that at low levels of managerial 
ownership, managerial ownership is negatively related to cash holding. The 
appearance of Figure 3.1 is similar as the one provided by Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004). But the turning point is quite different from theirs. Cash holdings first 
decrease with managerial ownership. When firms have managerial ownership 
between 9 and 15%, cash holdings fall to the lowest level of. Once managerial 
ownership exceeds 15°x6, the negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and cash holdings changes to be a positive one. Finally, cash holding 
decreases to a lower level when managerial ownership exceeds 70%. This 
indicates that the interests of managers can converge to the interests of 
shareholders when managerial ownership is high enough. 
In general, the figure reveals that the relationship between cash holding and 
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managerial ownership is non-monotonic. To control for the non-linear aspect of 
managerial ownership, in our empirical model we include the level of managerial 
ownership (OWN), the square value of managerial ownership (OWN2) and the 
cubic value of managerial ownership (OWN). Doing so, we capture the 
possibility that the relationship between managerial ownership and cash holding 
has two turning points. Managerial ownership (OWN) is measured as the 
percentage of shares held by all executive directors. 
3. Z. 5 The Rok of Financial Consdaints 
Another strand of cash holding literature is to link financial constraints with cash 
holding. In fact, based on the above analysis, firms with limited internal fiords 
and higher costs of external funds to invest are more likely to be financially 
constrained and tend to retain more cash holdings out of cash flow. Hence, we 
can expect a positive relationship between the costs of external funds and cash 
holdings. In the following section, we present a brief review of related research 
in this respect. 
The role of financial constraints has been widely acknowledged by the 
investment literature. They argue that financially constrained firms should rely 
more heavily on internal cash flows to finance investment. And investment is 
more sensitive to the fluctuations of cash flow in firms with lower dividend 
payouts. These conclusions, however, have been challenged on theoretical and 
empirical grounds (see, Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary 1999 etc) that firms 
classified as less financially constrained actually exhibit higher investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. 
Despite these controversies concerning investment-cash flow sensitivity, 
Almeida et al. (2004) propose an alternative model of corporate demand for 
liquid assets. They argue that financial constraints should be related to firms' 
propensity to save cash out of cash flow, which they refer to as "cash flow 
sensitivity of cash". Their notion originates from Keynes' (1936) research, which 
proposes that the importance of corporate cash policy is influenced by firms' 
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capacity to raise external finance (financial constraints). It is beneficial for 
financially constrained firms to retain cash to avoid transaction costs and future 
cash shortfalls arising from agency problems and asymmetric information. In 
contrast, financially unconstrained firms have unrestricted access to external 
capital markets, so internal funds and cash holding is irrelevant. Therefore, they 
believe that cash flow sensitivity of cash should be increased in financially 
constrained firms, while such a systematic relationship between cash flow and 
cash holding does not exist in financially unconstrained firms. Thus, we expect 
that financially constrained firms display a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash, 
while financially unconstrained firms do no have such a positive sensitivity. 
Finally, we use the following four alternative criteria to identify financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms: SIZE, LEV, DIV1, DIV2 and AGE. 
Specifically, we assign to the category of financially constrained firms those 
firms that are in the bottom three deciles (smaller) of the distribution (the 
distribution of size leverage, age or dividend). And those firms that are in the top 
three deciles (larger) of the distribution are assigned to the category of financially 
unconstrained firms. 
3.26 Interaction of Investment and Cash Flow 
Provided that cash flow is positively related to investment (e. g. Fazarri et al., 
1988; Devereux and Shiantarelli, 1990; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Hoshi et al., 
1991) and cash holding (Almeida et a!., 20(4), especially in financially 
constrained firms, cash holding and investment in these firms can both increase 
with cash flow. A following question could be whether the interaction of cash 
and investment could be used to further explain the positive cash flow sensitivity 
of cash and the positive cash flow sensitivity of investment in financially 
constrained firms. 
In the following section, we discuss this question in two respects. The possible 
framework is that, on the one hand, cash policy should affect investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. The lower the capacity of raising external fiords is, the higher 
the cash holdings are required, which may hamper firms' current investment but 
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facilitate their ability to invest in the future. In this regard, we will provide some 
related literature later. On the other hand, investment decisions can also affect 
cash flow sensitivity of cash. Since investment and cash holding are both 
determined by the availability of internal funds (cash flow) in financially 
constrained firms, more investment can limit the source available for cash and 
increase cash flow fluctuations in the future. Therefore, from the hedging 
perspective, more cash will be required. In our study, we aim to centres on this 
respect whether investment can affect cash holding policy. 
The issue of cash policy influencing investment-cash flow sensitivity has been 
studied by Arslan et al., (2006) and Marchica and Mura (2007). Both sets of 
authors emphasize the hedging role of cash affecting investment-cash flow 
sensitivity by comparing cash-poor and cash-rich firms. The work of Arslan et al. 
(2006) investigates the role of cash holding in influencing the relationship 
between financing constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity. Authors not 
only use traditional methods to classify the firms into financially constrained and 
financially unconstrained firms, such as size, age, business groups and dividend, 
but also use cash holding to check whether cash holding is valid acting as a 
proxy for financial constraint. In order to set up the cash holding classification 
scheme, they use median value as a benchmark. Financially constrained firms are 
those firms with below median value of cash holdings, while financially 
unconstrained firms are those firms with above median value of cash holdings. In 
addition, they consider target cash level as another benchmark. And financially 
constrained firms (cash-poor) are those cash holdings lower than their estimated 
target levels, and vice versa. They argue that investment is much more sensitive 
to cash flow in those cash-poor firms. Since their empirical study focuses on a 
developing country-Turkey, they also consider the role of cash on investment 
decisions in a period of financial crisis. They find that investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is greater in those cash poor firms, especially in the period of crisis. 
Another work from Marchica and Musa (2007) investigates how persistent cash 
policy affects investment decisions. They focus on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity in the UK listed firms using target cash holding as a benchmark to 
classify firms into high cash holding fums and low cash holding firms. In line 
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with the persistent cash holding policy proposed by Mikkelson and Partch (2003), 
they consider high (low) cash holding firms as those persistently holding higher 
(lower) cash than the estimated target level for at least three consecutive years. 
Meanwhile, they use GMM to reduce endogenous and heterogeneous problems 
in the panel and average cross-sectional regression to deal with annual 
adjustment of explanatory variables. Their findings show that those firms with 
persistently low cash invest less in investment expenditure, while firms with 
persistently high cash invest significantly more and their cash policy seems to 
decrease investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Unlike Arslan et al. (2006) and Marchica and Mura (2007), we investigate a 
reverse part of the interaction of investment and cash holding, which is how 
investment affects cash flow sensitivity of cash. In addition, we emphasize the 
importance of financial constraints in influencing this relationship. 
The `irrelevance of liquidity' theory deems (Almeida et al., 2004) that a 
financially unconstrained firm is able to invest at the first-best and holds cash 
regardless of cash flow, which is still the case for the financially unconstrained 
firms in our hypothesis. That is because financially unconstrained firms are those 
either facing low costs of external financing or having sufficient internal funds 
for their present and future investment. Financially unconstrained firms can 
invest to their first-best investment levels, which are independent of other 
corporate financial policies including cash holding policy. The first-best 
investment in each period is determined at the point where firms can maximize 
their profits so that the (expected) marginal return on investments is equal to the 
marginal cost of capital. Consequently, the cash holding level is irrelevant of 
internal funds. In line with this, we predict that investment is independent of the 
cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially unconstrained firms. 
On the contrary, financially constrained firms are unable to undertake all their 
positive NPV investment projects owing to limited internal finds and costly 
external financing. First, these firms prefer to use internal funds to invest as 
external financing is costly for them. When the firms are with limited internal 
firms for investment, their investment cannot be achieved at the first-best levels. 
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Second, the firms need cash holdings in the presence of asymmetric information, 
agency costs and transaction costs to facilitate future investment. Any increase in 
cash holdings will result in the sacrifice of some current profitable investments. 
Thus, we can predict that financially constrained firms might have a propensity 
to save more cash out of cash flow. Third, when cash flow increases, firms can 
choose dividend payout, debt payoff, investment and cash holding to distribute 
additional cash flow. However, financially constrained firms are unlikely to 
choose a zero NPV project (such as dividend payout) rather than pass up other 
valuable investments. Moreover, cash is a very important tool for avoiding 
transaction costs and cash flow shortfalls. As a result, constrained firms choose 
to increase investment and cash in the first stage. However, an increase in 
investment expenditure will limit the source of saving cash and increase cash 
flow fluctuations in the future. Then, an increase in investment expenditure can 
eventually induce constrained firms to save more cash out of cash flow. 
Empirically, we predict that investment can increase firms' propensity to save 
cash in constrained firms, which is called "cash flow sensitivity of cash". 
3.2.7 The Rok of Managerial Overconfidence 
In the second chapter, we have already discussed the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment decisions. The premise behind this is that 
corporate decisions can also be affected when managers are irrational. 
Managerial overconfidence, as a particular irrationality, has been recently 
emphasized that overconfident managers tend to overestimate the outcomes of 
the investment under their control (see, Roll, 1986; Heaton, 2002; Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2007). 
Building on this, we further explore whether investment undertaken by 
overconfident managers can exert an impact on cash flow sensitivity of cash. The 
analysis in this section is conducted especially in financially constrained firms 
rather than in financially unconstrained fines. That is because, for financially 
unconstrained firms, the `irrelevance of liquidity' theory (see Almeida et al., 
2004) is also applicable even for firms with overconfident managers. With easier 
124 
access to capital, overconfident managers can invest at their desired first-best 
levels. Although they may invest more than non-overconfident managers, their 
investment decision is still irrelevant of cash flow sensitivity of cash. 
In regard to financially constrained firms, we develop our hypothesis in two 
stages. First, we acknowledge that investments undertaken by overconfident 
managers increase with cash flow in financially constrained firms. The 
underlying notion is that overconfident managers are those who overestimate the 
return of investment projects and tend to invest more aggressively. In addition, 
managers' preference for internal finds over external funds to invest is still held 
for overconfident managers. The reason for this is that overconfident managers 
tend to believe capital markets undervalue their firms. Then, the cost of external 
financing in their perspective is much higher than that in the perspective of non- 
overconfident managers such that overconfident managers are reluctant to raise 
funds externally to invest. As a result, overconfident managers' overinvestment 
tendency and their financing preference induce positive investment-cash flow 
sensitivity in financially constrained firms with overconfident managers. In 
summary, an increase in cash flow can increase investment undertaken by 
overconfident managers in financially constrained firms. 
Second, we apply the managerial view into the linkage between cash holding 
policy and investment and argue that a biased balance between cash holding and 
investment should exist. We focus on one of the drawbacks of investing liquid 
asset, which is the low return of holding cash. For instance, if firms expect to 
experience high costs of external financing, firms tend to save more cash out of 
cash flow. However, hoarding cash today means passing up current investment 
projects. Meanwhile, overconfident managers think the benefits of their desired 
investment should be larger than the benefits of accumulating cash. Hence, firms 
with overconfident managers tend to increase their investment with internal 
finds, but are reluctant to increase their cash holding. In other words, for 
financially constrained firms, when cash flow increases, overconfident managers 
would rather invest in production than invest in cash. Their propensity for saving 
more cash out of cash flow is less sensitive to cash flow than those with non- 
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overconfident managers. We predict that this managerial investment decision can 
eliminate the positive relationship between investment and cash flow sensitivity 
of cash holding in financially constrained firms. 
Our main overconfidence dummy variable is organized as follows. That is we 
consider stock dealing decisions by all executive directors during the period 
2003-2006. In a firm, when the amount of shares purchased by executive 
directors in a sample year is larger than the amount of shares sold by executive 
directors, the firm will be classified as a net buyer in this sample year. Moreover, 
we identify firms with managerial overconfidence based on their persistent share 
dealing behaviour. That is, we identify those firms who have been classified as 
net buyers (overconfident) for at least three years over the period 2003-2006 as 
those with managerial overconfidence (0VER1); otherwise those firms are 
without managerial overconfidence. To give more evidence, we also measure 
managerial confidence (OVER 2) using outsiders' perception of the executive 
directors as captured by press. When the total number of articles over the period 
2003-2006 describing executive directors as the optimistic or confident is higher 
than the total number of articles describing executive directors as reliable, steady, 
practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not confident, this firm 
will be classified as a firm with managerial overconfidence and OVER2 equals 
one, otherwise zero. We predict that investment by non-overconfident managers 
can positively and significantly affect the cash flow sensitivity of cash in 
constrained firms, while investment by overconfident managers tend to 
insignificantly affect the cash flow sensitivity of cash in constrained firms. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Daia 
In our estimation, we use a sample of non-financial UK listed films during the 
period 1996-2006, using two data sources for the compilation of the sample: 
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Datastream and Hemscott. First, financial firms are excluded from our sample. 
Second, the dataset was cleared of outliers by excluding the values of each 
variable that he outside the Ist and 99th percentile range. Third, we chose those 
firms that had no missing data in the period 1996-2006. In order to carry out the 
GMM estimations we included in the sample only those firms with a minimum 
of five consecutive years of observations. Taking these factors into account 
resulted in an unbalanced panel of 648 firms. Data on corporate managerial 
ownership (2003-2005) and managerial overconfidence (2003-2006) are 
collected from Hemscott. Table 3.1 presents a definition of all variables used in 
our analysis, Table 3.2 A shows descriptive statistics for the main variables and 
Table 3.2 B shows the panel data structure. 
Table 3.2 A shows that all firms have 11 % of total assets investing in cash 
holdings (CH) during the period 1996-2006. This is higher than the 9.9% 
reported by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) in the period 1995-1999 and the 10.4% 
reported by Marchica and Mura (2007) in the period 1989-2002, but is close to 
that reported by Guney et al. (2007), of 11% in the period 1996-2000. Different 
mean values of cash holdings are probably the result of different sample periods. 
For example, in our sample, the mean value of cash holding is around 10.6% 
over 1996-2000, but increases to about 12% during 2001-2006. We use capital 
expenditure in fixed assets to calculate investment (I) and report an average value 
of 0.057. This is in line with Guney et al. (2007), who report an average value of 
0.06 during 1996-2000. In addition, cash flow (CFLOW) is around 8% from 
1996 to 2006. This closes to the reports from Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and 
Guney et al. (2007), who report 8.8% in the period 1995-1999 and 8% in the 
period 1996-2000, respectively. In addition, average firm size (SIZE) is around 
11.376, average leverage ratio (LEV) is 0.176 and average market to book value 
(MTB) is 1.851. These are in line with Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Guney et al. 
(2007). 
As for as managerial ownership is concerned, average executive ownership is 
8.20%, which is lower than the 8.98% reported by Florackis and Ozkan (2007). 
Finally, we report our managerial overconfidence variable (OVERT), which is a 
dummy variable, and about 23.6% of firms appeared to be net buyers for at least 
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three years in the stock market over the period 2003-2006. And about 37.3% of 
firms have been perceived by press as overconfidence (OVER2). 
In Table 3.3, we present the Pearson's correlation matrix. The results are 
generally in line with our prediction. The negative correlation between cash 
holding and cash flow means that firms with sufficient cash flow have lower 
transaction costs and fewer incentives to hold large amount of cash. It also 
indicates that smaller-size firms with younger age, lower leverage ratio and lower 
dividend payouts tends to hold more cash, which is in line with the transaction 
costs theory. Firms with higher growth opportunity also tend to hold more cash, 
which is in line with the asymmetric information theory. Moreover, we find that 
managerial ownership displays a negative relationship with cash holding, which 
is in line with the alignment effect of managerial ownership. That is an increase 
in managerial ownership can help to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders and thus managers tend to use less cash to pursue their private 
benefits. Finally, our managerial overconfidence measures (OVERT and OVER2) 
are significantly and negatively correlated with cash holding. It also indicates 
that firms with managerial overconfidence tend to invest more rather than retain 
cash. However, such findings do not lead to concrete inferences for the potential 
interaction effect of managerial overconfidence and cash flow sensitivity of cash. 
3.3 .2 Methodology 
We firstly perform our average cross-sectional (CSA) regression using the 
following specification: 
(1) CH, =ao, +a1, CFLOW, +a2,1, +a3, CFLOW *1, +Eak, xk, +a, 
k-4 
We conduct our initial estimation to discuss the determinants of cash holdings 
using our subsample over the period 2001-2006 in the UK listed firms. 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), two average cross-sectional regressions 
are executed. They are: one: the dependent variable (CH) is measured in year 
2006 and two: the dependent variable is measured in year 2005. And 
independent variables are measured as average-past values over the period 2002- 
2005 with 550 firms and the period 2001-2004 with 562 firms respectively. 
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Averaged values of independent variables can mitigate annual adjustment and 
extreme values for each firm, and lagged values can deal with endogenous 
problems. We mainly focus on whether investment can affect cash flow 
sensitivity of cash. To do so, we use an interaction term CFLOW "I, which 
represents the impact of investment on cash flow sensitivity of cash. If 
investment decisions can increase the sensitivity of cash to cash flow, then the 
coefficient a, of this term should be a positive one. We also use Zaax, to 
k=4 
control for variables relating to the transaction costs and precautionary motives 
for holding cash such as size, market to book value, leverage, and dividend and 
managerial ownership to investigate their roles in determining cash holding. 
Finally, in order to test the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership 
and cash holding, we include the squared and cubic values of managerial 
ownership in 
ý ý aklxk, 
k=4 
According to our prediction that investment has different impacts on cash flow 
sensitivity of cash with financial constraints, we also identify firms as being 
either financially constrained or unconstrained as discussed in Section 3.2.5. We 
are especially interested in the sign and significance level of the coefficient (a3 ) 
and expect it is positive in financially constrained firms. 
In addition, we use a panel data set over the period 1996-2006 with 648 UK 
listed firms to provide more evidence. Panel data sets that combine time series 
and cross sections are common in the existing cash holding literature. 
Heterogeneity and endogeneity arising from panel data require various 
estimation techniques. For example, cross-sectional and pooled cross-sectional 
regressions are used by Kim et al. (1998) and Dittmar et al. (2003). Opler et al. 
(1999) emphasizing the persistence of cash holding and the target cash levels. 
They use the Fama-Macbeth methodology (Fama and Macbeth, 1973), a cross- 
sectional regression is estimated for each year, which can eliminate the problem 
of serial correlation in the residuals. They also use OLS and fixed effect 
estimations. In these estimations, White's (1980) correction has been used for 
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testing heteroskedasticity. 
These static cash holding models used in the cash holding research implicitly 
assume that firms can instantaneously adjust towards the target cash level 
following changes in firm-specific characteristics and/or random shocks (Ozkan 
and Ozkan, 2004). However, real adjustment process of cash holding always 
involves a lag, which changes specification (1) as follows: 
Let the optimal cash holding of firm i in period t, denoted as CH, *, , 
be a function 
of cash holding determinants (X °) and lagged explanatory variables (X b) and 
write: 
"ab (2) CH,, =Ff a1X P+Zx ýrýr-ýý 
+ 
i: firm, j: inants, I : time 
This set-up implies that the optimal cash holding may vary both across firms and 
over time. In the presence of capital market imperfection, the observed cash 
holding of firm i at time t, CH,,, should be equal to the optimal cash holding, i. e. 
CH. = CHü . However, 
if capital market imperfection makes adjustment costly, 
firms may not fully adjust their cash holding level from a previous period to a 
current one. This leads to a partial adjustment mechanism as follows: 
(3) CHI -CH, J_, = ß(CH; -CH_, ) . 
where fi is the adjustment parameter capturing the extent of desired adjustment 
of the optimal cash holding from the previous to the current period. The value of 
/S varies between 0 and 1. If .8 =1, the entire adjustment 
is made immediately 
and a firm's cash holding is at the target. If ß =0, no adjustment of cash holding 
is made to its target due to high adjustment costs. 
Rewriting equation (3) using equation (2) yields: 
CH = CH,., -1 + 
ß(CH;, - CH,., -1) (4) 
=(1-ß)CH +ßýfcriX°j+ßýf jXbnu-1)+s. 
We, in tum, can obtain an empirical specification as follows: 
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(5) CH;, = y0CH,,, 1+ 
EYkX at + j:. Z, tXbkla-1) + U, + U, + #r, . k=1 k=1 
Unobservable characteristics of a firm that have a significant impact on the 
firm's cash holding are captured by u, . 
The fixed effects v, represent firm- 
specific effects which are unobservable and differ across firms but are fixed for a 
given firm through time. These characteristics include an ownership variable 
which can be assumed to be constant over the years. Hence, X° includes firm- 
specific characteristics determining cash holding such as cash flow, size, etc., 
apart from managerial ownership and Xb includes all lagged explanatory 
variables. This time-invariant industry-specific effect can also capture industry- 
specific effects. U, captures time effects that are kept the some for all firms at a 
given point in time but vary across time. The time effects include 
macroeconomic factors such as prices and interest rates. 
In addition, ýB =1- yo represents the speed of adjustment. Hence, a higher value 
of fl denotes a higher speed of adjustment. In other words, the higher value of 
yo =1- ß in equation (5) represents a lower speed of adjustment on cash holding. 
We argue that the adjustment speeds vary with financial constraints. It is easier 
for financially unconstrained firms to change their cash holding level and 
investment level by choosing among several alternative sources of financing. 
However, financially constrained firms are more likely to face future cash 
shortfalls and their target cash levels are relatively higher. In order to adjust to 
the target levels, they have to pass up some positive NPV projects and 
accumulate cash out of cash flow. Hence, it would take longer for financially 
constrained firms to adjust to their target cash levels. Hence, we expect the 
adjustment speed will be lower in financially constrained firms. Accordingly, To 
in equation (5) will be higher in financially constrained firms. 
Furthermore, comparing with other estimation methods, the dynamic GMM 
model (equation (5)) has unique advantages for dealing with several econometric 
problems (Hsiao, 1985). First, the fixed effects v, may be correlated with 
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explanatory variables. Second, firm-specific variables may be endogenous so that 
the causality affecting cash holding may also affect some regressors and these 
regressors may also be correlated with error term 4u . 
Third, the lagged 
dependent variable CH,, r_, gives rise to autocorrelation with the error term. 
If we use OLS in equation (5), dynamic panel bias can arise. OLS regression 
cannot consistently estimate the parameters because (CHa_, - CH, -2 
) and 
(p, - p_, ) are correlated through CH,, _, and kü_, . 
Moreover, fixed-effect (FE) 
and random-effect (RE) estimations are neither consistent nor eliminate this bias 
(see Nickell, 1981; Bond, 2002). In a simulation, Judson and Owen (1999) find a 
high bias of 20% when time period equals 30. 
Moreover, if the errors cannot be considered to be independent on the regressors, 
then instrumental variables (IV) are called for. Therefore, Kiviet (1995) 
suggested a corrected FE estimator to eliminate this bias. However, this approach 
only works for the balanced data and without considering the endogeneity of 
some regressors. Another solution is the application of the N estimator, 
proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). They introduce instruments by using 
ACHU_2 = (CHü_2 - CH. -3) or 
CHN_2 for the first difference of the lagged 
dependent variable where both are correlated with (CHN_l - CHU_2) but 
uncorrelated with (.,, This instrumental variable estimation can provide 
inconsistent estimators if the error term jtu is not serially correlated. However, 
this approach cannot provide good improvement in its efficiency by using deeper 
lags of dependent variable as instruments since more observations with 
unavailable lagged observations are dropped which makes the sample much 
smaller10 . 
Consequently, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested a new approach of first- 
differencing GMM-DIF. It has asymptotic properties and can be performed in a 
few time periods with many firms' cases, as Monte-Carlo evidence is able to 
10 More details about OLS and N tecbn qucs can be feud in Appendix B. And more details 
about OLS and Fama- h techniques can be found in Appendix C. 
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show. Its advantages are the ways to solve the above three problems faced by 
dynamic models. 
In order to deal with the first problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) derive a first- 
differencing (A) model, which can be transformed from equation (5) as follows: 
(6) ACHtt = y0ACHt. t-1 + ykAXakit + 1: AkAX bW(t-1) + Aut + APO . k=1 k=1 
As can be seen, the individually fixed effect, such as ownership variable has been 
removed from our model. In addition, GMM-DIF is concerned with not only the 
endogenous problem between lagged dependent variables and firm-specific 
effects but also the endogenous problem between lagged dependent variables and 
other firm-specific variables. This is because the first lagged dependent variable 
may be correlated with firm-fixed effects or with firm-specific variables. For the 
second and third problems, they use instrumental variables in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, where lagged dependent variable and endogenous regressors 
are instrumented. Therefore, the selection of instrumental variables is very 
important. GMM-DIF employs additional instruments obtained by the orthogonal 
conditions that exist between the error term pt and the lagged dependent 
variables. Therefore, the GMM-DIF optimally exploits all the linear moment 
restrictions specified by the model. To obtain consistent GMM-DIF estimators, 
E"f4t-1) is not necessarily zero but E(#, /4-2) should be zero. If the error 
terms are not correlated, then A& is orthogonal to the past variables X and CH 
so that (X-2, X. -I ... 
CHI-2, CHH-3 ... ) can be used as instruments for AX. If 
. au 
follows a MA(l) process, then the instrument set will be 
XR-,, XM-.... CH 3, CHM-4.... That is the first valid instruments start form the 
third lag not from the second because the differenced distribution follows an 
MA(2) process. Therefore, it is important that there is no higher-order serial 
correlation to have a valid instrument set. Empirically, it is reported by Sargan's 
test of overidentifying restrictions, which indicates the validity of instruments 
whether instruments and residual are independent. We also test the null 
hypothesis of no first and second order serial correlation in the residuals 
separately (denoted as M1 and M2). Finally, we compute and report the two-step 
GMM results using the small variance correction (Windmeijer, 2000). 
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The disadvantage of the first-difference GMM estimation is its dealing with 
missing data in the unbalanced data set. If CH is missing for some companies, 
then ACH,, = CH - CH,., _1 and 
ACH,.,.., = CH,., +1 - 
CH,, will be missing in the 
transformed equation. Arellano and Bover (1995) argue that the absence of 
information with respect to the parameters in the level variables causes 
substantial loss of efficiently in models estimated in first-differences using 
instruments in levels. Therefore, they use `forward orthogonal deviations' for 
transformation into a differencing equation, which is called system GMM 
(GMM-SYS). Blundell and Bond (1998) show that GMM-SYS has dramatic 
efficient gain when GMM-DIF estimator performs poorly especial for short 
sample period and persistent data. For example, the coefficient estimator of 
lagged dependent variable can be downward-biased when the coefficient 
estimate of lagged dependent variable approaches unity and the ratio of 
(variance( u, )/variance( A)) increase. Moreover, once lagged first differenced 
and lagged levels instruments are used into the instrument set, the finite sample 
biases can be reduced considerable by exploiting the additional moment 
conditions coming from level equations. That is, instead of subtracting CH,., _, 
in 
ACH,, , we can subtract the average of all 
future available observations of CH 
which minimizes the data loss. Also, lagged observations are used as instruments. 
We use GMM-SYS as our robustness test. 
Finally, the long-term relationship between the cash holding and its determinants 
may differ from the short-term effect. Any difference in the sign of the 
coefficient of the contemporaneous and lagged values of explanatory variable 
reveals its possibility (Blundell and Bond, 1998). We finally examine the long- 
run relationship ( Antoniou et al., 2006) by using the following equation (7). 
CH'r+ )AM* + (Y2 + )CFLOW'+(r+ )I'+ 1-ro 1-ro 1-ro 
r'+ý'')LEY'+(r + )DIY'+(r + )SIZE'+ 
1-ro 1-ro 1-ra 
(r, +. 
1, )AGE' +(r 
+ )I' * CFLOW 1-ro 1-ro 
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The parameters used in the above (yo "" "ys, A, """. ý) and obtained using a dynamic 
estimation of equation (5). 
3.4 Empirical Results 
This section contains the empirical results of our regressions. Section 3.4.1 
presents a univariate analysis of mean-comparison of key independent variables 
by different cash holding quartiles. We then present multivariate analysis in 
Section 3.4.2. In this section, we first use averaged cross-sectional regression to 
show determinants of cash holding and how investment has different impacts on 
cash holding policy between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We 
then use average cross-sectional regression to show how managerial investment 
influences cash holding policy in financially constrained firms by splitting firms 
into those with managerial overconfidence and those with managerial non- 
overconfidence. In Section 3.4.3, we use panel data estimates to show further 
robustness results. 
3.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
We report univariate mean-comparisons of key independent variables in different 
cash holding quartiles of our sample in Table 3.4. The quartiles are based on 
annual data of cash holding. Then, we use a t-test to see whether the firms' 
characteristics (e. g. investment, cash flow, MTB, size, leverage and dividend) in 
the first quartile firms are significantly different from those in the fourth quartile. 
As expected, mean values of investment in the four quartiles monotonically 
decrease with the cash holding quartiles and firms with the highest cash holding 
in the fourth quartile generally have least investment expenditure. This is 
consistent with our starting point, that firms can reduce the reserve of cash 
holding in order to make necessary investment. In other words, when firms have 
to save more cash out of cash flow, they may have to reduce their investment. 
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The results also indicate that MTB, as a proxy for investment opportunity, has 
been found monotonically to increase with cash holdings from the first quartile to 
the fourth quartile. This is in line with the argument that cash holding can 
facilitate firms' investment ability in the future. It also implies that more 
investment opportunities can increase bankruptcy costs and then more cash is 
required. Moreover, the youngest firms with the lowest leverage and the lowest 
dividend payouts tend to hold the highest level of cash. In addition, firms' size in 
the first two quartiles is relatively larger than in the last two quartiles. These also 
suggest that the youngest firms or those with the lowest leverage, the lowest 
dividend payouts or smaller size can be identified as financially constrained 
firms, who are facing limited internal cash flow and have a propensity for saving 
more cash out of cash flow. Finally, firm-specific variables such as investment, 
MTB, leverage, age and size in the first and fourth quartiles differ significantly. 
Finally, evidence about the relationship between cash flow and cash holding is 
mixed. Cash flow is lowest in the first quartile, which is consistent with the view 
of Arslan et al. (2006) that the most financially constrained firms tend to hold the 
lowest level of cash holdings. Cash flow is decreasing with cashing holding from 
the second quartile to the fourth quartile. It suggests that firms with sufficient 
cash flow facing lower transaction costs do not need retain cash holding. Hence, 
cash flow is negatively related to cash holdings. 
3 . 4.2 
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
In this section, we test several predictions as follows. First, we use an average 
cross-sectional (CSA) regression to test the roles of firm-specific characteristics 
and managerial ownership in determining the optimal cash holding. Second, we 
use the CSA regression to compare the different impacts of investment on cash 
holding between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Finally, we use 
the CSA regression to test the roles of investment by overconfident managers on 
fume' cash holding in financially constrained firms. 
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In Table 3.5, we use the average cross-sectional regression in which dependent 
variable cash holding (CH) is measured in 2006, while other independent 
variables are averaged over 2002-2005, apart from managerial ownership which 
is averaged over 2003-2004. After matching two datasets, the subsample fans to 
550. We first analyze the determinants of cash holding for an firms and then 
explore the different roles of investment in cash flow sensitivity of cash in both 
financially constrained and financially unconstrained firms. 
The determinants of cash holding. for all firms, we find a significantly positive 
relationship between cash holding (CH) and market to book value (MTB). This is 
in line with our arguments that firms with higher growth opportunities are more 
likely to face bankruptcy costs and cash shortfall and hold more cash. Cash flow 
(CFLOW) is negative but insignificant. Similar results were also found in Opler 
et al. (1999). A significant negative relationship between leverage (LEV) and 
cash (CH) has been shown in our result. This is consistent with our prediction 
that leverage as a proxy for firms' ability to raise funds from external market can 
act as a substitute for holding cash. Less cash holding can be associated with 
higher leverage. Another negative relationship can also be found between 
dividend payouts (DWI) and cash holding. This implies that firms with dividend 
payouts are facing lower transaction costs than those firms with no dividend 
payout. In addition, firms' size (SIZE) is negatively related to cash holding and 
this relationship is statistically significant. It seems that larger firms are less 
likely to face asymmetric information and tend to hold less cash. 
As far as investment expenditure (I) is concerned, we find a negative and 
significant relationship between investment and cash holding. This is in line with 
our prediction that investment expenditure as a consuming aspect of internal 
funds can decrease firms' investment in cash holdings. More importantly, 
investment can also affect firms' cash flow sensitivity of cash. In our regression, 
we find a positive coefficient of the interaction term of investment and cash flow 
(I"CFLOW). It gives a hint that the relationship between investment and cash 
flow sensitivity of cash might be related to the financial constraints. 
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Finally, to allow for the potential non-linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and cash holding, in our empirical model we include the level of 
managerial ownership (OWN), the squared value of managerial ownership 
(OWN2) and the cubic value of managerial ownership (OWN). In line with our 
hypothesis, we find a negative and significant relationship between ownership 
(OWN) and cash holding. When managerial ownership is at a low level, an 
increase in managerial ownership can eliminate the conflicts between managers 
and shareholders (alignment effect), leading to relatively lower cash holding. 
However, when the level of managerial ownership exceeds a certain level, this 
alignment effect can be replaced by entrenchment efiect. This happens when the 
benefits to managers from low cash holdings are lower than private benefit. Then, 
an increase in managerial ownership can lead to higher cash holding. Our finding 
of a significant positive coefficient of OWN2 suggests a turning point of 
managerial ownership at 11.8%, in that cash holding decreases as ownership 
increases up to 11.8% and then increases for managerial ownership levels above 
11.8%, which is in line with Figure 3.1. Finally, the significant negative 
coefficient of OWN3 suggests that this positive relationship between ownership 
and cash holding may also turn into a negative one, with the turning point being 
around 60%. This indicates that the interests of managers can converge to the 
interests of shareholders when managerial ownership is substantially high. In 
summary, it suggests a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership 
and cash holding, which is in line with the findings of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). 
The interaction of investment and cash flow. Another objective in Table 3.5 
focuses on whether investment decisions have different impacts on cash flow 
sensitivity of cash in financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We 
identify firms to be financially constrained or financially unconstrained firms 
based on firms age and average values of size, leverage and dividend over 2002- 
2005. 
The most important finding is that we observe a positive coefficient of 
interaction term (1*CFLOW) in financially constrained firms. And it is 
statistically significant in leverage and dividend groups. This supports our 
prediction that investment diverts some cash flow from cash saving, incream 
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cash flow fluctuation and makes firms' cash holding to be more sensitive to cash 
flow. Meanwhile, we find that coefficients of cash flow are also positive and 
significant in constrained firms identified by leverage and dividend (DIV I and 
DIV2) which are consistent with the study by Almeida et al. (2004). It implies 
that financial constraints should be related to firms' propensity to save cash out 
of cash flow. In addition, we find a negative relationship between investment and 
cash holding, which is significant in unconstrained groups identified by age, 
dividend and leverage. It seems that investment as a consuming part of cash flow 
can decrease cash holdings especially in financially unconstrained firms. 
For other explanatory variables, we find the constrained firms in leverage, 
dividend and age groups display a significant and positive relationship between 
MTB and cash holding, which is in line with the findings by Almeida et al. 
(20(4). This suggests that future investment opportunity is important, especially 
in financially constrained firms. Moreover, we find that leverage and dividend 
are both negatively related to cash holding, although the statistically significant 
level is mixed. We also cannot find any strong evidence to demonstrate different 
roles of firms' size in cash holding between constrained and unconstrained fines. 
Finally, with respect to managerial discretion, we include OWN, OWN2 and 
OWN3 to control for non-linear association between managerial ownership and 
cash holding. Our findings suggest that the non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and cash holding dose not vary with the status of financial 
constraints. 
All these results are robust when we use our second average cross-sectional 
regression in which dependent variable cash holding (CH) is measured in 2005, 
while other independent variables are averaged over 2001 2004, apart from 
managerial ownership which is averaged over 2003-2004. The results are given 
in Table 3.6. Similarly, investment can increase cash flow sensitivity of cash in 
financially constrained firms identified by leverage, dividend and age. 
Meanwhile, the cash flow sensitivity of cash is found to be statistically 
significant in financially constrained firms in these groups. 
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The role of managerial overconfidence: We now turn to test whether investment 
undertaken by overconfident managers can affect the cash flow sensitivity of 
cash in financially constrained firms. Owing to the persistent behaviour of 
overconfidence, we measure managerial overconfidence from 2003 to 2006. And 
we identify those firms with managerial overconfidence (OVER 1) as those 
being net buyers between 2003 and 2006 for at least three years. The results are 
given in Table 3.7. 
In Table 3.7, we split financially constrained firms into firms with overconfident 
managers and firms with non-overconfident managers using OVERT. The most 
interesting finding is that coefficient of interaction term (1*CFLOW) becomes 
statistically insignificant in all constrained firms with managerial overconfidence 
while it remains significantly positive in constrained firms without managerial 
overconfidence in leverage and dividend (DIV1 and DIV2) groups. This result 
supports our hypothesis that managerial overconfidence can eliminate the 
positive impact of investment on cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially 
constrained firms. That is because overconfident managers overestimate payoff 
of investment, they tend to believe the benefits of their project should be larger 
than the benefits of accumulating cash and thus would rather invest than save 
cash out of cash flow, even if their firms are facing financial constraints. In Table 
3.8, we use another CSA regression in which dependent variable is measured in 
year 2005 and all other independent variables are the average past values over 
the period 2001-2004. And we find consistent results. 
In Table 3.9 and 3.10, we try our alternative measurement of managerial 
overconfidence (OVER 2) to test whether investment undertaken by 
overconfident managers can affect the cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially 
constrained firms. And we find that that coefficients of interaction term 
(I*CFLOW), are insignificant in all constrained firms with managerial 
overconfidence while they remain significantly positive in constrained firms 
without managerial overconfidence in leverage, dividend(DN 1 and DIV2) and 
age groups. In sum, the consistent results indicate that overconfident managers 
would rather increase investment with cash flow than save cash out of cash flow, 
even if their firms are facing financial constraints. Therefore, investment by 
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overconfident managers in constrained firms cannot generate greater cash flow 
sensitivity of cash. 
3.4.3 Dynamic Estimation and Robustness 
3.4.3.1 Alternative estimator procedures and Diagnostics 
We turn to use GMM to estimate the baseline cash model to give further 
evidence. Since GMM will drop fixed effects by differencing and ownership 
variables are relatively stable over a certain period of time, our GMM test will 
not include managerial ownership. Before that, we first conduct a number of 
different methods to find which approach is proper for our equation (5). 
In Table 3.11, we present the OLS estimates in Model 1. In Model 2, we give the 
results of the Anderson-Hsiao (AH) estimate, which use CH2 Z as instruments. 
In Model 3, we present the results of the Within Groups estimate. In order to find 
a consistent GMM estimate, we particularly discuss the validity of instrument set 
and the relationship between regressors and error term. For example, if one 
regressor x is correlated with the fixed effects and ku is serially uncorrelated, 
we need to consider whether x. is predetermined or strictly exogenous with 
respect to p . We 
include all regressors dated x,,, _, 
(x,,, 
_2 
for the lagged 
explanatory variables) to investigate the potential biases which arise from the 
correlation between x,., -, and 
the first-differenced error term &. Hence, in 
Model 4, we start with the GMM estimate in levels (GMM-LEV 1), where all 
explanatory variables, except CH1 -, , are 
treated as strictly exogenous. 
Accordingly, GMM-DIF1 estimate in differences in Model 6 is used to test 
whether all explanatory variables, except CH1, -, , are strictly exogenous 
by 
including all current values of each variable x,., (x,,, _, 
for the lagged explanatory 
variables). In Model 5, we use the GMM estimate in levels (GMM-LEV2), 
where all explanatory variables are treated as endogenous, to test whether 
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variables are predetermined. And in Model 7, we use the GMM-DIF2 estimate in 
differences to test whether variables are predetermined" 
First, correlation test reveals that OLS (Model 1) and GMM-level specifications 
(Models 4 and 5) violate the assumption that there is no serial correlation in error 
terms. It seems that lagged dependent variable (CH, _, 
) is correlated with some 
unobservable and firm-specific fixed effects. Comparing with GMM-Differences 
(Models 6 and 7) the estimated coefficient of CH,, -, 
in OLS estimate (Model 1) 
is too higher. The same problem can also be found in GMM-Levels (Models 4 
and 5), in which the estimated coefficient of CH_, is even higher. Moreover, 
the Sargan Test in Model 4 reveals that instruments used are invalid. This implies 
that the explanatory variables cannot be treated as strictly exogenous. Also, the 
Sargan Test in Model 5 reveals instruments used are still invalid. This implies 
that the explanatory variables are not predetermined. Therefore, we can conclude 
that OLS and GMM-Levels estimates are not appropriate for a study of dynamic 
cash structure models. 
To solve these problems, we use the first-difference to transform the variables. 
We use AH-type (Model 2) and GMM-Differences (Models 6 and 7). It seems 
that AH-type estimates (Model 2) still suffers from the serial correlation 
problems. This is because two correlation tests for the first and the second order 
autocorrelation of error terms reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation as 
the results are significant. Hence, the AH-type cannot provide consistent 
estimates and has a downward bias. However, some standard deviations of the 
coefficients is this model are larger that the ones in GMM-Differences models. 
To some extent, it reveals that AH instrumental variable technique does not use 
all available moments, which may cause efficiency loss (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). As for GMM-Differences (Models 6 and 7), Sargen tests indicates that the 
instruments used are not valid. It rejects two assumptions: one is to assume that 
all explanatory variables except the lagged dependent variable are strictly 
exogenous (Model 6); two is to assume that all explanatory variables are 
predetermined (Model 7). 
"A similar won can be fand in Bhmdell et al. (1992). 
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We also report Within Groups estimate (Model 3; deviation from individual 
means). It seems that the first correlation test is insignificant but the second 
correlation test is significant. However, the standard deviations of the 
coefficients in this model are much higher that the ones in GMM models. It 
seems that the Within Groups estimate is not so efficient comparing with GMM 
methodology. 
Thus, the specifications of OLS, AH, GMM-Levels and GMM-Differences 
assuming that variables are predetermined or strictly exogenous are not 
appropriate methods of estimation for our dynamic cash holding models. As a 
result, we introduce GMM-DIF3 which might be a proper estimate for our panel 
date. That is GMM in first difference and instruments are all variables dated (1-2). 
3.4.3.2 GMM Estimation 
We present the results of GMM-DIF3 in Table 3.12. The first regression in this 
table provides the evidence on the determinants of cash holding with the whole 
sample. Consistent with the dynamic cash holding hypothesis, it suggests that 
firms partially adjust towards an optimal cash holding, with a positive adjustment 
value of 0.500. In line with our cross-sectional regression, dynamic panel data 
regression also shows that dividend and investment remain as important 
determinants of cash holding, in that firms with more growth opportunities, less 
dividend payouts and lower investment expenditure tend to hold more cash. 
Their coefficients are statistically significant at 10%. 
In order to investigate the different role of investment on cash flow sensitivity of 
cash, we identify funs to be financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
Based on annual values of size, dividend, leverage and age, we include those 
firms whose have been regarded as constrained (unconstrained) for at least half 
of their duration in our sample as financially constrained (unconstrained) firms in 
our regression. A potential problem arising from our identification is that it 
makes our sample size smaller relative to the number of instruments. For 
example, in year 1998, our GMM-DIF3 can generate only one instrument per 
instrumented variable. However, when year rises, the number of instruments will 
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grow large relative to our sample size in financially constrained (unconstrained) 
groups. Then, two types of problems can be caused by numerous instruments 
(Roodman, 2007). First, too many instruments can overfit endogenous variables, 
failing to remove their endogenous components. Second, in two-step GMM, a 
weighting matrix, which is the inverse of the covariance of the moments, is used 
to make two-step GMM asymptotically efficient. However, limited sample size 
and numerous instruments can make this matrix become singular. In order to 
avoid these two problems, we use only certain lags instead of all available lags 
and in our regression in that we cap the maximum number of instruments per 
period at three. 
In addition to GMM-DIF3 estimation, we also provide further results from 
system GMM (GMM-SYS) estimation. We present their results in Table 3.13. In 
Tables 3.12 and 3.13, we find consistent results from these two GMM estimates 
(GMM-DIF3 and GMM-SYS). They reveal that firms with lower investment and 
lower dividend tend to hold more cash. More importantly, we find positive and 
significant coefficients of interaction of investment and cash flow in constrained 
firms identified by leverage (LEV) and dividend (DIV 1 and DIV2). This 
supports our prediction that investment can increase cash flow sensitivity of cash, 
especially in financially constrained firms. Meanwhile, financially constrained 
fines in these groups display positive sensitivities of cash to cash flow, which is 
also in line with the argument of Almeida et al. (2004) that financially 
constrained firms are more likely to save more cash out of cash flow. 
Finally, both dynamic GMM estimations also provide evidence of adjustment 
speed of cash holding. Tables 3.12 and 3.13 reveal that the coefficient (r0 ) of 
lagged cash holding is significantly positive both in financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms. It means both constrained and unconstrained firms are 
trying to adjust their cash holding to the target level. This coefficient is much 
higher in younger firms with smaller-size and lower leverage ratio, which means 
that cash adjustment speed in financially constrained firms is much slower than 
unconstrained firms owing to costly external finance. This implies that 
financially unconstrained firms are able to change their cash holding level and 
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investment level by choosing among several alternative sources of financing. 
Therefore, financially unconstrained firms can quickly correct deviation from the 
optimal cash holding, and yo will be lower in financially unconstrained firms. 
However, it would take longer for financially constrained firms to adjust to their 
target cash levels - either because of their higher target levels or the costs of 
adjustment they entail. Hence, we expect the adjustment speed will be lower in 
financially constrained groups. Accordingly, yo in equation (5) will be higher in 
financially constrained groups. 
3.4.3.3 Long-term Relation 
The long-term static model assumes that target cash holdings are instantaneously 
adjusted as a reaction to random changes in the business and fines' condition. 
We provide static cashing holding model using GMM-SYS estimates to give 
more evidence in Table 3.14. As for the determinants of cash holding, we find 
that firms with lower investment and lower dividend tend to hold more cash, 
which is in line with our previous findings. However, we only find that 
investment can generate greater cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially 
constrained firms identified by dividend (DIV2). 
Finally, two correlation tests reveal that our estimates violate the assumption that 
there is no serial correlation in error terms. And Wald Test (joint significance) 
statistics are much lower than the dynamic models. It shows that it is better to use 
dynamic models to analyze our panel data in cash holding model. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates how investment decision influences cash holding by 
using a large sample of UK non-financial listed firms between 1996 and 2006. 
We believe that financial constraints play an important role in determining this 
linkage. We first argue that investment decisions can affect cash flow sensitivity 
of cash especially in financially constrained firms. That is, more investment 
expenditure may limit the source available for cash savings, increase cash flow 
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fluctuations in the future and lead cash to be more sensitive to cash flow in 
financially constrained firms, while investment decisions cannot have a positive 
impact upon cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially unconstrained firms. In 
addition, we discuss the role of managerial overconfidence affecting this linkage 
that investment decisions by overconfident managers can eliminate cash flow 
sensitivity of cash in financially constrained firms. This is because overconfident 
managers believe the benefits of their desired investments are much larger than 
the benefits of saving cash. They would rather invest in their projects than invest 
in cash. Finally, our analysis incorporates the dynamic nature of firms in 
adjusting their cash holding. We argue that financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms can adjust to their target cash level at different speeds. In 
particular, owing to costly external funds, financially constrained firms should 
adjust to their target cash level much slower than do financially unconstrained 
firms. 
We adopt two estimation techniques, average cross-sectional regression and 
dynamic GMM, to mitigate any possible econometric problems. In cross- 
sectional regression, we use average explanatory variables to deal with firms' 
annual adjustment and lagged explanatory variables to deal with endogeneity. In 
GMM, we account for unobservable firm-specific effects and firm-invariant 
time-effects and choose more efficient instruments to control for endogeneity. 
Both GMM (GMM-DIF3 and GMM-SYS) and cross-sectional regressions 
suggest that firms with less dividend payouts and lower investment expenditure 
tend to hold more cash. More importantly, investment can increase cash flow 
sensitivity of cash in financially constrained firms. The results are consistently 
significant in constrained firms identified by their leverage and dividend payouts. 
By contrast, in unconstrained firms, we cannot find such a positive relationship. 
However, our static model provides limited evidence on this aspect. 
In addition, our CSA estimates suggest that the relationship between ownership 
and cash holding is non-monotonic. When managerial ownership is at a low level, 
an increase in managerial ownership can eliminate the conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. However, when the level of managerial ownership 
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exceeds a certain level, an increase in managerial ownership can lead to higher 
cash holding. Finally, this positive relationship between ownership and cash 
holding may also turn into a negative one when managerial ownership exceeds a 
higher level. 
Moreover, the CSA results also reveal that managerial overconfidence can 
eliminate the positive impact of investment on cash flow sensitivity of cash. The 
results show that investment can still increase cash flow sensitivity of cash in 
constrained firms without overconfident managers. They are statistically 
significant in constrained firms identified by leverage, dividend and age. In 
contrast, this positive relationship becomes insignificant in constrained firms 
with overconfident managers. The results are robust when we use two alternative 
measures of managerial overconfidence. 
Finally, we use first-difference GMM and system GMM estimates to show that 
firms tend to adjust their cash holding to the target level and this adjustment 
speed is much slower in constrained firms. This implies that financially 
unconstrained firms are able to change their cash holding level and investment 
level by choosing among several alternative sources of financing quickly. 
However, it would take longer for financially constrained firms to adjust to their 
target cash levels - either because of the relatively higher target level or the 
costs of adjustment they entails. 
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Table 3.1: Variables, Definitions and Sources. 
Variable Definition Sources 
CH Cash holding: The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total Datastream 
assets. 
MTB The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value Datastream 
of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of 
total assets 
CFLOW The ratio of pretax profits plus depreciation to total assets. Datastream 
LEV The ratio of total debt to the total assets. Datastream 
SIZE Total assets (in natural logarithm). Datastream 
DIVI The ratio of ordinary dividends to total assets. Datastream 
DIV2 The ratio of ordinary dividends to earnings before dividend. Datastream 
I Investment: The ratio of payments to fixed assets to total Datastream 
assets. 
AGE The number of years that a firm has been incorporated in Datastream 
each year plus one in natural logarithm. 
OWN The total percentage of shareholding by the executive Hemscott 
directors. 
OVER I Managerial overconfidence: a dummy variable, which takes Hemscott 
the value of 1 if the firm is identified as a net buyer for at 
least 3 years over 2003-2006, and 0 otherwise. 
OVER 2A dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the number Nexis UK 
of articles describing a firm's executive directors as 
optimistic or confident is larger than the number of articles 
describing a firm's executive directors as reliable, steady, 
practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not 
confident over 2003-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
Notes: Datastream database provides accounting and market data. Hemscott Guru Academic 
database provides financial data for the UK's top 300,000 companies and detailed data on all 
directors of UK listed companies. Nexis UK is a single most powerful global news and business 
information service. 
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Figure 3.1: The Relationship between Cash Holding and Managerial 
Ownership. 
0.18 
0.16 
0.14 
0.12 
22 0.1 
0 
t 0.08 ý ý 
0.06 
0.04 
0.02 
0 
<0.01% 0.01-5% 5-9% 9-15% 15-20% 20-50% 50-70% >70% 
Managerail Ownership 
Table 3.2 A: Descriptive statistics. (N=648) 
Variables Mean S. D. 25% Median 75% 
CH 0.110 0.136 0.020 0.061 0.147 
CFLOW 0.080 0.161 0.039 0.102 0.166 
MTB 1.836 1.561 1.032 1.391 2.053 
LEV 0.176 0.161 0.031 0.148 0.274 
SIZE 11.416 2.125 9.883 11.183 12.740 
DIV 1 0.023 0.031 0.000 0.018 0.033 
DIV 2 0.349 2.819 0.000 0.246 0.460 
I 0.057 0.066 0.019 0.039 0.072 
AGE 3.113 1.072 2.303 3.045 4.043 
OWN 8.203 14.559 0.148 1.090 9.831 
OVER1 0.236 0.425 000 
OVER2 0.373 0.484 001 
Note: This table shows the sample characteristics for 648 firms over the period 1996-2006, apart 
from managerial ownership which is over the period 2003-2004 and managerial overconfidence 
variable which is over the period 2003-2006. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 
4.1. 
Table 3.2 B: Panel Data Structure. 
a) Number of records on each firms 
5 21 
6 76 
7 75 
8 39 
9 101 
10 25 
11 311 
b) Number of firms in each year 
1996 357 
1997 381 
1998 485 
1999 517 
2000 590 
2001 643 
2002 629 
2003 622 
2004 615 
2005 602 
2006 585 
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Table 3.4: Firm Characteristics by Cash Quartiles. 
CASH First Second Third Fourth 
quartiles quartile quartile quartile quartile 
t--test 
CFLOW 0.069 0.093 0.085 0.074 -0.79 
0.146 0.130 0.153 0.203 
MTB 1.455 1.676 1.836 2.376 -15.34*** 
1.058 1.259 1.546 2.047 
SIZE 11.579 12.143 11.488 10.455 14.93*** 
2.271 2.159 1.892 1.785 
I 0.066 0.062 0.052 0.047 7.14** 
0.082 0.064 0.054 0.056 
LEV 0.238 0.211 0.163 0.089 26.66*** 
0.163 0.152 0.148 0.138 
DIV 1 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.021 -1.88* 
0.039 0.029 0.025 0.024 
AGE 3.280 3.252 3.138 2.780 12.88*** 
1.050 1.072 1.030 1.059 
Notes: This table provides univariate mean comparisons of firm-specific characteristics by cash 
holding quartiles. It also provides standard deviation. We use cash holding measured over 1996- 
2005, and split the sample into four quartiles. The t-statistic is for the difference of means 
between the first and the fourth quartiles. *** , and 
* indicate the coefficient is significant at 1 
5% and 10 %, respectively. Defmitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 3.11: Panel Data Estimation by Using Different Methods. 
Dependent Variable: (lit, 
Independent 
Variables 
CHI, -1 
111TB 
11tTBr_, 
CFLOW 
CFLOW , 
IN 
Iu. 1 
LEV 
LEVM_, 
Drvw 
DIVa. j 
SIZE,, 
SIZE, 
AGE,, 
-, 
AGE,, -, 
I,, `CFLOW,, 
I,, 
_1 
*CFLOW,, 
-, 
Nil 
M2 
Sargan Test 
Wald Test 
olnt 
1234567 
OLS All WITHIN GMM GMM- GMM- GMM- 
-LEV 1 LEV2 DIF I DIF2 
0.654 0.373 0.338 0.744 0.759 0.444 0.505 
(0.020) (0.054) (0.078) (0.078) (0.028) (0.048) (0.046) 
(33.2)**" (2.16)" (4.33)"*" (26.7)"" (26.8)*** (9.35)*"' (11.1)'"' 
0.002 -0.071 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 
(0.002) (0.018) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
(0.92) (2.50)** (1.05) (0.98) (0.88) (0.85) (0.85) 
0.004 -0.042 0.005 0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.002 
(0.002) (0.028) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
(2.12)*" (1.80)" (0.90) (1.22) (0.37) (2.18)"" (0.98) 
0.060 0.028 0.050 -0.016 0.043 0.042 0.054 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.132) (0.053) (0.101) (0.023) (0.033) 
(3.12)*'* (2.22)" (0.38) (1.30) (0.42) (1.82)' (1.63) 
-0.043 0.037 -0.104 0.004 -0.076 0.012 -0.010 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.113) (0.030) (0.075) (0.020) (0.024) 
(2.27)** (2.18)** (0.92) (0.12) (1.01) (0.60) (0.41) 
-0.162 -0.008 -0.312 -0.170 -0.325 -0.213 -0.092 
(0.037) (0.074) (0.215) (0.126) (0.283) (0.056) (0.064) 
(4.33)"* (2.09)"* (1.45) (1.34) (1.15) (3.80)"" (1.44) 
0.063 -0.016 -0.063 0.019 0.285 -0.091 -0.031 
(0.030) (0.077) (0.022) (0.071) (0.293) (0.045) (0.046) 
(2.14)*" (2.17)** (0.29) (0.27) (0.98) (2.04)"" (1.66)' 
-0.113 0.001 0.090 -0.147 -0.093 -0.044 -0.063 
(0.019) (0.031) (0.134) (0.081) (0.582) (0.026) (0.041) 
(5.87)*** (0.67) (0.67) (1.82)' (0.16) (1.70)' (1.57) 
0.052 0.014 -0.078 0.090 0.085 0.058 0.087 
(0.019) (0.037) (0.067) (0.070) (0.110) (0.023) (0.025) 
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(0.194) (0.0001) (0.233) (0.524) (1.101) (0.250) (0.266) 
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-2.327** -4.508** -1.022 -3.882*** -3.508*** -8.118*** -8.612*** 
-1.753* -1.957** -2.519** 1.368 1.064 1.377 1.553 
-- 187.5*** 90.34*** 251.2** 244.1** 
2108*** 25.33* 39.12*** 1954*** 1583*** 197*** 207.9*** 
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Chapter 4 
The Impact of Managerial Overconfidence on 
Debt Maturity: Empirical Evidence from the 
UK 
163 
4.1 Introduction 
Four main hypotheses are presented by the existing literature as the determinants 
of debt maturity structure. These include: 1) the agency cost of debt hypothesis 
that short-term debt is more effective than long-term debt in reducing agency 
costs arising from debt financing (Myers, 1977; Barnea et al., 1980; Hart and 
Moore, 1995); 2) the asymmetric information hypothesis that short-term debt can 
act as a signalling role of firms' quality (Flannery, 1986), and long-term debt will 
be preferred by firms when liquidity risk increases over time (Diamond, 1991); 3) 
the taxation hypothesis that optimal debt maturity depends on the tax advantage 
of debt (Brick and Ravid, 1985); 4) the managerial discretion hypothesis that 
long-term debt will be preferred when managers' self-interests are weakly 
aligned with shareholders'(Datta et al., 2005; Guney and O7kan, 2005). 
Although the empirical literature has been successfully in providing evidence of 
the significant roles played by firm-specific characteristics such as size, growth 
opportunity, firm's quality, tax rates, managerial ownership in determining debt 
maturity (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Datta et al., 2005 
etc. ), little is known about the extent to which the personal characteristics such as 
managerial overconfidence may affect this policy. Managerial overconfidence as 
a particular form of cognitive bias focuses on a stylized fact that some managers 
are less than completely rational and tend to overestimate the prospects of their 
projects. Hence they are more likely to believe their firms being undervalued by 
the market. This tendency can potentially lead overconfident managers to adopt 
a biased debt maturity, which is a choice between short-term debt and long-term 
debt. A possible scenario, for example, is that overconfident managers have more 
incentives to use short-term debt to signal their perceived quality to the market. 
Moreover, this can happen even if overconfident managers believe they run the 
best interests of shareholders and maximize shareholders' wealth, although they 
are not doing so. Thus, the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity 
should be irrelevant of the impact of managerial discretion on debt maturity for 
private benefits. The main objective of this chapter is therefore to provide more 
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insight into the potential role of managerial overconfidence in determining debt 
maturity structure. 
The empirical analysis of this chapter is presented in three stages. First, based on 
traditional theories of asymmetric information and agency costs, we simply 
investigate the direct impacts of firm-specific characteristics on debt maturity 
(long-term debt ratio). Specifically, we investigate the non-linear impact of 
managerial ownership on debt maturity. It has been argued that managerial 
ownership is a potential incentive mechanism which can alleviate managerial 
discretion related to conflicts between managers and shareholders. When 
managerial ownership is at a low level, an increase in managerial ownership can 
help to align the different interests between managers and shareholders. Thus 
firms tend to increase short-term debt with managerial ownership to facilitate 
more external monitoring (alignment effect). However, when managerial 
ownership exceeds a certain level, the alignment benefits for managers from 
short-term debt are no longer higher than their private benefits from long-term 
debt and thus the conflicts can no longer be aligned. Instead, firms tend to 
lengthen their maturity of debt to avoid external monitoring (entrenchment effect). 
We expect to observe a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
long-term debt ratio and a positive relationship between the squared value of 
managerial ownership and long-term debt ratio. 
Second, we test whether managerial overconfidence can affect firms' debt 
maturity. In the presence of asymmetric information, short-term debt can act as a 
signalling role of firms' quality and so a negative relationship between firms' 
quality and long-term debt can be predicted. We argue that overconfident 
managers are more disposed to issue short-term debt to signal their perceived 
quality. The reason for this is because overconfident managers overestimate the 
future outcomes of their projects and tend to believe their firms being 
undervalued by the market, which means they have to pay higher premiums to 
issue long-term debt than they expected. In order to avoid such unnecessary costs, 
overconfident managers are more likely to issue short-term debt. Moreover, they 
take advantage of the re-evaluation associating with the short-term debt to pursue 
a better debt contract in the future. Thus, we expect to find that managerial 
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overconfidence can increase the negative relationship between firms' quality and 
long-term debt ratio. 
Moreover, in the presence of agency costs, since short-term debt can alleviate the 
underinvestment problems, then firms' with more growth opportunities tend to 
issue more short-term debt. The relationship between short-term debt and growth 
opportunity can be more significant for firms with overconfident managers. This 
is because the perceived growth opportunity by overconfident managers is higher 
than it should be. When overconfident managers realize that long-term debt is 
unable to help them invest at their desired level, they have more incentives to 
choose more short-term debt. Hence, we predict that managerial overconfidence 
can increase the negative. relationship between firms' growth opportunity and 
long-term debt. 
Also, we believe that managerial overconfidence as a psychological factor is 
irrelevant of managerial discretion. Thus, the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on debt maturity should be still pronounced when we take 
account of the impact of managerial ownership on debt maturity. 
Third, we further consider whether the impact of managerial overconfidence on 
debt maturity is homogeneous across corporate governance mechanisms. It has 
been suggested that a potential prescription for managerial overconfidence could 
be outsider monitoring when biased decisions are recurrent problems (Kahneman 
and Lovallo, 1993; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). By that they mean that 
outsiders are capable of drawing managerial attention to information that may 
indicate that their perceptions are wrong. If this is the case, we expect to find the 
impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity becomes insignificant in 
firms with strong monitoring governance mechanisms. By contrast, the 
influences of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity should persist in firms 
with weak monitoring governance mechanisms. Meanwhile, given that corporate 
governance mechanisms can exert monitoring effects on managerial discretion, 
we predict that, in the presence of good governance mechanisms, managerial 
discretion can be effectively aligned and thus the non-linear relationship between 
debt maturity and managerial ownership becomes less pronounced. 
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To investigate these empirical hypotheses, we use a large sample of UK listed 
firms over the period 2002-2006. First of all, we collect the annual share dealings 
by executive directors to identify managerial overconfidence (OVER! ), which is 
a dummy variable equalling 1 when executive directors are persistently net 
buyers in the open market over the period 2003-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
Meanwhile, we consider those firms which have been habitual net buyer for at 
least three years during 2003-2006 as an alternative measurement of managerial 
overconfidence (OVER 2) to provide more evidence. In addition, we use OVER3 
for our robustness test, which is based on outside perception by using the 
business press which characterizes executive directors as "confident" or 
"optimistic". When the number of articles describing a firm's executive directors 
as "confident" or "optimistic" is larger than the number of articles describing a 
firm's executive directors as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, frugal, 
cautious, not optimistic, or not confident over 2003-2006, this firm is identified 
as the one with managerial overconfidence. We include two interaction terms of 
managerial overconfidence and firms' quality and managerial overconfidence 
and growth opportunity to test the impacts of managerial overconfidence on debt 
maturity. Moreover, in order to test the roles of corporate governance 
mechanisms in influencing debt maturity by overconfident managers, we split 
firms using a set of governance variables such as board size, non-executives' 
ratio and blockholders' ownership. In particular, for each variable we divide 
firms into those three subgroups: board size (larger, medium, smaller), non- 
executive ratio (higher, medium, lower) and blockholders' ownership (higher, 
medium, lower). Firms are assigned to the larger (higher) groups when they are 
in the top three deciles of the whole distribution, and vice versa. And the rest of 
them are assigned to the medium groups. Finally, in terms of the estimation 
methods, we initially utilize the average cross-sectional estimation (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995) to control the possibilities that short-term fluctuations and 
endogeneity in data may also have some important impacts on debt maturity. To 
test the robustness of our results, we execute our estimation over two different 
time periods: one, the dependent variable is measured in 2006; two, the 
dependent variable is measured in 2005. And all the other explanatory variables 
are lagged average values. Finally, pooled regression is included to give more 
evidence. 
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The analysis of this chapter provides several important findings with regard to 
the association among firm-specific variables, managerial ownership, managerial 
overconfidence and debt maturity. We find firms with larger size and worse 
quality tend to issue more long-term debt, which is consistent with the 
asymmetric information hypothesis. As far as the firms' debt capacity is 
concerned, we find firms with higher leverage tend to issue more long-term debt. 
Moreover, we find a significantly negative relationship between firms' liquidity 
and long-term debt, which rejects the argument that firms with higher liquidity 
will be easier to access external funds. By contrast, our evidence suggests that 
higher liquidity limits firms' debt capacity, which is in line with the arguments 
by Myers and Rajan (1998). Moreover, our evidence strongly supports a non- 
linear relationship between managerial ownership and long-term debt. We 
observe that when managerial ownership is at a low level, a negative relationship 
exists between managerial ownership and long-term debt It indicates an increase 
in managerial ownership can align the different interests between managers and 
shareholder. However, when managerial ownership exceeds a certain level, a 
positive relationship exists between managerial ownership and long-term debt. It 
implies that firms tend to lengthen their maturity of debt for their private benefits 
rather than pursue alignment benefits. Finally, there is only limited evidence for 
the tax hypothesis that long-term debt is directly related to tax rates. 
As for the impact of managerial overconfidence, we observe strong evidence that 
managerial overconfidence can significantly increase the negative relationship 
between firms' quality and long-term debt, which is consistent in our robustness 
checks. We also find some evidence that the negative relationship between firms' 
growth opportunity and long-term debt is greater for firms with managerial 
overconfidence. However, it is not significant in our robustness checks. 
Moreover, our results imply that the impact of managerial overconfidence on 
debt maturity is distinct from the impact of managerial discretion on debt 
maturity. Both play significant roles in determining debt maturity. 
Finally, the impacts of managerial overconfidence and managerial ownership on 
debt maturity can also be related to corporate governance mechanisms. With 
regard to the impact of managerial overconfidence, our findings show that the 
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negative impact on the relationship between firms' quality and long-term debt is 
retained to be significant in firms with weak governance mechanisms (i. e. lower 
non-executive ratio or lower blockholders' ownership. In contrast, this impact 
tends to be insignificant in firms with good governance mechanisms (i. e. medium 
non-executive ratio or medium blockholders' ownership). This is in line with our 
argument that, assuming the biased decision is a recurrent problem, outsider 
monitoring can be an effective prescription for the biased decision. In terms of 
managerial ownership, its non-linear impact on debt maturity becomes 
insignificant in firms with good governance mechanisms (i. e. fines with medium 
ratio of non-executive directors in boards or with medium blockholders' 
ownership). It suggests that effective outsider monitoring can align the conflicts 
between managers and shareholders and thus the impact of managerial ownership 
becomes less pronounced in these firms. However, we do not find consistent 
results that neither the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity nor 
the impact of managerial ownership on debt maturity changes to be significant 
when firms with higher ratio of non-executive directors in boards or with higher 
blockholders' ownership. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we provide 
a brief review of related literature and organize our empirical hypothesis. In 
Section 4.3, we describe our dataset and methodology. And our results are 
presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 provides robustness checks using alternative 
measurements of managerial overconfident and an alternative estimation method 
such as pooled regression. Finally, we present the conclusion in Section 4.6. 
4.2. Related Literature and Empirical Hypotheses 
4.21 Detemthia is of Debt Modesty 
4.2.1.1 Definition of Debt Mats rity 
Prior studies have used various measures of debt maturity. The most common 
one is to use the ratio of short-term or long-term debts to total debts as a proxy 
for the average debt maturity of firms. In particular, some studies on US fines 
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consider a debt as a long-term debt if it is due to be repaid after one year (e. g. 
Scherr and Hulburt, 2001) while others define it as long-term debt if it is due to 
repaid after three years (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Barclay et al., 2003) or after 
five years (e. g. Datta et al., 2005). Because of the limited availability of data, 
studies on the UK firms, such as Guney and Ozkan (2005) mainly use the 
standard accounting definition of long-term debt, which is that any debt due to be 
repaid in more than one year. This method has also been applied to international 
studies, such as evidence for Italy, the UK and India (e. g. Schiantarelli and 
Sembenelli, 1997a and 1997b), and for France, Germany and the UK (e. g. 
Antoniou et al., 2006). 
Another method to define debt maturity is to use the maturity of new public debt 
issues rather than existing issues. They adopt the term of maturity of each debt 
issue to identify debt maturity in years: in Mitchell (1991), short-term debt is less 
than 20 years, whereas in Guedes and Opler (1996) it is less than 10 years. This 
incremental approach enables to identify the determinants of maturity at all 
points. However, new debt issues may have a maturity that is very different from 
the average maturity of a firm's assets. 
The third method to measure debt maturity is to use weighted average maturity 
of liabilities such as in Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001), 
which equals the fractions of each type of debt multiplied by its average 
remaining maturity in years (months). However, this method is strongly 
dependent on having the detailed information on outstanding debt, which is not 
available in the UK. 
In this chapter, driven primarily by the available data, we define long-tern debt 
as the debt maturing in more than one year, while short-term debt as the 
borrowing repayable within one year. And the debt maturity (MAT) ratio is 
defined as long-term debt divided by total debt. 
4.2.1.2 Signalling vs Asymmetric Information 
A large amount of studies on asymmetric information (Jaffee and Russell, 1996; 
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Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) argue that lenders, in debt markets, cannot identify 
information about firms' value or the riskiness of firms' investment project, the 
asymmetric information between lenders and firms will make external financing 
costly (the adverse selection problem and the moral hazard problem) and affects 
firms' investment incentives (the underinvestment problem). In addition, 
Flannery (1986) suggests a signalling role of debt maturity associating with 
asymmetric information. He emphasizes the existence of different debt 
equilibriums according to zero transaction costs or positive transaction costs. On 
the one hand, if issuing debt is costless, then bad-quality firms can mimic good- 
quality firms. Hence, only a pooling equilibrium in this market can be achieved, 
reflecting the average quality of all firms. Thus, good-quality firms will suffer 
from this pooling equilibrium because of the negative mis-valuation by lenders. 
In contrast, bad-quality firms will benefit from this equilibrium because of the 
positive mis-valuation by lenders. On the other hand, if issuing debts is costly, 
the self-selection can induce bad-quality firms to have greater propensities to 
issue long-term debt. When the mis-valuation in pooling equilibrium by lenders 
is higher than the added transaction costs from the rollover short-term debt, then 
a separating equilibrium will be generated that good-quality firms turn to issue 
short-term debt. His argument has also been supported by Kale and Noe's study 
(1990), in which they find a sequential game equilibrium in an economy with no 
transaction costs. When the changes in firms' value are correlated over time, a 
similar separating equilibrium as in Flannery's (1986) can be achieved. 
In summary, if the debt market cannot distinguish between good- and bad-quality 
firms, then firms with better quality prefer short-term debt to avoid paying extra 
premiums on long-term debt. Moreover, when firms need to renew their debt 
contracts, good-quality firms can benefit from a re-evaluation and have a new 
debt contract at better terms than bad-quality firms. In contrast, bad-quality firms 
will suffer from the re-evaluation and tend to issue long-term debts to postpone it. 
Therefore, short-term debt can be regarded as a signal of firms' good quality and 
we can predict a negative relationship between firms' quality and debt maturity 
(long-term debt ratio). In line with Ozkan (2000), we use the growth rate of 
earning to proxy for firms' quality (QUALITYI), which is defined as the 
difference between pretax profits in t+l and the pretax profits in t divided by the 
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pretax profits in t. Alternatively, we use the difference between EPS in year t+l 
and t divided by share price in t as an alternative proxy for firms' quality 
(QUALITY2). 
4.2.1.3 Liquidity Risk vs Asymmetric Information 
A major drawback of short-term debt is the high liquidity risk that it entails. 
Diamond (1991) creates a strong link between the credit rationing system and 
debt maturity that debt maturity is a trade-off between the benefits of short-term 
debt (such as signalling effects of their credit ratings, in Flannery (1986)) and its 
liquidity risk. In particular, liquidity risks are those risks undertaken when 
borrowers are unable to refinance because of the deterioration in financial or 
economic conditions. It suggests that short-term debt can give substantial control 
to lenders such that they are able to refuse to refinance the debt contract when 
bad news arrives resulting in inefficient liquidation for borrowers. For high-rated 
(good-quality) firms, since the private information benefits of credit ratings can 
overweigh the liquidity risk, they still prefer short-term debts such as commercial 
papers. For low-rated (bad-quality) firms, since their private information benefits 
of credit ratings cannot overweigh the liquidity risk, they would turn to prefer 
long-term debt. However, for very low-rated firms, they have no choice but to 
choose short-term debt via private placement and/or intermediaries. This is 
because the firms have more probabilities of insufficient cash flow to support 
long-term debt and the returns received in liquidation are a large part of returns 
received by these firms. In summary, the debt maturity is not a monotonic 
function of borrowers' credit rating, which contradicts the signalling hypothesis 
by Flannery (1986). 
In the study of Leland and Toft (1996), bankruptcy as a kind of liquidity risk is 
determined endogenously and depends on the maturity and the amount of short- 
term debt. Optimal leverage level depends on debt maturity and is lower when 
fines are financed by short-term, debt. In particular, firms with low levels of 
leverage are supposed to fi ce less liquidity risk (Ferri and Jones, 1979; Titman 
and Wessel, 1988; Whited, 1992) and thereby have no incentives to shun short- 
term debt. Thus, liquidity risk increases with the leverage and firms with higher 
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leverage are expected to use more long-term debt. Thus, we predict a positive 
relationship between leverage and long-term debt. To test the robustness of our 
results, we measure leverage in two ways: (1) the ratio of total debt to total asset 
(LEV i ); (2) The ratio of total debt to book value of total assets minus book value 
of equity plus the market value of equity (LEV2). 
In addition to leverage, asset liquidity can act as another proxy for firms' debt 
capacity. A traditional view is that liquid assets give creditors greater value in 
liquidation. In the model of Harris and Raviv (1990), they note the advantages of 
debt in providing information about a fine's prospects. This is because managers 
are reluctant to provide the detailed information that could result in liquidation. 
Investors need to exploit the informational role of debt by observing a firm's 
ability to make contractual payments, and then decide whether to liquidate the 
firm or not. Consequently, the optimal debt is determined by trading off the 
expected costs of default against the mitigating agency costs of debt. Firms with 
higher asset liquidity can give investors greater value in liquidation than firms 
with lower asset liquidity. Hence, investors are more likely to use debt to obtain 
information about the firm. However, Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that 
excessive liquidity generates more potential conflicts between managers and 
investors over property rights and limits the managers' operating flexibility. As a 
result, greater asset liquidation can reduce firms' capacity of raising external 
fiords. To the extent that firms with higher liquidity have more access to external 
funds, we can observe a positive relationship between asset liquidity and long- 
term debt. To test the robustness of our results, we measure the liquidity ratio in 
two ways: (1) the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (LIQ 1); (2) the ratio 
of current assets to total assets (UQ2). 
4.2.1.4 Agency Costs of Debt 
Myers (1977) emphasizes the role of short-term debt in reducing agency costs of 
debts, such as underinvestment. In this paper, the u>Irinvestment problems are 
rather great when a debt contract matures after the expiry date of the investment. 
This is because shareholders cannot receive all the net benefits from future 
investment opportunities, and part of them will be transferred to bondholders. 
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Hence, shareholders choose to exercise the growth option only if net benefits can 
offset debt repayments. When only shareholders have the rights to decide 
whether to exercise an investment option before the debt matures or not, firms 
with risky debt to invest may have incentives to pass up some valuable growth 
options. To avoid the underinvestment problems, an efficient solution is to 
shorten debt maturity, i. e. issuing debt that matures before investment options are 
exercised. When the debt matures before growth (investment) options are 
exercised, firms can renew the debt contract such that net benefits from new 
investment will not be transferred to bondholders. Moreover, monitoring costs 
for bondholders will be reduced by periodical re-evaluation. Empirically, we can 
predict a negative relationship between long-term debt and growth opportunities, 
in which more growth options are associated with more short-term debts. 
Consistent with this prediction, there are some studies that find a negative 
relationship between long-term debts and growth opportunities (see, e. g. Titman, 
1992; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Ozkan, 2000,2002). 
However, Hart and Moore (1995) emphasize the role of long-term debt in 
controlling managerial discretion to finance unprofitable investment, which has 
been acknowledged as an overinvestment problem in lower growth firms (see, 
Hoshi et al., 1991; Vogt, 1994). And firms with higher risky growth options are 
also exposed to higher liquidity risks (Diamond, 1991; Guedes and Opler, 1996), 
which can induce firm to borrow more long-term debt to avoid such risks. 
Therefore, the nature of the relationship between growth opportunity and debt 
maturity is an empirical issue. We use market-to-book value (MTB) to measure 
growth opportunity, which is the ratio of the book value of total assets minus the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of total assets. 
Another agency problem is that asset substitution can happen when debt 
contracts have been issued. In order to maximize shareholders' value, managers 
may have incentives to choose riskier projects than those agreed with 
bondholders (e. g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, Barnea et al. (1980) 
argue that short-term debt can be a tool to mitigate the adverse risk incentive of 
td&8 high payoff but risky projects. This is because the value of short-term debt 
is less sensitive to a change in value and variance of underlying assets, namely a 
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shift into the lower value-higher variance projects. Empirically, it is argued that 
larger firms are less exposed to asset substitution (Smith and Warner, 1979). 
Larger firms regularly have more opportunities to issue debt, and have incentives 
to mitigate the risk-shifting problem. Then, a negative relationship between firm 
size and risk-shifting behaviour can be predicted. Moreover, larger firms are 
expected to have a lower asymmetric information problem and more 
collateralizable assets (Titman and Wessel, 1988; Whited, 1992). So they have 
much easier access to long-term debt market. As a result, we can expect a 
positive relationship between firm size and long-term debt. We measure firms' 
size (SIZE) by using the natural logarithm of total assets and adjusted in 2002 
prices. Moreover, Myers (1977) also argues that, in order to deal with agency 
problems between shareholders and bondholders, debt repayments should match 
the decline in the value of assets in place. We expect a positive relationship 
between long-term debt and asset maturity (AMAT), defined as the ratio of net 
property, plant and equipment to annual depreciation expense. 
4.2.1.5 Agency costs of managerial discretion 
Prior research points out that the firm's resources may be diverted by managers 
for their private benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). It is noted 
that managerial shareholdings as a potential incentive mechanism can alleviate 
the conflicting interests of managers and outside shareholders. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) formalize a linear relationship between firm value and 
managerial ownership. They suggest that a firm's value depends on the fraction 
of shares owned by insiders. However, other studies indicate that the relationship 
between ownership and agency costs can be non monotonic (see, Stulz, 1988; 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishney, 1988; McConnel and Serveas, 1990,1995; Short 
and Keasey, 1999). When managerial ownership is at a low level, an increase in 
managerial ownership can help align the different interests between managers 
and shareholders. However, when managerial ownership exceeds a certain level, 
an increase in managerial ownership can no longer align the conflicts. Instead, 
managers would run the firms for their own private benefits and entrench 
themselves at the expense of other investors. 
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In the context of debt-maturity decisions, Datta et al. (2005) argue that managers 
with low or no equity ownership may deviate from the optimal debt maturity 
choice and prefer longer debt maturity. The reason for this is that managers can 
use long-term debt to avoid external monitoring for a longer period. Under this 
framework, an increase in managerial ownership can reduce managerial 
incentives for private benefits and insufficient efforts (alignment effect). As 
managerial ownership increases, the desire for long-term debt decreases. Then a 
negative relationship between long-term debt and managerial ownership can be 
predicted. The negative relationship has also been support by the UK study from 
Gamey and Ozkan (2005). In particular, they find that the negative relationship 
significantly decreases in widely-held firms. Managers in widely-held firms have 
greater discretion and are more likely to avoid monitoring associated with short- 
term debt. Thus, they prefer long-term debt. Moreover, they analyse the 
discrepancy between control rights and cash flow rights can influence the 
negative relationship between debt maturity and managerial ownership. They 
argue the control rights have entrenchment effects on firms' value and cash flow 
rights have incentive effects on firms' value. Their evidence suggests that 
managers tend to have greater discretion in those firms with greater discrepancy. 
They provide evidence that firms with shareholders whose cash-flow rights are 
significantly less than their control-rights choose more short-term debt in order to 
curtail the negative impact of agency costs on firms' value. 
In the spirit of these studies, we argue that the relationship between long-term 
debt and managerial ownership is likely to be non-monotonic. That is, at low 
levels of managerial ownership, an increase in managerial ownership can help 
align the conflicts between managers and shareholders and managers tend to use 
more short-term debt to facilitate external monitoring (alignment effect). A 
negative relationship between managerial ownership and long-term debt can then 
be predicted. However, when managerial ownership exceeds a certain level, the 
benefits from short-term debts cannot be higher than the benefits from long-term 
debts. Then the conflict will not be aligned and managers tend to lengthen their 
maturity of debt (entrenchment effect) to avoid external monitoring. Thus, a 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and long-term debt can be 
predicted. 
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We, therefore, carry out a preliminary investigation about the relationship 
between managerial ownership and debt maturity. Figure 4.1 presents the way in 
which two variables are associated. It seems that when managerial ownership is 
at a low level, managerial ownership is negatively related with debt maturity. 
However, after managerial ownership exceeds 10-20%, the decreasing rate is 
slower. And after managerial ownership exceeds 30-40%, the relationship 
becomes a positive one. 
To control for the non-linear impact of managerial ownership on debt maturity, 
we include the level of managerial ownership (OWN) and the squared level of 
managerial ownership (OWN) in our empirical model. And managerial 
ownership (OWN) is measured as the percentage of shares held by all executive 
directors. We expect to observe a negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and long-term debt and a positive relationship between the squared 
level of managerial ownership and long-term debt. 
More importantly, we do not expect a non-linear relationship between debt 
maturity and managerial ownership to be held in the firms with effective 
governance mechanisms. When corporate governance mechanism can act as an 
alternative monitoring role, managerial discretion can be aligned in the presence 
of effective corporate governance mechanism. By contrast, we expect that the 
non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and debt maturity is still 
held in weak-governed firms. 
4.2.1.6 Taxation 
Several studies demonstrate the impact of the tax system on debt maturity choice. 
For example, Brick and Ravid (1985) suggest that if the term structure of 
corporate coupon rates is increasing, then long-term debt is optimal since there 
exist net tax benefits from the long-term debt owing to the acceleration of 
interest payments. Contrarily, if the term structure of corporate coupon rates is 
decreasing, then short term debt is optimal since the net gains from long-term 
debt will be negative. In addition, Kane et al. (1985) develop a model in which 
the optimal debt maturity is determined by a trade-off between the tax advantage 
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of debt financing and bankruptcy costs and debt issue flotation costs on a period 
basis. And the net advantage of debt increases with corporate tax rate and 
decreases with debt flotation costs. Their simulation results imply that at a lower 
tax advantage, a longer maturity can amortize the flotation costs. Therefore, a 
positive relationship between long-term debt and tax rate can be expected. 
However, without considering agency costs and bankruptcy costs but taxation 
instead as the market imperfection, Lewis (1990) uses a time-state preference 
framework and relaxes the restriction that capital structure does not depend on 
debt maturity structure. He finds that there is no tax difference between long- 
term and short-term debt and debt maturity decision is independent of the firm 
value when optimal leverage and debt maturity are simultaneously determined. 
Moreover, Scholes and Wolfson (1992) propose that although the transaction 
costs of rolling-over short-term debt are higher, not all firms can afford to issue 
"expensive" long-term debt. Tax rate (TAX) is defined as the total tax charge 
divided by pre-tax profits (as in Ozkan, 2000 and 2002). 
4.12 The Rok of Managerial Overconfidence 
4.2.2.1 Background 
Several recent studies examine the relationship between corporate capital 
structure and managerial biases. Malmendier et al. (2007) keep consistent with 
their previous studies and define managerial overconfidence as the fact that 
managers overestimate the future returns of the project (better-than-average 
effect) and underestimate the likelihood of failure. They measure managerial 
overconfidence not only using the degree of under-diversification of the 
executives' personal portfolios, but also using press perception. They focus on 
two issues: the pecking-order of financing and debt conservatism. They argue 
that overconfident managers overestimate the outcome of their projects and 
perceive their firms to be undervalued by the market and thus believe external 
financing to be costly. As a result, they choose low levels of risky debt relative to 
available interest tax deductions. They find evidence that overconfident CEOs 
have pecking order preferences. 
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Apparently, in all Malmendier's papers (i. e. Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2007), the definition and the 
measure of managerial overconfidence is a combination of optimism and 
overconfidence. However, Hackbarth (2008) consider managerial biases 
according to two aspects: growth perception bias and risk perception bias. 
Growth perception means managers overestimate the growth rate of earnings, 
while risk perception bias means managers underestimate. They found a 
consistent result with Malmendier et al. (2007) that managers with growth 
perception bias follow a pecking order preference. However, when managers 
with risk perception bias need external funds, they prefer equity than debt. That 
is because, `for managers with risk perception bias, perceived equity 
overvaluation provides incentives to issue more shares into the market'. 
Moreover, they find positive effects of managerial biases. That is `mildly biased 
managers make capital structure decisions that are more in the interest of 
shareholders, while extreme managerial biases are detrimental to the firm'. 
Ben-David et al. (2007) use miscalibration to measure managerial 
overconfidence. They design a survey of CFOs in the US asking them to predict 
expected one- and ten-year market equity returns as well as the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of the distributions of market. Their overconfident measure maps 
each CFO's 10th and 90th percentile predictions into individual probability 
distortion for each respondent. Wide distribution means high uncertainty, while 
narrow distribution reflects confidence. Then they calculate the volatility and 
generate two overconfidence measures based on one- and ten-year forecasts of 
the S&P500 respectively. Similarly, they create two optimism variables based on 
expected one- and ten-year return forecasts respectively. They found that 
overconfident CFOs issue more debt leverage, prefer long-term debt and pay 
fewer dividends. 
4.2.2.2 Our Hypotheses 
First, we discuss the direct relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
debt maturity, which is rather complicated. In Hackbarth (2008), they illustrate 
that managers with growth and risk perception biases exercise debt restructuring 
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options earlier resulting shorter refinancing periods. However, as mentioned by 
Ben-David et al. (2007), in a sense of inflexible, when managers tend to 
underestimate their riskiness of future cash flows and might choose less flexible 
capital structure to commit long-term interest payments. They find that the 
portion of long-term debt (more than one year) out of total debts is positively 
related to their overconfidence variable. Therefore, the direct relationship 
between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity in our analysis will be due 
to their combined effects. Taken together, we argue it is an empirical issue. 
As noted in Section 4.2.1.2, short-term debt can be treated as a signal of firms' 
quality and a negative relationship between firms' quality and long-term debt can 
be predicted. In this framework, managerial overconfidence may also exert an 
impact on debt maturity decisions through the interaction with firms' quality. 
Overconfident managers are supposed to overestimate the outcomes of their 
projects and overestimate their precision of private information on firms' quality. 
When they are aware that asymmetric information about the firms' quality exists 
between the market and their firms, they tend to believe their firms are 
undervalued by the market. It can also be explained by risk perception bias 
(Hackbarth, 2008). When managers underestimate the volatility of risky process, 
they may perceive their perceived firms' cash flows are safer than they really are 
and thus, they believe that their firms are undervalued by the market. Moreover, 
the cognitive bias of firms' quality even leads overconfident mangers to ensure 
that they pay higher premiums on long-term debt than the premiums in their 
perspective. In order to avoid this, overconfident managers have more incentives 
to issue short-term debt rather than long-tam debt. And they believe that issuing 
short-term debt can help them to have a contract at a better-term after a re- 
evaluation. In other words, overconfident managers aim to take advantage of the 
signalling role of short-term debt available to the market to seek a better debt 
contract in the future. 
Consequently, firms with overconfident mangers have greater propensity to 
issue short-term debt to signal their perceived quality to the market bean those 
with non-overconfident managers. To test this hypothesis, we include the 
interaction term between our managerial overconfidence measure and firm 
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quality (OVER*QUALITY) in our debt maturity equation. We predict that the 
negative impact of firms' quality on long-term debt is greater when firms with 
managerial overconfidence. 
Moreover, as noted in Section 4.2.1.4, if debt matures before the investment 
option expiration date, then the underinvestment problem will be eliminated. 
And a negative relationship between long-term debt and growth opportunity can 
be predicted. In our framework, managerial overconfidence may also exert an 
impact on debt maturity decisions through an interaction with growth opportunity. 
The perceived growth opportunity by managers should be greater for firms with 
managerial overconfidence. In order to invest to their desired level and eliminate 
underinvestment problems, overconfident managers have more incentives to 
issue short-term debt rather than long-term debt. To test this hypothesis, we 
include the interaction term between our managerial overconfidence measure and 
firm quality (OVER*MTB) in our debt maturity equation. We predict that the 
negative relationship between growth opportunity and long-term debt is greater 
for firms with managerial overconfidence. 
Finally, our overconfidence variable (OVER! ) is based on executive directors' 
stock dealings in the open market. When the amount of shares purchased by a 
manager during the sample period is larger than the amount of shares sold, the 
manager will be classified as net buyer or overconfident. In this chapter, we 
accumulate all executive directors' stock purchase amount (positive value) and 
selling amount (negative value) during each sample year (2003-2006). When 
firms have been persistently displayed as net buyers over the period 2003-2006, 
our overconfidence variable (OVERT) equals 1 and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, we 
consider those firms which have been habitual net buyer for at least three years 
during 2003-2006 as an alternative measu ement of managerial overconfidence 
(OVER 2) to provide more evidence. To test the robustness of our results, we use 
OVER3 to be another alternative measure of managerial overconfidence, which 
is a dummy variable equalling 1 when the number of articles describing a firm's 
executive directors as optimistic or confident is larger than the number of articles 
describing a firm's executive directors as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, 
frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not confident over 2003-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
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4.2.3 The Role of Corporate Governance Mechanism 
In the following text, we discuss whether the biased impact of managerial 
overconfidence on firms' debt maturity decisions can vary with corporate 
governance mechanisms. We attempt to analyse whether the impact of 
managerial overconfidence is only pronounced in firms with weak governance 
mechanism (weak monitoring mechanism). 
It has been suggested that the potential prescription for managerial 
overconfidence could be outsider monitoring (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; 
Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). They argue that a standard incentive 
contract such as stock-based compensation is unable to mitigate the biased 
impact of overconfidence. The reason for this is that overconfident managers 
even believe that they are acting in the best interests of shareholders, although 
they are not actually, in the perspective of shareholders. By that they mean 
outsiders are capable of drawing managerial attention to information that may 
indicate that managers' perceptions are wrong. 
Thus, if the biased perception is a recurrent problem, then the most effective 
prescription for managerial overconfidence can be the strong outsider monitoring 
by corporate governance mechanisms. If this is the case, we expect that the 
impact of managerial overconfidence on the negative relationship between firms' 
quality and long-term debt can be monitored by an efficient governance 
mechanism and tend to be insignificant. By contrast, the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on the negative relationship between firms' quality and long- 
term debt cannot be restrained for firms with weak governance mechanisms. 
Similarly, we predict that the impact of managerial overconfidence on the 
negative relationship between firms' growth opportunity (or growth opportunity) 
and long-term retains to be significant in firms with weak governance 
mechanism. 
In order to identify firms as those with efficient monitoring mechanisms and 
those with weak monitoring mechanisms, we base on the following related issues 
such as board structure and ownership concen ration. We use a more cautious 
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way than in Chapter 2 identifying firms with weak or good governance 
mechanisms. That is, we especially concern an issue that the relationship 
between board structure and ownership concentration and the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanism may not be a linear one12. 
For example, larger boards make coordination, communication more 
cumbersome than smaller boards and agency problems increase with board size 
(John and Senbet, 1998). However, larger boards can provide a range of 
expertise to help make better decision and might be better for corporate 
performance. It seems board size is not necessarily associated with its 
effectiveness. And neither smaller-size boards nor larger-size board can exert 
effective monitoring efforts on management. If this is the case, we predict that 
the impact of managerial overconfidence retains significant in these firms. To 
estimate, we define board size (BOARD) as the total number of directors on the 
board. In particular, we divide firms into three subgroups: firms with larger-size 
boards, medium size boards and smaller-size boards. We assign firms to the ones 
with larger-size boards when those firms are in the top three deciles of the whole 
board size distribution, and vice versa. And the rest of them are assigned to those 
with medium-size boards. 
Moreover, board composition can influence the effectiveness of governance 
mechanism. It is widely acknowledged that non-executive directors are appointed 
to act in the shareholders' interests and have incentive to monitor management 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hart, 1995). They may act as professional referees to 
ensure that managers stimulate actions consistent with the interests of 
shareholders. It seems that, when there are fewer non-executive directors in 
boards, then they may have less incentive to monitor management. However, too 
many non-executive directors may also cause a free-rider problem that having 
more outsiders on the board reduces the efforts of all outsiders. If this is the can, 
we predict that the impact of managerial overconfidence retains significant when 
firms with too many or too few non-executive directors in boards. We define 
RATIO as the ratio of the number of non-executives to total number of directors. 
12 A literature brief can be ibcmd in the second Chapter 
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In particular, we divide firms into three subgroups: fines with lower-ratio, 
medium level and higher-ratio of non-executive directors in boards. We assign 
firms to the ones with higher-ratio when those firms are in the top three deciles 
of the whole RATIO distribution, and vice versa. And the rest of them are 
assigned to those with medium ratio. 
Finally, outside shareholders with substantial stakes have incentives to monitor 
management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large investors may represent their own 
interest, which do not need to coincide with the interest of other investors in the 
firms, or with the interests of employees and managers. Thus, not all 
shareholders may benefit from the managerial monitoring by large investors. 
Woidtke (2002) also note that some institutional investors such as administrators 
of public pension funds may focus on political or social issues other than firm 
performance. It seems that, when blockholders' ownership is quite lower, they 
have less incentive to monitor management. However, when blockholders' 
ownership increases to a higher level, potential agency problems between large 
and minority shareholders may arise. Hence, large investors cannot effectively 
supervise management. If this is the case, we predict that the impact of 
managerial overconfidence is kept to be significant in these firms. We define 
BLOCK as the total ownership of non-management shareholders with more than 
3% of shares. In particular, we split firms into three subgroups: firms with lower 
ownership, medium level and higher ownership. We assign firms to the ones with 
higher ownership when those firms are in the top three deciles of the whole 
BLOCK distribution, and vice versa. And the rest of them are assigned to be the 
medium group. 
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4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data Description 
We use a large sample of non-financial listed UK firms over the period 2002- 
2006. The initial data are available from the DataStream and Hemscott Guru 
Academic Database (Hemscott hereafter). The whole data set is constructed as 
follows: 
First, the data for companies' accounting information are mainly collected from 
DataStream from 2002 to 2006. We use Datastream to collect information for the 
following variables: Market to book value ratio, firm size, leverage, long-term 
debt, firm's quality, tax rate and liquidity. We only chose those firms with no 
missing data over the period 2002- 2006. 
Second, information on share dealing (2003-2006), firms' ownership (2003- 
2005), ownership concentration (2004-2005) and board structure (2004-2005) are 
collected from Hemscott. It provides detailed information about share dealings of 
each director in the open market each year, the share holding level of each 
director, ownership concentration, and numbers of executive directors and non- 
executive directors. 
Finally, we compile these two datasets into one sample and drop missing firm- 
year observations and outliers by trimming to the 1-99% percentile. We create 
our final balanced sample of 564 firms for our empirical analysis. Table 4.1 
provides the definitions of the variables used in this chapter whereas Table 4.2 
summarizes the key descriptive statistics. 
In Table 4.2, we observe that 47.6 % of total debt is due more than one year, 
which is close to the 46% reported by Antoniou et al. (2006) for UK. And the 
average market to book value ratio (MTB) is 1.928, which is between 2.05 the 
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figure reported by Florackis (2005) and 1.845 the figure reported by Guney and 
Ozkan (2005). Firm size measured as the logarithm of assets is 11.224, firms' 
quality (QUALITY 1) is -0.025 and QUALITY 2 is 0.086. Average book 
leverage ratio (LEVERAGE 1) is 0.165 and average market leverage ratio 
(LEVERAGE 2) is 0.236. And the book leverage ratio is in line with the figure in 
Guney and Ozkan (2005) and in Antoniou et al. (2006). Liquidity ratio measured 
by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (LIQUIDITY 1) is 2.16, which 
is higher than 1.63 reported by Guney and Oaken (2005), whereas liquidity ratio 
measured by the ratio of current assets to total assets (LIQUIDITY 2) is 0.52, 
which is lower than 0.57 reported by Antoniou et al. (2006). 
As far as the ownership and board structure variables are concerned, we find that 
executive ownership is 8.75%, which is lower than the number reported by other 
studies. It maybe due to a declining evolution of ownership in UK firms 
(Marchica, 2005). The average ownership concentration (BLOCK) reaches the 
level of 36.87%, the average proportion of non-executive directors in board is 
50.8% and the average board size is 7.073 directors. These are in line with the 
figures reported by Florackis (2005) in which he uses UK data for his analysis. 
Finally, we report our managerial overconfidence variable (OVERT), which is a 
dummy variable and about 6.9% of firms persistently display as net buyers in the 
stock market over the period 2003-2006. Meanwhile, we report an alternative 
managerial overconfidence variable (OVER2), which is about 24.1% of the firms 
display as netbuyers for at least three years over the period 2003-2006. Finally, 
we report another managerial overconfidence variable (OVER3), which is about 
37.2% of the firms that the number of articles describing executive directors as 
optimistic or confident is large than the number of articles describing executive 
directors as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not 
optimistic, or not confident the over the period 2003-2006. 
In Table 4.3, we present the Pearson's correlation for variables used in our 
regression. The results are generally in line with our prediction. The measures of 
firms' quality (QUALITY 1 and QUALITY 2) are negatively and significantly 
correlated with debt maturity. And firms' size (SIZE) increases with debt 
186 
maturity. These are in line with the asymmetric information hypothesis. Growth 
opportunity (MTB) appears to be negatively correlated with debt maturity, which 
is consistent with the agency costs hypothesis. Leverage (LEV 1 and LEV2) is 
positively correlated with debt maturity. It implies that fines' with higher 
leverage tend to have higher debt capacity and issue more long-term debt. The 
observed negative correlation between liquidity (LIQ 1 and LIQ2) and debt 
maturity rejects the argument that firms with higher liquidity will be easier to 
access external funds. But it is in line with the argument that higher liquidity 
limits firms' debt capacity. We also observe that managerial ownership (OWN) 
is negatively correlated with long-term debt, which is in line with managerial 
discretion hypothesis. Finally, our three overconfidence measures are highly 
correlated with each other. But, their direct relationship with debt maturity is 
unclear. However, such findings do not lead to concrete inferences given the 
impact of managerial overconfidence is interacting with the relationship between 
debt maturity and firm quality (growth opportunity). 
4.3.2 Mdhodology 
We examine the determinants of debt maturity by utilizing the average cross- 
sectional estimation proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1995). We execute our 
estimation over two time periods: 1). the dependent variable as a long-term debt 
ratio is measured in year 2006; 2). the dependent variable is measured in year 
2005. And independent variables are average-past values over the period 2002- 
2005 and 2002-2004 respectively. Averaged values can mitigate annual 
adjustment of each firm or extreme values and lagged values can deal with 
endogeneity. In addition, we especially interact managerial overconfidence 
variable with firm quality and growth opportunity respectively to test whether 
managerial overconfidence can increase the negative relationships between 
firms' quality and long-term debt and whether the negative relationship between 
growth opportunity and long-term debt is greater in firms with managerial 
overconfidence. 
Moreover, we use a pooled regression process to test the robustness of our results. 
The foremost advantage of using a pooled regression is that it provides an 
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examination of variations among cross-sectional units and variations within 
individual units over time simultaneously. Meanwhile, incorporating 
information relating to both cross-sectional and time series variables takes 
account of the situation that short-term fluctuations in the data may also have 
some important effects on debt maturity. In addition, using the pooled regression 
can provide an increased number of data points, which generates additional 
degrees of freedom. In our analysis, we use lagged explanatory (one year lag) 
variables to minimize endogeneity in the pooled regression. Due to the 
availability of managerial ownership information, we can execute the pooled 
regression over the period 2003-2005 when we include ownership variable in our 
estimation. Our empirical specification is as follows. 
DEBT MATURITY,, = EakX*u +9 (QUALITY,, ''OVER,, ) +y (M7B,, " OVER,, ) + /4, 
DEBT MATURITY,, is the dependent variable of debt maturity which is the 
ratio of long-term debt to total debt, I: akX, denote all firm-specific 
characteristics we used to test our hypothesis which include size, quality, 
liquidity, taxation, market to book value ratio, leverage , executive ownership, 
squared value of executive ownership. X is the error term. Hence, the 
coefficients of QUALITY,, *OVER, and (MTB,, *OVER. ) are the centres of our 
study, we expect that they are both negative and statistically significant. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 UnivariattAnalysis 
Table 4.4 presents univariate mean and standard deviation comparisons of 
several firm-specific characteristics by debt maturity quartiles. We are interested 
in whether the characteristics of firms differ significantly across firms with 
shorter debt maturity (the first quartile) and firms with longer debt maturity (the 
fourth quartile). 
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In general, we find supportive evidence that firms in the first quartile differ from 
firms in the fourth quartile at 1% significant level. Generally, we find that 
smaller firms having lower leverage ratio, higher liquidity value and greater 
growth opportunities tend to have shorter debt maturity. In addition, we find that 
firms' quality is negatively related to debt maturity. This is consistent with our 
signalling hypothesis that firms with good-quality tend to issue more short-term 
debts. Moreover, it seems that firms with higher managerial ownership tend to 
issue more short-term debt, which is consistent with our initial hypothesis that 
managerial ownership can reduce managerial incentives of insufficient effort and 
private preferences for longer debt maturity. However, the potential non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and debt maturity has not been 
captured by the univariate analysis. 
Finally, our univariate analysis does not capture a clear relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and debt maturity. There are at least two reasons. 
First, managerial overconfidence is a psychological characteristic, which can not 
be controlled by managers themselves. Second, univariate analysis does not 
capture the indirect effect of managerial overconfidence on the relationship 
between debt maturity and firms' quality (or MTB). According to our hypothesis, 
we emphasize the impact of managerial overconfidence by focusing the 
relationship between firms' quality and debt maturity. Hence, a complicated 
estimation technology should be required. 
4.4.2 Mu llvariate Analysis 
Table 4.5 presents the results from the average cross-sectional analysis of the 
determinants of debt maturity (long-term debt ratio). In this table, debt maturity 
is measured in year 2006 and other variables are average-past value of 2002- 
2005. We start with the regression in column (1), which includes the firm 
specific characteristics as suggested in the previous literature review. In column 
(2), we add managerial ownership and the squared value of managerial 
ownership in our regression to test the nonlinear relationship between managerial 
ownership and debt maturity. In column (3), we interact managerial 
overconfidence with firms' quality (OVER1*QUALrIYI) and with growth 
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opportunity (OVERT *MTB) in our regression to test the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on debt maturity. In column (4), we use alternative measures of 
liquidity and leverage variables to give further checks. Finally, in columns (5) 
and (6), we use alternative measures of quality (QUALITY2) to give further 
checks and other things are same as in the columns (3) and (4). 
Firm Size: from column (1) to column (6), we find that firms with larger size 
tend to issue more long-term debt at the 1% significant level. This implies that 
larger firms having lower asymmetric information costs and easier access to the 
capital market tend to raise more long-term debt. 
Quality: from column (1) to column (6), we find that firms with better quality 
tend to issue less long-term debt. And this result is statistically significant in 
columns (1)-(4). It supports the signaling hypothesis that short-term debt can act 
as a signaling role of firms' quality. 
Leverage: in columns (1), (2), (3) and (5), we find a consistently positive 
relationship between LEVERAGE 1 and debt maturity, which is at the 1% 
significant level. This is consistent with the liquidity risk hypothesis that firms 
with higher leverage ratio need to control for the bankruptcy risks they may incur 
by issuing more long-term debt. This result is robust when we use the market 
leverage ratio (LEVERAGE 2) in columns (4) and (6) as an alternative measure 
for leverage. 
Liquidity: the coefficients on liquidity in all models, as another proxy for 
liquidity risk, are negative and at the 1% significant level, which does not 
support the view that firms with higher asset liquidity are unable to raise more 
long-term debt. This is possibly due to the conflicts between managers and 
investors arising from the excessive liquidity (Myers and Rajan, 1988), which 
can limit managers' operating flexibility with providing limit output. As a result, 
the investors' control rights are lower than before and thus they may consider 
reducing financing. The negative relationship is consistently significant when we 
use an alternative measurement of liquidity (LIQUIDITY 2) in columns (4) and 
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(6). 
Growth opportunity and Tax: In all columns, we find a mixed relationship 
between growth opportunity (MTB) and long-term debt. All the results are 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, we find a negative but insignificant 
relationship between long-term debt and taxation across column (1) to column 
(6). Similar results can be found in Antoniou et al. (2006), which implies the 
effective rate of tax cannot play an important role in determining the debt 
maturity structure in our sample. 
Managerial ownership: in columns (2)-(6), we estimate the non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and long-term debt by including 
ownership (OWN) and squared value of ownership (OWN2) in our regression. In 
line with our hypothesis, the results reveal that the relationship is non-linear. In 
particular, when the level of managerial ownership is low, an increase in 
ownership can align the different interests of managers and outside shareholders 
and less long-term debt are desired However, when managerial ownership 
exceeds a certain level, the conflicts between managers and shareholders cannot 
be aligned and managers tend to lengthen their debt maturity to pursue their 
private benefits and avoid external monitoring. Our findings suggest a turning 
point of 40% in that the debt maturity decreases as managerial ownership 
decreases up to 40%, and then increases with managerial ownership level above 
40%, which is in line with our Figure 4.1. 
Managerial overconfidence: More importantly, in columns (3)-(6), we further 
investigate whether managerial overconfidence can affect the relationship 
between long-term debt and firms' quality and whether managerial 
overconfidence can affect the relationship between long-term debt and growth 
opportunity. To do so, we include two interaction tams OVER1*QUALITY and 
OVER1 *MTB. We observe a negative and significant coefficient of 
OVER1 *QUALITY. It indicates that overconfident managers tend to believe that 
the market underestimates their firms' quality which incurs higher costs for them 
to issue long-term debt. Hence, they have more incentives to issue short-term 
debt to signal their perceived quality to the market. Meanwhile, our results reveal 
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that the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity is independent of 
the impact of managerial ownership on debt maturity. The results are statistically 
significant by controlling both managerial ownership and managerial 
overconfidence. 
Moreover, we find a negative and significant coefficient of OVERT*MTB. Since 
overconfident managers tend to overestimate the outcome of their investment, 
their perceived growth opportunity is tend to be greater than it should be. And 
according to the agency costs theory, short-term debt can be used to alleviate 
underinvestment problems. In order to invest to their desired investment level, 
overconfident managers tend to issue more short-term debt. 
In Table 4.6, it presents the results from the average cross-sectional analysis 
(CSA) of the determinants of debt maturity (long-term debt ratio). In this table, 
debt maturity is measured in year 2005 and other variables are average-past value 
of 2002-2004. Moreover, in Table 4.7, it presents the results from the pooled 
regressions. In each year, we use one-year lagged values of independent values. 
In these two tables, we find that firms with larger size, higher leverage and worse 
quality, lower liquidity tend to issue more long-term debt. They also support a 
non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and long-term debt. The 
most important thing is that the negative relationship between debt maturity and 
long-term debt is greater in firms with managerial overconfidence. Moreover, 
managerial overconfidence can increase the negative relationship between 
growth opportunity and debt maturity. 
The role of corporate governance mechanisms: In Tables 4.8,4.9 and 4.10, we 
test whether the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity varies 
with corporate governance mechanisms. In Table 4.8, we use the cross-sectional 
average regression with dependent variable measured in year 2006. In table 4.9, 
we use the cross-sectional average regression with dependent variable measured 
in year 2005. And in Table 4.10, we use the pooled regression. In this procedure, 
we extend our analysis including two considerations: one is to test whether 
effective corporate governance mechanisms can affect managerial discretion; the 
other is to test whether different corporate governance environment can influence 
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debt maturity decision by overconfident managers. In particular, we split firms 
into three subgroups adopting a set of governance variables over the period 2004- 
2005, such as board size (BOARD), ratio (RATIO) and blockholders' ownership 
(BLOCK) as mentioned in section 4.2.3. 
First, as for the impact of managerial ownership on debt maturity, we find that 
the relationship between managerial ownership and debt maturity is significant 
and negative when firms are with smaller-size boards (BOARD), lower ratio of 
non-executive directors in boards (RATIO) or with lower blockholders' 
ownership (BLOCK). It is in line with the view that firms with smaller-size 
boards, lower ratio of nonexecutive directors or with lower blockholders' 
ownership have less power or fewer incentives to monitor management. Then the 
effectiveness of these corporate governance mechanisms is weak. And in these 
firms, managerial ownership can play an important role as an incentive 
mechanism (alignment effects). That is, an increase in managerial ownership can 
align the conflicts between managers and shareholders and managers tend to 
issue more short-term debt to facilitate external monitoring. Meanwhile, we 
observe the coefficient of the squared value of managerial ownership (OWN2) is 
positive and significant in these firms. Such evidence can be regarded as a 
support for the view that the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership can 
also be more pronounced in weak governed firms. That is, when managerial 
ownership exceeds a certain level, managers in weak governed firms tend to 
expropriate wealth by issuing less short-term debt to avoid external monitoring. 
Thus, the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and debt 
maturity is held in the firms with smaller-size board, lower ratio of nonexecutive 
directors or lower blockholders' ownership. 
In contrast, we observe that the coefficients of managerial ownership and the 
squared value of managerial ownership become insignificant when firms are with 
medium ratio of non-executive directors or medium level of blockholders' 
ownership. These firms are predicted to have better corporate governance 
mechanisms. The result supports the proposition that managerial ownership can 
less influence the debt maturity as an incentive mechanism in the case of firms 
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that already have more effective governance mechanisms. However, in the board 
size classification, we can only find consistent evidence in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. 
Furthermore, when firms are with higher ratio of non-executive directors or 
higher level of blockholders' ownership in Table 4.10, we find that the 
coefficients of managerial ownership and the squared value of managerial 
ownership appear to be significant. It seems that these firms are with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms. Too many non-executive directors may result 
in free rider problems. And higher blockholders' ownership may induce agency 
problems between large and minority shareholders. Hence, the non-linear 
relationship between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity becomes 
significant. However, in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9, we do not find any consistent 
evidence. 
Second, with regard to the impact of managerial overconfidence, we observe that 
the coefficient of interaction term (OVER1*QUALITY) remains negative and 
statistically significant in firms with smaller-size boards, lower ratio of non- 
executive directors or lower blockholders' ownership. This result is robust when 
we use different estimation methods in three tables. It implies that, when firms 
have weak corporate governance mechanisms, monitoring by outsiders can not 
restrain overconfident managers to pursue their desired debt maturity. In contrast, 
the coefficient of interaction term (OVER1 *QUALITY) turns to be an 
insignificant one in firms with medium ratio of non-executive directors or lower 
blockholders' ownership, which implies the biased debt maturity decision , to 
some extent, can be restrained by the effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
But, for firms with higher ratio of non executive directors or higher 
blockholders' ownership, we find limited evidence that the coefficient of 
interaction term (OVER1 *QUAUTY) can change to be significant. Also, we do 
not find any supportive evidence that the coefficient of interaction term 
OVER1 *MTB varies with corporate governance mechanisms. 
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4.5 Robustness Check 
In this section, we use two alternative managerial overconfidence variables 
(OVER2 and OVER3) to provide a further robustness check. Tables 4.11-4.13 
present the results about the determinants of debt maturity using three different 
regression approaches with OVER2. And Tables 4.14-4.16 present the results 
about the determinants of debt maturity using three different regression 
approaches with OVER3. 
Consistent with previous results, we find firms with larger size, higher leverage 
ratio, worse quality and lower liquidity tend to issue more long-term debt. 
Moreover, there is a supportive evidence for the non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and debt maturity. As far as the indirect impacts of 
managerial overconfidence on debt maturity are concerned, the results are 
consistent with our earlier findings that the coefficient of interaction term of 
managerial overconfidence and firms' quality (QUALITY 1) is negative and 
significant. But, we do not find and supportive evidence when firms' quality is 
measured by QUALITY2. Finally, we find that the coefficient of the interaction 
term of (OVER2*MTB) is negative but insignificant. 
Finally, Tables 4.17-4.19 present the evidence of the role of corporate 
governance mechanism using three different regression approaches with OVER2. 
And Tables 4.20-4.22 present the evidence of the role of corporate governance 
mechanism using three different regression approaches with OVER3. 
Consistent with previous results, we find that managerial ownership plays an 
important role as an incentive mechanism (alignment effects) when firms do not 
have strong monitoring mechanisms such as firms with smaller-size boards, 
lower ratio of non-executive directors or lower blockholders' ownership. 
Moreover, the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership is more pronounced 
in these firms. By contrast, when funs are with medium ratio of non-executive 
directors or medium level of blockholders' ownership, managerial ownership 
play less important roles as an incentive mechanism and managers an unlikely to 
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expropriate wealth from shareholders when firms already have more effective 
monitoring mechanisms. However, we find limited evidence that the impact of 
managerial ownership on debt maturity is associated with higher ratio of non- 
executive directors or higher blockholders' ownership. 
In terms of managerial overconfidence, we find consistent evidence that 
managerial overconfidence can significantly increase the negative relationship 
between debt maturity and firms' quality for firms with lower ratio of non- 
executives directors or lower blockholders' ownership. It indicates that when 
corporate governance can not oversee management effectively, the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on debt maturity is kept to be significant. In summary, 
the results from in these tables are consistent with the results from previous 
regressions and generally support our hypothesis. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we provide an empirical analysis of the determinants of debt 
maturity structure (long-term debt ratio). We particularly focus on the influences 
of managerial ownership and managerial overconfidence on debt maturity. To do 
so, we include managerial ownership and its squared value to allow us to test the 
nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and debt maturity. 
Moreover, we use the interaction term of managerial overconfidence and firms' 
quality to test the hypothesis that managerial overconfidence can increase the 
negative relationship between long-term debt and firms' quality. Meanwhile, we 
include the interaction term of managerial overconfidence and firms' growth 
opportunity to test the hypothesis that managerial overconfidence can increase 
the negative relationship between long-term debt and growth opportunity. We 
use three alternative overconfidence measurements to give more evidence: two of 
them are related to the annual share dealing behaviour by executive directors and 
the rest one is related to the press perception. 
Our empirical findings strongly suggest that firms with larger size, higher 
leverage ratio, worse quality and lower liquidity tend to issue more long-term 
196 
debt. Moreover, our results reveal that the relationship between debt maturity and 
managerial ownership is non-monotonic. In particular, when managerial 
ownership is at a low level, an increase in the ownership can align the conflicts 
between managers and shareholders and more short-term debt are desired to 
facilitate external monitoring. However, when managerial ownership exceeds a 
certain level, conflicts between managers and shareholders cannot be aligned and 
managers tend to lengthen their debt maturity to pursue their private benefits and 
avoid external monitoring. And the non-linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and debt maturity is kept to be significant when firms are with 
smaller-size boards, lower non-executive ratios or lower blockholders' 
ownership. This implies that the alignment and entrenchment effects of 
managerial ownership are significant when firms are without effective 
governance mechanisms. 
More importantly, we find that managerial overconfidence can play a significant 
role in increasing the negative relationship between firms' quality (QUALITY 1) 
and long-term debt. This attributes to the fact that overconfident managers 
believe the debt market undervalues their firms' quality and tend to issue more 
short-term debt to signal their perceived quality. Meanwhile, they believe the re- 
evaluation associating with the short-term debt can help them to find a debt 
contract at better-terms in the future. This result is robust when we use 
alternative estimate methods and two other alternative overconfidence 
measurements. Moreover, we find some evidence that the negative relationship 
between debt maturity and growth opportunity managerial overconfidence tend 
to be greater for firms with overconfident managers. But the results are 
significant only in one of our overconfidence measurements (OVER 1). It 
provides some evidence that overconfident managers are more likely to issue 
short-term debt to invest to their desired level. 
Finally, the impact of managerial overconfidence varies with different corporate 
governance mechanisms. In particular, managerial overconfidence can still 
significantly increase the negative relationship between long-term debt and 
firms' quality in firms with lower ratio of nonacecutive directors or lower 
blockholders' ownership. In contrast, this impact turns to be insignificant in 
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firms with medium ratio of non-executive directors in board or medium level of 
blockholders' ownership. These results are robust when we use different estimate 
approaches and two other alternative measurements of managerial 
overconfidence. 
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Table 4.1: Variables, Definitions and Sources. 
Variable Definition Sources 
MAT The ratio of debt that matures in more than one year to total 
debt. Datastream 
MTB The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity to book value of total Datastream 
assets. 
SIZE Total Assets( in nature logarithm). Datastream 
QUALITY1 The growth rate of earnings, defined as the difference between Datastream 
pretax profits in t+l and the pretax profits in t divided by the 
pretax profits in t. 
QUALITY2 The difference between EPS in year t+l and t divided by share Datastream 
price in I. 
TAX The ratio of total tax charge to pre-tax profits. Datastream 
LEVI The ratio of total debt to total assets. Datastream 
LEV2 The ratio of total debt to book value of total assets minus book Datastream 
value of equity plus the market value of equity. 
LIQ1 The ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Hemscott 
LIQ2 The ratio of current assets to total assets. Hemscott 
OWN The total percentage of shareholding by executive directors. Hemscott 
BLOCK The total percentage of shareholding by all shareholders (other 
than managers) with ownership larger than 3%. 
Hemscott 
BOARD The total number of directors in board room. Hemscott 
RATIO The ratio of total number of non-executive directors to total Hemscott 
number of all directors. 
OVERT Managerial overconfidence: a dummy variable, which takes 
the value of 1 if the firm is identified as a netbuyer for all Hemscott 
years over the period 2003-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
OVER2 Managerial overconfidence: a dummy variable, which takes 
the value of 1 if the firm is identified as a nethuyer for at least Hemscott 
3 years over the period 2003-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
OVER3 A dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the number 
of articles describing a firm's executive directors as 
optimistic or confident is larger than the number of articles NexisUK describing a firm's executive directors as reliable, steady, 
practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or 
not confident over 2003-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
Notes: Datastream database provides accounting and market ta. Hemscott Guru Acaden-dc 
database provides financial data for the UK's top 300,000 companies and detailed data on all 
directors of UK listed companies. Nexis UK is a single most powerful global news and business 
information service. 
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Figure 4.1: The Relationship between Debt Maturity and Managerial 
Ownership. 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics. (N=564) 
Variables 
DEDT MATURITY 
SIZE 
QUALITY 1 
QUALITY 2 
LEV I 
LEV 2 
TAX 
LIQI 
LIQ 2 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
BOARD 
RATIO 
BLOCK 
OVER1 
OVER2 
OVER3 
Mean S. D. 25% Median 75% 
0.476 
11.224 
-0.025 
0.086 
0.165 
0.236 
0.204 
2.156 
0.515 
1.928 
7.781 
8.748 
7.073 
0.508 
36.867 
0.069 
0.241 
0.372 
0.386 0 0.542 0.852 
2.264 9.541 11.098 12.635 
2.414 -0.607 0.022 0.385 
0.617 -0.020 0.011 0.056 
0.168 0.012 0.125 0.267 
0.211 0.026 0.211 0.387 
0.585 0.028 0.261 0.327 
2.835 1.014 1.408 2.142 
0.249 0.326 0.518 0.698 
1.772 1.068 1.418 2.083 
15.578 1.997 4.454 7.997 
15.044 0.150 1.309 11.169 
2.561 578 
0.159 0.4 0.5 0.6 
21.776 21.102 36.291 51.179 
0.254 
0.428 
0.484 
oo 
00 
0 
0 
0 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for main variable used in our analysis. Debt 
maturity is measured over the period 2003-2006, OVER!, OVER2 and OVER3 are measured 
over the period 2003-2006 and internal corporate governance variables are measured over the 
period 2004-2006, managerial ownerships are measured over the period 2003-2005. All the other 
variables are measured over the period 2002-2005. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.4: Firm Characteristics by Debt Maturity Quartiles. 
First Second 
quartile quartile 
SIZE 9.801 10.795 
(1.630) (1.932) 
QUALITY! 0.090 0.088 
(2.263) (2.778) 
QUALITY2 0.138 0.088 
(0.703) (0.809) 
LEV 1 0.040 0.161 
(0.098) (0.151) 
LEV 2 0.062 0.238 
TAX 
LIQ 1 
LIQ 2 
(0.129) (0.192) 
0.201 0.187 
(0.711) (0.489) 
3.746 1.648 
(4.570) (1.164) 
0.626 0.566 
(0.258) (0.202) 
MTB 3.746 1.648 
(4.570) (1.164) 
AMAT 8.251 6.296 
(25.551) (7.941) 
OWN 13.329 9.920 
(17.102) (14.843) 
OVER1 0.073 0.043 
(0.260) (0.203) 
OVER2 0.191 0.196 
(0.394) (0.397) 
OVER3 0.373 0.399 
(0.484) (0.490) 
Third 
quartile 
11.902 
(2.450) 
-0.105 
(2.186) 
0.066 
(0.505) 
0.215 
(0.164) 
0.299 
(0.191) 
0.241 
(0.500) 
1.507 
(1.475) 
0.461 
(0.227) 
1.507 
(1.475) 
7.763 
(9.904) 
6.874 
(13.804) 
0.067 
(0.251) 
0.261 
(0.439) 
0.378 
0.485 
Fourth 
t-test 
quartile 
12.492 -25.850*** 
(1.945) 
-0.174 2.039** 
(2.430) 
0.048 2.738*** 
(0.363) 
0.257 -27.668*** 
(0.166) 
0.359 -31.053*** 
(0.195) 
0.187 0.369 
(0.592) 
1.522 15.779*** 
(1.448) 
0.401 11.653*** 
(0.231) 
1.522 15.779*** 
(1.448) 
8.633 -0.332 
(9.974) 
4.638 8.721*** 
(12.386) 
0.090 -1.099 
(0.287) 
0.317 5.039*** 
(0.466) 
0.342 1.094 
0.475) 
Notes: This table provides univariate mean comparisons of firm specific characteristics by debt 
maturity quartiles. It also provides standard deviation comparison in parentheses. We use debt 
maturity measured over the period 2003-2006, and split sample into four quartiles. The t-statistics 
is for the difference of means between the first and the fourth quartiles. ***and * indicate 
coefficient is significant at 1% and 10% respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Table4.1. 
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Table 4.5: CSA Regressions (2006): the Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
Independent 
Variables 
SIZE 
QUALITY! 
QUALITY2 
LEVI 
(LEV2 in 4,6) 
TAX 
LIQ1 
(LIQ2 in 4,6) 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
OWN2 
OVER1 
OVER1* 
QUALITY! 
OVERI* 
QUALITY2 
OVER1* 
MTB 
CONSTANT 
Obs. 
F-test 
R2 
Adj. R2 
Est 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
Debt Maturity ( MAT) 2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.047 0.036 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.032 
(6.41)*** (4.72)*** (4.88)*** (4.56)*** (4.36)*** (4.15)*** 
-0.032 -0.033 -0.030 -0.024 
(2.61)*** (2.18)** (2.38)** (2.09)** 
-0.101 -0.063 
(1.55) (1.07) 
0.734 0.719 0.717 0.615 0.772 0.640 
(5.85)*** (5.87)*** (5.83)*** (6.82)*** (6.67)*** (6.77)*** 
-0.023 -0.016 -0.011 -0.002 -0.018 -0.008 
(0.46) (0.34) (0.25) (0.45) (0.40) (0.45) 
-0.018 -0.020 -0.020 -0.327 -0.019 -0.332 
(3.25)*** (3.74)"' (3.77)"" (4.07)'*" (3.50)*** (4.16)*** 
0.0003 -0.0003 0.005 0.016 0.001 0.014 
(0.24) (0.02) (0.43) (1.26) (0.08) (1.06) 
-0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.002 -0.0006 -0.002 
(0.21) (0.36) (0.14) (1.61) (0.72) (1.58) 
-0.009 
(3.84)**" 
-0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
(3.62)*** (3.18)*** (3.55)*** (3.12)** 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(3.71)s** (3.53)*** (3.63)sss (3.36)*** (2.66)*** 
0.205 0.191 0.202 0.196 
(0.21) (1.48) (2.46)** (1.08) 
-0.105 -0.108 
(3.02)*** (3.63)*"" 
-0.241 -0.307 
(2.37)*** (3.33)*** 
-0.085 -0.068 -0.086 -0.070 
(2.46)** (1.94)* (2.48)** (2.04)** 
-0.124 0.051 0.021 0.145 0.071 0.182 
(1.46) (0.52) (0.22) (1.28) (0.70) (1.57) 
564 564 564 564 564 564 
32.39*** 32.39*** 27.09*** 32.55*** 25.61*** 32.03*** 
0.35 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.35 0.38 
0.32 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.35 
Notes: this table presents the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decision. All 
regressions include industry dummies. We use consistent heteroscedasticity standard errors. T-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10"/0 
respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.6: CSA Regressions (2005): the Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
Independent 
Variables Est 
0.058 0.046 0.047 0.043 0.044 0.043 
(8.84)*** (4.72)*** (4.88)*** (6.24)*** (6.06)*** (5.89)*** 
ty (MAT) 2005 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SIZE 
QUALITY1 
QUALITY2 
LEV1 
(LEV2 in 4,6) 
TAX 
LIQ1 
(LIQ2 in 4,6) 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
OWN2 
OVER! 
OVER1* 
QUALITY! 
OVER1* 
QUALITY2 
OVER1* 
MTB 
CONSTANT 
Obs. 
F-test 
R2 
Adj. R2 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
-0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.015 
(2.01)** (2.08)** (2.38)** (1.53) 
-0.076 -0.049 
(1.60) (1.08) 
0.646 0.638 0.640 0.564 0.685 0.577 
(6.38)*** (5.87)*** (5.83)*** (6.75)*** (7.34)*** (7.10)*** 
0.005 0.011 0.010 0.021 0.004 0.015 
(0.09) (0.34) (0.17) (0.40) (0.07) (0.31) 
-0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.272 -0.017 -0.272 
(3.02)*** 
Debt Maturi 
(3.44)*** (3.51)*** (3.62)*** (3.50)*** (4.16)*** 
-0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.007 
(0.60) (0.45) (0.11) (0.99) (0.12) (0.87) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
(1.42) (0.45) (1.40) (1.61) (0.72) (1.58) 
-0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 (3.66)*** (3.48)*** (2.98)*** (3.43)*** (2.93)** 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(3.37)*** (3.21)x"' (2.47)** (2.99)"** (2.32)*" 
0.137 0.141 0.142 0.151 
(1.63) (1.07) (1.59) (1.23) 
-0.048 -0.049 
(2.18)** (2.25)** 
-0.141 -0.307 
(1.93)* (2.60)** 
-0.048 -0.041 -0.050 -0.044 
(2.18)* (2.09)** (2.31)** (2.31)** 
-0.227 0.046 -0.067 0.034 -0.029 0.057 
(0.91) (0.50) (0.73) (0.32) (0.31) (0.53) 
564 564 564 564 564 564 
44.94*** 38.94*** 32.63*** 36.18*** 31.32*** 37.18*** 
0.38 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.40 0.43 
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.40 
Notes: this table presents the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decision. All 
regressions include industry dummies. We use consistent heteroscedasticity standard errors. T-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. "W", ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
205 
Table 4.7: Pooled Regressions: the Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
Independent 
Variables 
SIZE 
QUALITY1 
QUALITY2 
LEV1 
(LEV2 in 4,6) 
TAX 
LIQ1 
(LIQ2 in 4,6) 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
OWN2 
OVER1 
OVER1* 
QUALITYI 
OVERI* 
QUALITY2 
OVER1* 
MTB 
CONSTANT 
Obs. 
F-test 
R2 
Adj. R2 
ESt. 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+! - 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
Debt Maturity (MAT) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.03 0.046 0.046 0.043 0.047 0.043 
(16.44)*** (11.10)"** (11.25)+"" (10.72)*** (11.09)""" (10.72)"S* 
-0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
(2.50)** (2.76)** (2.34)** (2.22)** 
-0.010 -0.006 
(0.61) (0.34) 
0.694 0.688 0.687 0.600 0.696 0.608 
(13.41)*"" (11.21)*** (11.23)"+" (12.12)+"' (11.16)"** (12.15)I*$ 
-0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 0.009 -0.007 
(0.09) (0.69) (0.69) (0.58) (0.07) (0.51) 
-0.012 -0.017 -0.017 -0.255 -0.017 -0.254 
(4.88)*** (5.04)""" (5.11)*** (5.91)*** (5.14)*** (5.85)*** 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.009 0.002 0.011 
(0.41) (0.22) (0.47) (1.96)* (0.40) (2.42) 
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 
(1.42) (1.45) (1.79)* (1.91)* (1.72)* (1.58) 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
(4.38)*** (5.11)*** (4.46)*** (3.43)*** (4.20)** 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(3.70)*** (3.51)*"' (3.90)** (2.99)*** (3.64)*** 
0.121 0.124 0.111 0.115 
(1.66)* (1.87)'' (1.25) (1.55) 
-0.048 -0.025 
(2.72)*** (2.77)** 
0.036 0.018 
(0.40) (0.25) 
-0.048 -0.044 -0.052 -0.045 
(2.76)*** (2.88)*** (2.76)** (2.90)*** 
-0.208 -0.083 -0.088 -0.005 -0.086 0.006 
(5.29)*** (0.50) (1.63) (0.08) (1.58) (0.10) 
1692 1692 1692 1692 1692 1692 
73.07*** 78.70*** 65.03*** 75.21*** 62.29*** 73.05*** 
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.40 
0.35 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.39 
Notes: this table presents the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decision. All 
regressions include industry dummies and time dummies. We use consistent heteroscedasticity standard 
errors. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. "", "' and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.11: Robustness Check 1: the Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
(OVER 2 and CSA 2006). 
Independent II Debt Maturity (MAT) 
Variables I Est (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SIZE 
QUALITY1 
QUALITY2 
LEVI 
(LEV2 in 4,6) 
TAX 
LIQ1 
(LIQ2 in 4,6) 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
OWN2 
OVER2 
OVER2* 
QUALITY! 
OVER2* 
QUALITY2 
OVER2* 
MTB 
CONSTANT 
Obs. 
F-test 
R2 
Adj. R2 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
0.034 
(4.42)*** 
0.030 0.032 
(3.95)*** (4.05)*** 
-0.025 -0.020 
(1.85)* (1.58) 
0.028 
(3.57)*** 
-0.136 -0.123 
(2.37)** (2.60)*** 
0.724 0.676 0.782 0.725 
(5.90)*** (5.65)*** (6.81)*** (6.25)*** 
-0.008 -0.006 -0.017 -0.015 
(0.17) (0.12) (0.37) (0.31) 
-0.022 -0.389 -0.019 -0.378 
(4.33)*** (5.06)*** (3.58)*** (4.96)*** 
0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.001 
(0.47) (0.20) (0.12) (0.05) 
-0.0003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.36) (1.25) (0.82) (0.64) 
-0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
(3.72)*** (3.47)*** (3.63)*** (3.44)*** 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(3.63)*** (3.25)*** (3.44)*** (3.13)*** 
0.117 0.082 0.011 0.072 
(1.00) (1.39) (0.90) (1.20) 
-0.048 -0.051 (1.83)* (2.14)** 
0.112 0.081 
(0.90) (0.61) 
-0.044 -0.023 -0.041 -0.022 
(1.58) (0.81) (1.51) (0.76) 
0.043 0.273 0.092 0.307 
(0.44) (2.45)*** (0.92) (2.72)*** 
564 564 564 564 
28.71*** 28.96*** 25.12*** 25.61*** 
0.36 0.37 0.35 0.37 
0.33 0.35 0.32 0.34 
Notes: this table presents the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decision. All 
regressions include industry dummies. We use consistent heteroscedasticity standard errors. T-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. """, "" and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.12: Robustness Check 2: the Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
OVER 2 and CSA 2005). ( 
Independent 
Variables 
SIZE 
QUALITY! 
QUALITY2 
LEVI 
(LEV2 in 4,6) 
TAX 
LIQ1 
(LIQ2 in 4,6) 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
OWN2 
OVER2 
OVER2* 
QUALITYI 
OVER2* 
QUALITY2 
OVER2* 
MTB 
CONSTANT 
Obs. 
F-test 
R2 
Adj. R2 
E. s1 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
(3) 
Debt Maturi 
(4) 
ty ( MAT 
(5) ý (6) 
0.045 0.042 0.042 0.040 
(6.12)*** (5.95)*** (5.68)*** (5.65)*** 
-0.011 -0.006 
(1.95)* (0.53) 
-0.128 -0.100 
(4.13)*** (3.74)*** 
0.625 0.571 0.710 0.598 
(6.46)*** (6.76)*** (7.73)*** (7.57)*** 
0.015 0.025 0.011 0.021 
(0.27) (0.49) (0.19) (0.41) 
-0.018 -0.279 -0.016 -0.253 
(3.85)*** (3.70)*** (3.10)*** (3.43)*** 
-0.001 0.005 0.003 0.005 
(0.10) (0.61) (0.33) (0.56) 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
(1.55) (1.63) (0.87) (1.13) 
-0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
(3.52)*** (3.03)*** (3.57)*** (3.09)*** 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(3.27)*** (2.58)*** (3.14)*** (2.51)*** 
-0.080 -0.054 -0.068 -0.048 
(1.58) (1.06) (1.36) (0.95) 
-0.032 -0.038 
(1.66)* (2.04)** 
0.173 0.156 
(1.17) (1.56) 
-0.013 0.001 -0.018 -0.006 
(0.72) (0.03) (1.00) (0.29) 
0.047 0.057 0.004 0.069 
(0.52) (0.55) (0.04) (0.65) 
564 564 564 564 
31.67*** 33.78*** 33.03*** 35.41*** 
0.41 0.43 0.41 0.43 
0.38 0.40 0.38 0.40 
Notes: this table presents the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decision. All 
regressions include industry dummies. We use consistent heteroscedasticity standard errors. T-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. ""', "" and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Definitions of an variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.13: Robustness Check 3: the Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
f OVER 2 and Pooled Keg 
Independent 
Variables Est 
SIZE 
QUALITY! 
QUALITY2 
LEV1 
(LEV2 in 4,6) 
TAX 
LIQI 
(LIQ2 in 4,6) 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
OWNZ 
OVER2 
OVER2* 
QUALITY1 
OVER2* 
QUALITY2 
OVER2* 
MTB 
CONSTANT 
Obs. 
F-test 
R2 
Adj. R2 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+i- 
+ 
+ 
+i- 
ression I 
Debt Maturity (MAT) 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.045 0.042 0.045 0.042 
(10.83)*** (10.59)*** (10.75)*** (10.48)*** 
-0.006 -0.005 
(2.46)** (1.24) 
-0.022 -0.159 
(1.52) (1.16) 
0.692 0.605 0.703 0.612 
(11.32)*** (12.29)*** (11.30)*** (12.27)*** 
-0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 
(0.59) (0.46) (0.62) (0.50) 
-0.016 -0.252 -0.016 -0.247 
(5.70)*** (5.88)*** (5.02)*** (5.73)*** 
0.001 0.010 0.001 0.010 
(0.32) (2.06)** (0.27) (2.05)** 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.78) (1.61) (0.87) (1.58) 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
(4.13)*** (4.22)*** (4.21)*** (4.22)*** 
0.00008 0.00007 0.00008 0.00007 
(3.54)*** (3.76)*** (3.67)*** (3.78)*** 
0.079 0.057 0.075 0.054 
(0.34) (1.18) (0.25) (0.59) 
-0.017 -0.019 
(2.33)** (2.63)*** 
0.091 0.075 
(1.14) (1.63) 
-0.016 -0.003 -0.018 -0.005 
(1.30) (0.22) (1.49) (0.38) 
0.080 0.012 -0.082 -0.006 
(1.48) (0.20) (1.51) (0.10) 
1692 1692 1692 1692 
65.24*** 73.92*** 64.81*** 73.38*** 
0.38 0.40 0.37 0.40 
0.37 0.39 0.36 0.39 
Notes: this table presents the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decision. All 
regressions include industry dummies and year dummies. We use consistent heteroscedasticity standard 
errors. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%. 
5% and 10% respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.14: Robustness Check 4: the Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
(OVER 3 and CSA 2006). 
Independent 
Variables Est 
Debt Maturity (MAT ý 
SIZE 
QUALITY! 
QUALITY2 
LEVI 
(LEV2 in 4,6) 
TAX 
LIQ1 
(LIQ2 in 4,6) 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
OWN2 
OVER3 
OVER3* 
QUALITY1 
OVER3* 
QUALITY2 
OVER3* 
MTB 
CONSTANT 
Obs. 
F-test 
RZ 
Adj. R2 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+r- 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.037 0.033 0.034 0.032 
(4.88)*** (4.34)*** (4.30)*** (4.16)*** 
-0.020 -0.014 
(2.38)** (0.98) 
-0.176 -0.139 
(3.26)*** (3.02)*** 
0.715 0.329 0.779 0.327 
(5.83)*** (4.12)*** (6.72)*** (4.16)*** 
-0.019 -0.002 -0.025 -0.013 
(0.25) (0.45) (0.52) (0.28) 
-0.021 -0.329 -0.021 -0.327 
(3.82)*** (4.12)*** (3.62)*** (4.16)*** 
0.006 0.012 0.006 0.012 
(0.43) (0.80) (0.38) (0.80) 
-0.0003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.38) (1.61) (0.87) (1.58) 
-0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
(3.72)*** (3.32)*** (3.51)*** (3.10)*** 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(3. S5)*** (2.90)*** (3.22)*** (2.60)*** 
0.166 0.191 0.004 -0.030 
(0.34) (0.48) (0.09) (0.59) 
-0.044 -0.049 
(1.88)* (2.12)** 
0.207 0.191 
(1.14) (1.33) 
-0.015 0.006 -0.024 -0.003 
(0.71) (0.24) (1.16) (0.12) 
0.043 0.175 0.086 0.196 
(0.44) (1.54) (0.86) (1.71)* 
564 564 564 564 
27.16*** 31.88*** 25.61*** 29.16*** 
0.35 0.38 0.35 0.38 
0.32 0.35 0.32 0.35 
Notes: this table presents the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decision. All 
regressions include industry dummies. We use consistent heteroscedasticity standard errors. T-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. "M, '" and " indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.15: Robustness Check 5: the Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
OVER 3 and CSA 20051. I 
Independent 
Variables 
SIZE 
QUALITY1 
QUALITY2 
LEV1 
(LEV2 in 4,6) 
TAX 
LIQ1 
(LIQ2 in 4,6) 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
OWN2 
OVER3 
OVER3* 
QUALITYI 
OVER3* 
QUALITY2 
OVER3* 
MTB 
CONSTANT 
Obs. 
F-test 
R2 
Adj. R2 
Est 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+i- 
Debt Maturity (MAT ) 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.048 0.045 0.045 0.043 
(6.67)*** (4.34)*** (6.12)*** (5.96)*** 
-0.011 -0.007 
(2.01)** (1.64) 
-0.127 -0.099 
(2.84)*** (2.53)*** 
0.625 0.554 0.694 0.580 
(6.20)*** (6.39)*** (7.46)*** (7.15)*** 
0.018 0.030 0.006 0.018 
(0.25) (0.59) (0.10) (0.28) 
-0.018 (3.44)*** 
-0.285 -0.017 -0.273 
(3.79)*** (2.46)*** (3.62)*** 
-0.003 0.0004 0.003 0.001 
(0.30) (0.04) (0.33) (0.13) 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
(1.38) (1.61) (0.87) (1.58) 
-0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
(3.51)*** (3.11)*** (3.40)*** (3.00)*** 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(3.21)*** (2.66)*** (2.93)*** (2.60)*** 
-0.039 -0.062 -0.044 -0.070 
(0.80) (1.44) (1.00) (0.59) 
-0.039 -0.049 
(1.91)* (2.20)** 
0.125 0.120 
(1.14) (0.71) 
-0.001 0.015 -0.004 -0.012 
(0.05) (0.91) (0.35) (0.81) 
0.043 0.066 0.086 0.087 
(0.44) (0.64) (0.86) (0.81) 
564 564 564 564 
30.60*** 34.60*** 29.44*** 34.15*** 
0.40 0.43 0.40 0.43 
0.38 0.40 0.38 0.40 
Notes: this table presents the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decision. All 
regressions include industry dummies. We use consistent heteroscedasticity standard errors. T-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.16: Robustness Check 6: the Role of Managerial Overconfidence (OVER 3 and Pooled Regression) 
Independent 
Variables Est 
Debt Maturity (MAT) 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
SIZE 
QUALITYI 
QUALITY2 
LEV1 
(LEV2 in 4,6) 
TAX 
LIQ1 
(LIQ2 in 4,6) 
MTB 
AMAT 
OWN 
OWN2 
OVER3 
OVER3* 
QUALITY1 
OVER3* 
QUALITY2 
OVER3* 
MTB 
CONSTANT 
Obs. 
F-test 
R2 
Adj. R2 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
0.047 0.044 0.047 0.044 
(11.11)*** (10.80)*** (11.08)*** (10.66)*** 
-0.006 -0.005 
(1.33) (1.15) 
-0.005 0.004 
(0.18) (0.13) 
0.680 0.596 0.688 0.600 
(11.03)*** (11.94)*** (10.96)*** (11.89)*** 
-0.009 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008 
(0.69) (0.51) (0.74) (0.55) 
-0.017 -0.254 -0.017 -0.255 
(5.16)*** (5.89)*** (5.11)*** (5.86)*** 
0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 
(0.41) (1.64) (0.36) (1.61) 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.38) (1.61) (0.87) (1.58) 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(4.28)*** (4.36)*** (4.35)*** (4.34)*** 
0.00008 0.0001 0.00008 0.00007 
(3.61)*** (2.90)*** (3.81)*** (3.84)*** 
-0.005 -0.024 -0.008 -0.026 
(0.20) (1.01) (0.31) (1.08) 
-0.017 -0.018 
(2.30)** (2.58)** 
-0.008 -0.019 
(0.25) (0.64) 
-0.010 0.002 -0.011 0.001 
(1.10) (0.18) (1.15) (0.13) 
-0.077 0.023 -0.080 0.06 
(1.41) (0.38) (1.46) (0.06) 
1692 1692 1692 1692 
63.22*** 72.84*** 62.27*** 72.57*** 
0.38 0.40 0.37 0.39 
0.37 0.39 0.36 0.38 
Notes: this table presents the impact of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decision. All 
regressions include industry dummies and year dummies. We use consistent heteroscedasticity standard 
errors. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1. 
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5.1 Main Findings 
The objective of this thesis is to provide more insight into our understanding of 
the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate investment decisions and 
financial policies. Two main financial policies have been discussed in our 
analysis: cash holding policy and debt maturity policy. Using a large sample of 
UK listed firms, we show several findings of managerial overconfidence issues 
as follows. 
In Chapter 2, there are two important features in our analysis. First, we focus on 
the importance of financial constraints in determining the linkage between 
managerial overconfidence and investment cash-flow sensitivity. Since 
overconfident managers tend to overestimate the return of the project, they have 
more incentives to increase their investment with cash flow, especially in 
financially constrained firms. Specifically, we use film-specific characteristics 
such as size, leverage, dividend, age and cash holding to identify financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Meanwhile, we use executive directors' 
stock purchasing activities as the main proxy for managerial overconfidence 
rather than CEO's stock purchasing activities in Malmendier and Tate (2005). 
This is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the net amount of stock 
purchased by all executive directors in one firm is positive for certain duration 
during our sample period. It indicates this firm is a net buyer and possessing 
managerial overconfidence. Moreover, we use outsiders' perception of the 
executive directors as captured by press as an alternative proxy for managerial 
overconfidence. Second, we attempt to test whether different corporate 
governance mechanisms can influence the impact of managerial overconfidence. 
Our results show that the relationship between cash flow and investment is 
significantly positive in financially constrained fines in dividend, leverage, cash 
and age groups. It indicates that financially constrained firms tend to increase 
their investment with internal fund, while financially unconstrained fines do not. 
Moreover, managerial overconfidence can increase this positive sensitivity, 
especially in the financially constrained funs. This implies that overconfident 
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managers tend to increase more investment with cash flow than other non- 
overconfident managers do. Finally, we find that the positive effect of 
managerial overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially 
constrained firms is still significant in these firms with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as firms with low ratio of nonexecutive directors 
or low blockholders' ownership. However, the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially constrained 
firms become insignificant in constrained firms with high ratio of non-executive 
directors or high blockholders' ownershp. It is in line with the argument that the 
potential prescription for managerial overconfidence could be outsider 
monitoring (see Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Doukas and 
Petmezas, 2007), in which outsiders are capable of drawing managerial attention 
to information that may indicate that their perceptions are wrong and restrain 
overconfident managers' decision. 
In Chapter 3, we fu ther show the linkage between investment decisions and 
fines' cash holding policy emphasizing the role of financial constraints. It is 
presented in two stages. One is to analyze how investment decisions affect cash 
flow sensitivity of cash and the other is to discuss how investment decisions by 
overconfident managers influence this sensitivity. In the spirit of Almeida et al. 
(2004), we acknowledge that financial constraints can create a demand for 
hoarding cash and facilitate future investment. In addition, we argue that 
investment decisions can limit the available source for cash holding and increase 
cash flow fluctuations in the future in financially constrained firms, which lead 
cash holding to be more sensitive to cash flow. However, investment decisions 
by overconfident managers would reframe this linkage. This is because 
overconfident managers tend to believe that the benefits of their desired 
investment projects should be larger than the benefits of cash holding and thus 
they would rather invest than save cash out of cash flow. Hence the positive 
impact of investment on cash flow sensitivity of cash is no longer held in 
financially constrained firms with managerial overconfidence. 
The empirical findings reveal that firms with less dividend payouts and lower 
investment expenditure tend to hold more cash. In particular, investment can 
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increase cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially constrained firms. More 
importantly, our findings show that the positive relationship between cash flow 
sensitivity of cash and investment becomes less pronounced in financially 
constrained firms with overconfident managers. This indicates that overconfident 
managers in financially constrained firms are more disposed to increase their 
investment with cash flow but are reluctant to save cash out of cash flow. Finally, 
our dynamic panel data models show that UK firms adjust partially towards their 
target cash holding levels. And the adjustment speed is much slower in 
financially constrained firms than in financially unconstrained firms. This 
implies that financially unconstrained firms are able to quickly change their cash 
holding level by choosing among several alternative sources of financing. 
However, it would take longer for financially constrained firms to adjust to their 
target cash levels - either because of the relatively higher target levels or the 
costs of adjustment they entail. 
In Chapter 4, we aim to extend the empirical literature on the role of managerial 
overconfidence in determining debt maturity (long-term debt ratio). Specifically, 
we are concerned with the effects of managerial overconfidence on the 
relationship between firms' quality (or growth opportunity) and debt maturity. 
We control this effect by interacting managerial overconfidence with firms' 
quality variable (or growth opportunity). 
Our results show that firms with larger size, higher leverage ratio, worse quality 
and lower liquidity tend to issue more long-term debt. In addition, our results 
exhibit a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and debt 
maturity. When managerial ownership is at a low level, an increase in managerial 
ownership can align the conflicts between managers and shareholders and thus 
more short-term debt will be issued. However, when managerial ownership 
exceeds a certain level, the alignment effects of managerial ownership will be 
replaced by the entrenchment effects and thus more long-term debt will be issued. 
More importantly, managerial overconfidence can decrease the negative 
relationship between firms' quality and long-term debt. It seems that 
overconfident managers believe their firms have been undervalued, which leads 
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them to pay extra premium on long-term debt. Hence, they have more incentives 
to take advantage of short-term debt to signal their perceived quality. However, 
we do not find consistent evidence that the negative relationship between growth 
opportunity and debt maturity is greater in firms with managerial overconfidence. 
Finally, our results suggest that the negative impact of managerial 
overconfidence on the relationship between debt maturity and firms' quality 
varies with different corporate governance mechanisms. It is shown the negative 
impact of managerial overconfidence on the relationship between firms' quality 
and debt maturity is still pronounced in firms with weaker corporate governance 
mechanism such as those with lower ratio of non-executive directors or lower 
blockholders' ownership. And this negative impact changes to be insignificant 
when firms are with better corporate governance mechanisms (i. e. medium ratio 
of non-executive directors, medium level of blockholders' ownership). 
5.2 Conclusions and Implications 
The main conclusions and implications of this thesis can be summarized as 
follows. This thesis makes an attempt to explain and increase understanding the 
fact that managerial overconfidence could potentially play a significant role in 
corporate decision-making process. In our above analysis, the biased decisions 
by overconfident managers are clearly reflected to corporate investment, cash 
holding policy and debt maturity policy. 
Moreover, our results indicate that the impacts of managerial overconfidence are 
more likely to be found in firms with weak monitoring mechanisms (e. g. lower 
ratio of non-executive directors, lower blockholders' ownership) but they are less 
widespread in firms with strong monitoring mechanisms(e. g. higher ratio of non- 
executive directors, higher blockholders' ownership). It would provide possible 
hints for a potential prescription of managerial overconfidence. That is outsider 
investors should play an effective monitoring role and be active in disciplining 
rather than advisory. They may not only act as counsellors to oversee that 
manager run the business to maximize shareholders' value, but also make sure 
that they collect information to help managers to realize that some of their 
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perception might be wrong. Also, when managerial overconfidence has been 
documented as a recurrent distortion in one firm, outsiders should consider a 
more cautious way to select their management and set up a proper compensation 
contract. 
Finally, this thesis enriches economic understanding by incorporate human 
nature into corporate finance models. A comprehensive study of managerial 
biases needs an integration of many different schools of thoughts and fields, in 
which it includes scholars from the social sciences (psychology) and business 
administration such as management, marketing, finance and accounting. As we 
anticipated, a combination of standard corporate finance (e. g. agency theory and 
asymmetric information theory) and behaviour finance should yield a large crop. 
Thus, it would be desirable to find a common framework in order to analyze both 
problems and get predictions on common ground. A better understanding can 
help investors/management to recognize the mistakes of others to make a 
superior decision and assist investors/management to develop their efficient 
range of disciplines. 
5.3 Future Research 
Several lines for further research can be suggested. First, a natural extension of 
our work would be to investigate the implications of managerial overconfidence 
on other corporate policies. Dividend decision, for example, has been 
acknowledged as an efficient way to mitigate market frictions. Some have 
documented that dividend payouts can enhance firms' value and be treated as a 
signal of firms' future earnings. However, an increase in dividend payouts may 
result in passing up some investment projects. The possible question could be 
whether firms with managerial overconfidence tend to issue less dividend 
13 payouts. 
Second, we do not yet provide answers to such questions as whether managerial 
overconfidence effects are positive or negative with respect to firms' value, or if 
13 A possible re emice could be the study by Deatnmkh d al. (2009) 
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there exist an optimal level of managerial overconfidence. In our framework, we 
mainly attribute the downside effects of managerial overconfidence to the fact 
that overconfident managers tend to choose some negative NPV investments but 
positive in their perspective, which may hurt firm's value. However, there is a 
need to develop a more sophisticated mechanism of the linkage between 
managerial overconfidence and corporate decisions. A possible scenario is that 
overinvestment by overconfident managers may eliminate the underinvestment 
problem arising from the conflicts between managers and shareholders. If this is 
the case, the different degrees of managerial overconfidence have different 
impacts on firms' value. One way to think about answering this question is to 
consider the nonlinear relationship between overconfidence and firms' value. 
When managerial overconfidence is low or moderate, it could exert effects on 
aligning the conflicts between two different parties and make performance better. 
However, as managerial overconfidence increasing to extreme, the alignment 
effects could be dominated by overinvestment, which makes firms' value to be 
worse off. Some efforts have been concerned with this possible advantage of 
overconfidence but the existing literature is restricted to the theoretical models 
(see, e. g., Gervais and Goldstein, 2003; Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2006; Goel 
and Thakor, 2007; Hackbarth, 2007). More importantly, in this process, the 
measurement of managerial overconfidence should be developed rather than a 
dummy variable so far, which no longer can control the non-linear impacts of 
managerial overconfidence14. 
Finally, there is a need to investigate the determinants of managerial 
overconfidence. Some observable personal characteristics would reinforce 
individual overconfidence. For example, managers with successful histories in 
career/education may think that they are more experienced and are more likely to 
be overconfident in their own judgements and overestimate the positive 
outcomes of their decisions (Gervais and Odean, 2001). In addition, Barber and 
Odean (2001) find that gender can help in predicting a person's degree of 
overconfidence in that men are prone to be overconfident than women. Their 
results reveal that females not only trade less but also face lower trading costs 
"A possible refimce can be the study by Campell et al. (2009) 
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than their male counterpart. Finally, the learning objection may also lead to a 
positive impact. Learning from experiences also means irrational managers will 
learn from their experience to be rational. This process can be made by 
considering the linkage between the outcomes of previous performance, 
education, career and the corporate financial policies in firms with overconfident 
managers. And a satisfactory answer to this question will improve our 
measurement of managerial overconfidence as well. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Industry Index 
Industry No. Description 
1 Automotive, Aviation and Transportation 
2 Beverage, Tobacco 
3 Building and construction 
4 Chemicals, health care and pharmaceuticals 
5 Computer, electrical& electronic equipment 
6 Diversified industry 
7 Engineering, Mining, Metallurgy and Oil and Gas Exploration 
8 Food Producer, Processors and Farming and Fishing 
9 Leisure, Hotels, Restaurants and Pubs 
10 Other Business 
11 
Paper, Forestry, Packaging, Printing and Publishing 
Photography 
12 Retailers, wholesalers and distributor 
13 Services 
14 Textile, leather, clothing & footwear and furniture 
15 Utility 
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Appendix B: OLS and IV Estimates for Panel Data 
Here we provide a brief review of OLS and IV techniques (see Greene, 2000) 
The basic linear regression is a departure point of empirical analysis. There are 
six assumptions about this model: 
1) linearity; the model can be written as: y, = x ß, + xt2,82 +"""+ xurjBK + s, ; 
2) full rank; 
3) exdogeneity of independent variables: Els, X j, X j2 """ x1K 
I 
=0; 
4) homoscedasticity and nonautocorrelation: each disturbance s, has the same 
finite variance .2 and is uncorrelated with other disturbance sj ; 
5) Exogenously generated data and; 
6) the disturbances are normally distributed. 
Panel data is a dataset which combine time series and cross sections. This is quite 
common in economics. The fundamental advantage of a panel dataset is that it 
provides greater flexibility in modelling differences in behaviour across 
individuals (firms). 
The basic framework of a panel data set can be written as: 
Yu =a, +ß'zu+sa 
In this model, yp represents the dependent variable for cross-section unit i at 
time t where 1-1, ......... n and t=1, ........., T. x,, represent a matrix of explanatory 
variables for unit I at time t. This matrix includes K explanatory variables but not 
includes constant term. a, represents the individual effect which is constant over 
time t but specific to each individual (i). 
If a, is to be the same across all individuals, then OLS can provide consistent 
and efficient estimates of a and P. However, if a, is unobserved but correlated 
with the explanatory variables z , then the OLS estimator of ß will be biased 
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and inconsistent as a consequence of an omitted variable. In this instance, we can 
use fixed effects approach. This approach takes ai to be a group specific 
constant term in the regression model. And the above equation can be rewritten 
as: 
Yr=ia, +ß'X, +a, 
or 
yi 
y: 
y. J 
or 
X, 
X2 
LX. J 
ß+ 1i °::: °1 0i0 
a, 
az 
00"""i II a 
EI 
E2 
+ 
LE. J 
y=[X di d2 """ d. 
tall 
+8 
where d, is a dummy variable indicating the ith unit. This model is usually 
referred to as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model. If n is small 
enough, then the model can be estimated by OLS. 
On the other hand, if a, is unobserved and uncorrelated with xk , then 
OLS will 
produce consistent estimates of ß but the standard errors will be understated. In 
this instance, random effects approach can be used. This approach takes a, to be 
a group specific disturbance, similar to se except that for each group. In other 
words, random effects model is to deal with the fact that T observations on n 
individuals are not the same as observations on nT different individuals. And the 
equation can be rewritten as: 
Yö=Q'+u, '+ßýZk+Bü . 
The model can be estimated by a feasible generalized least square (GLS). The 
GLS model is quite straightforward : 
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First , it derives an estimator of the covariance matrix of the error term. 
We 
assume that 
E[st, IX]=E[EI; 
I" 
]=0, 
L[E, 2IX]=a6, 
E ý; IX]_ aä , 
E[süujlX]=0 for all i, t andj, 
L[sr , sj, (X1=0 if t *sori*j, 
E[u, ujIXI=O ifi*j. 
Let j7u =Er, +ur and 1qr 
Qü + Qä O'ä ... Qa 
22+22 
E=EýýtýrýýJ=QsIT+Qü11'= ý" Qw 
ýa ... Qa 
QR Qý . aw + Qä ý 
and the disturbance covariance matrix for the Bill nT observations is: 
[a oo """ 01 
v= 
0 SZ 0 """ 0 
000 n] 
=I, ®SZ 
Then the generalized least squares estimator of 0 is 
"a 
ä= (X'Llý`X)ý1X'i24y ! (ZXýfl-`XJ-'(LX, n-iyý) 1-1 1=1 
In order to computer this estimate, we need only find t-12 , which is 
tl-1'2 =_! _ I- 
T VT where 8 =1- ° or, Qs f ýQý 
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Then the transformation of y, and Xi for GLS is 
Al - ey,. 
-inyý 
1 y, 2 -07A. 
Qa 
AT - 
ey,. 
Thus, for GLS, it is essential to know 9. If the variance components are known, 
then GLS can be easily computed. However, when the variance components are 
unknown, we must estimate the disturbance variances and then use GLS 
approach. 
Heteroscedasticity occurs when the variances of regression disturbances are not 
constant across observations, such as 
VarýE,, ý=oý; =Q2wi i=1, """, n 
E[Be'IX] = o=SZ = o= 
aý oo """ o 
0 Q%Z U """ 
000... lvý J 
Qi 00 """ 
QZ 0 """ 
Ij 
000... QR2 
0 
Heteroscedasticity only affects the elements on the principal diagonal of 
Var(e) and disturbances are still assumed to be pairwise uncorrelated. 
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, OLS estimator is still unbiased, consistent 
and asymptotically normally distribution. But it is inefficient compared to GLS. 
In GLS, it consists of the regression of a transformed y vector on a transformed 
X matrix, gives a best linear unbiased estimator. However, OLS regresses 
untransformed variables, produces linear unbiased but not minimum variance 
estimators. 
Meanwhile, OLS coefficient standard errors are incorrect, and the conventional 
test statistics based on them are invalid The correct variance matrix for the OLS 
coefficient vector is 
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var(b) = El(b - ß)(b - ß')] 
= E[(alz)-'zlnalz(alz)-1] 
= Q2(a'a)-` X'SZa(z'a)-' 
2 -+ 
n 
=a 1(a'a) 1(i'ý) 1(a'a) 
nn ]... 1 
But the conventional formula only calculates part of this correct expression, 
which is QZ (x' x)-` . Therefore, the conventional test statistics are invalidated. 
However, White(1980) has shown that it is still possible to obtain an appropriate 
estimator for the variance of the OLS estimator. And the covariance matrix of b 
is (X'X)-1[X (c2fl)XJX'X)-1, in which X'Q2flX can be rewritten as 
ýý 
-i 
a; 0 
.. -o QZ X, vZSZX = x, xz ... xA 
:.. 
0 """ 
0 """ 
000 
o .. 
"" 0 
ffR2 
X, 
x2 
X. 
... 1 
n 2' 
= 
r=1 
The White estimator replace the unknown o by ee , where e, denote the OLS 
residuals, y, - x, b. And 
est. var(b) = (X, X)-1)Cr2AX(X, XF1 
where o2= diage2 
} 
This provides a consistent estimator of the variance matrix for the OLS 
coefficient vector and the square roots of the elements on the principal diagonal 
of est. var(b) are the estimated standard errors of the OLS coefficients. 
Autocorrelated disturbances are found in time-series data when the disturbances 
are autocorrelated in that variance around the regression is not independent from 
one period to the next. Suppose in the model 
Yr - ßx, + Ut 
Ur "r-1 + ö1, H<1 
_1 
I. ._ .9I 
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where E(e) =0, E(ee) = Q2I and ys = E(srsý+s) s=0, ±1, ±2, " 
Then var(u) = QW 2 and variance matrix of the disturbance vector is 1-gyp 
var(u) = 
Yo y, ... y-I 
Ti To ... yn-2 
Yn-1 Y_2 To i 
= Q2 
i OP 
ý1 
... /nR-1 
... 
Y//f'n-2 
4)n-1 ýn-2 ... 1 
OLS estimation in the presence of nonstochastic X and autocorrelated 
disturbances can provide unbiased consistent estimators but inefficient estimation 
and invalid inference procedures. The OLS estimate of f is 
b= r=1 Yrxr 
n2 
t=1 
Xr 
And correct sampling variance of this coefficient is 
Qý r2 Xr Xr-i º3 Xr Xr-2 Xix" 
var(b)_ 2x 
(1+2, 
p n2 +2qß2 nz+... 
+Ipn-1 n 2: 2 
r=1 Xr 
2: 
r=1 
Xr r=1 Xr rO1 
Xr 
ý: is the conventional but incorrect expression of var(b). If the regressor 
=1Xr 
variable is not autocorrelated then the term in brackets are negligible. However, 
if the regressors and disturbances are both positively autocorrelated, the 
conventional standard error is likely to underestimate the true standard errors. 
OLS is inefficient comparing to GLS. That is because: 
var(bors) = Q« (z'Q''z 
- 
Qý 
X 
1-ý2 
- ýý 
, x; 1+ý2 -2Q7ýra2xrxt-1/ýraxr -9Z(xiZ +xý)/ 
var(b,,,. ) 
'- 
1-41 2 
var(b) (1 + V2 - 2qrx1 + 2, or) 
2 
t=1 
xt 
r is the sample, first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the regressors. 
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Furthermore, if the regression is a combination of a lagged dependent variables 
and an autocorrelated disturbance, OLS will be inconsistent. 
Suppose the model 
Yr=flJ'r-2+ur, IM <1 
U, =gxt, -1+s,, 
H <1 
OLS estimate of fl is: 
b= YrYr-t =+ 
Yr-ýur 
2 
Yr-t Yr-1 
p1ixn(1 Yt-1ur) 
Thus, plimb =, 6 +1z 
plim( 
n 
ýYý-ý ) 
The consistence of b depends on plim( 
1z 
y, _, u, 
) . Since 
Yº-1 = ur-1 + et-2 +N 
tut-3 + ... then, 
Plim(1 F, Yr-tur) = Va. ' + 
PF2O2. + ßYaM +... _ 
ý" Thus, OLS cannot be 
n 1-ßý 
used in such a case. 
Finally, under the classical assumptions, OLS estimators are best linear unbiased. 
However, if the assumption of the independence of regressors from the 
disturbance term, OLS estimators are biased and inconsistent. 
Suppose the observed x can be represented by true value z and a random 
measurement error v, that is , 
ý x=x+v 
Then OLS estimator of fl is 
b =1M _ 
x(fiE +u) 
_ ß1-f + 
LN 
Ex2 Ex2 Ex2 ýx2 
Plimb 
r-, 2 
ý- 
Gr 
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Thus OLS is biased and inconsistent. 
A consistent estimator may be obtained by the use of instrumental variables (IV). 
That is we can find a data matrix Z in which the variable in Z are correlated 
with those in X and Z is uncorrelated with the disturbance term. 
Multiplying the basic model by Z' gives 
Z'y = Z'Xß+ Z's and Var(Z'E) = QZ(Z'Z), 
If plim T 
X's *0 
Then b,, = (X'Z(Z'Z)-' Z'X)-' X'Z(Z'Z)-' Z'y 
Let PZ = Z(VzYlz' 
bry=ß+ (! x'xj'(! x'e) 
We find that plim(b, v) = P. Thus, the IV estimator is consistent. 
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Appendix C: OLS and Fama-MacBeth Estimates for Panel Data 
In a study by Peterson (2009), he shows that both OLS and the Fama-MacBeth 
standard errors are biased when firm and time effects are present in the data. The 
proof is as follows: 
The standard regression of a panel data set is : 
Yr'XnN+scir 
It is known that OLS standard errors are unbiased when the residuals are 
independent and identically distributed. When the residuals are correlated across 
observations, OLS standard errors can be biased. For example, 
±xvfY, 
t 
A_ i=1 r=1 _ Q+ 1=1 r=1 /' OLS -NT !'NT 
and 
EE x xi t=1 t=1 1=1 r=1 
INT 
NZýF i=1 f=1 
AsY(Bozs -ß) =p lim N-+O 
Vhvd 
=plim N--ºao 
vbw 
NN T 
L. 
ýX zýz 
Nz a tr 
H t-I 
x 
_N(TorXor6XTaXr2_Qx2 NT 
The above results are based on the assumption that the errors are independent (i. e. 
the covariance of residuals is zero) and identically distributed (i. e. homoscedastic 
errors). However, the independent assumption is always violated in panel data. 
For example, if X,, and ä, are correlated across the observation of the same 
firms but are independent across firms. That is: 
1 i=j, t=s 
corr(X, X,. ) = pX 1= j, t *s 
0 t* j 
and 
NT \-Z1 
)21 ýýXý2 
t=1 t=1 Xusu 
N2 
 
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1 i=j, t=s 
COl7'(8it, 8j. ) = pa i=j, t *s 
0 iý j 
Then, 
Asv(äozs - Q) =p lim N-ºao 
T, ytxd 
=plim N-), m 
ford 
=p lim N-iao 
TJßzd 
INT 
Nz 
t=1 r=1 
Xiter, 
NT -2 
X; 
ý_ý ýý 
) 
NZ 
1NT 
NZ 
ý ýXitýir 
! =1 r--i 
/NT ý_Z 1 
tt xi2 t=1 t=1 
N2 
\I 
1Nr r-1 r 
NZ 
ý ýXaSa +7ýXrrXkgrrEr, 
J 
/NT \-21 
ýýxtt i=1 i=1 
N2 
\/ 
Y 
=N 
(TQgQB 
+T (T -1)PxazPQä XTa'x )-2 = ýN. j, (T + (T -1)PxPe ) x 
Hence, the OLS standard error will be underestimated when px and p` are non- 
zero. 
An alternative way to estimate the regression coefficients and standard errors 
when the residuals are not independent is the Fama-MacBeth approach (Fama 
and MacBeth, 1973). In this approach, the researcher runs T cross sectional 
regressions. 
The average of the T estimates is the coefficient estimate: 
lBýat 
ý 
-ý 
r "_1 r 
TT ýý 
IN\/N\ 
ZXaYu 
1 rr 7, Xº, £u 1 
NN -Qý, ýf. ý 
1=N 
EX2 
!r T 
r_1 ýX2 
ar 
1=1 1=1 
And the variance of estimates is : 
ww 
S(Bw 
i 
2 
r'°u 
)7 ý 
T-1 
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And the asymptotic variance of estimates is 
T-1 T 
rý_ Asy. Var(ýB ) 
2ý 2: Asy. Cov(h /B, ) 
Asy. Var(ftFm) =7F Asy. Va ý+ ''` ". '+' z 
t_, TT 
= 
Asy. YTr(ý, )+ T( T2 1) Asy. Cov(. Bs, IB, ) 
And 
plim iýin ný 
Rsy. c, ovlP,, Pr1= Nýoo lit 
-itX118il'11tt8t3 
XXý 
ýý 
N N N II N 
\J 
_ (a2 )-2 
P lim 
XN -+ o0 
INVN 'N1 
1Xüs, 
t 
II ýýýeis 
t=1 t=1 
N II N 
/\ /\ / 
Lk A Ji 
N 
ý xü BüXýýý 222 
(Q2 )-2 P 
"M 
(CF2 )-2 PxaxP`Q6 - 
PxPaas 
x N-4 co N2xN Na X2 
Finally, 
ý 
Asy. Yar(ßý )= Asy. Yar(ýBý )T 
(T -1) ýý 
1, + L, 2 
Asy. Coý. "P,, 
) 
= 
a, 2 + 
TT (T_1) PxPýaý 
= (T + (T -1)PxP, ) TaX T2 Naý a2xNT 
As we can see, the Fama-MacBeth standard errors are biased in exactly the same 
way as the OLS estimates. In other words, Fama-MacBeth standard errors do 
account for the cross correlation (i. e. et s, ) but are not robust to serial 
correlation (i. e. ak Ar. ). In OLS and Fama-MacBeth, the magnitude of the bias is a 
function of the serial correlation of both the independent variable and the residual 
within a cluster and the number of time periods per firm. 
T 
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